Are Culpability and Eternal Punishment Coherent Under an Unrequested and Undesired Sin Nature?

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Thesis. Eternal condemnation for actions that arise inevitably from an unrequested human disposition fails the control conditions for culpability and violates proportional sanction, so it cannot be justified as the response of a just and compassionate deity.

This paper develops a rigorous case against eternal punishment under the assumption—widely taught in Christian traditions—that humans possess an inherited inclination to sin that no one entirely overcomes. After reconstructing the core argument from a popular-level analogy, we locate the strongest philosophical pressure points: (i) whether responsibility requires genuine avoidability, in light of Frankfurt-style counterexamples and "guidance control" accounts (Fischer & Ravizza, 1998; Frankfurt, 1969; McKenna & Coates, 2019); (ii) whether proportionality permits infinite sanction for finite, often trivial acts (Husak, 2021; Ryberg, 2021; von Hirsch, 1993); and (iii) whether restorative aims could coherently replace retributive permanence (Zehr, 2015). Even if some residual responsibility survived under guidance-control, a species-wide, guaranteed failure implies degraded ownership of the mechanism and cannot rationally ground *eternal* condemnation. Moreover, any super-linear offense-to-sanction scaling remains bounded for finite acts; eternal torment still yields an infinite severity ratio. We also survey theological alternatives to eternal conscious torment (ECT), including annihilationism (Fudge, 2011) and reparative theodicies responsive to horrendous evils (Adams, 1999). The result is a

structured critique that preserves logical rigor while engaging central doctrinal defenses ("law on the heart," satisfaction and infinite offense; *The Holy Bible: New Revised Standard Version*, 1989; of Canterbury, 1998). We conclude that eternal condemnation for inevitable dispositions lacks a rational warrant.

Introduction

This essay addresses a focused question: *Can humans be rationally deemed culpable—and justly subjected to eternal punishment—for actions that arise inevitably from an unrequested and undesired disposition?* The motivating intuition is simple: blame presupposes the agent *could* have done otherwise or, minimally, that the relevant control conditions were satisfied for attributing the action to the agent in the right way. If sin is inevitable for all humans, and even the smallest instance merits eternal torment, then two problems emerge. First, the link between control and culpability becomes strained. Second, proportionality appears to collapse when finite, often minor, acts trigger infinite sanction.

Introducing the Barking Puppies Analogy. Imagine an owner who adores puppies but imposes a rule: *any puppy that ever barks will be confined to a dark basement forever*. Barking is a natural, highly probable behavior for puppies across normal lifespans. Despite training, exposure to ordinary stimuli (doorbells, sirens, startle responses) makes at least one bark effectively inevitable for every puppy. The rule is perfectly public; the owner attempts rudimentary training; but the consequence remains *eternal confinement* for a single bark. Our pretheoretical judgment is that such a regime is unjust: it penalizes an *inevitable* expression of an *unchosen* disposition with an *infinite* sanction and does nothing to rehabilitate or restore. In Appendix A, we specify this analogy rigorously (control and notice conditions, inevitability modeling, proportionality assessment) and map each element to the theological case.

Analogy Map: Puppies ↔ Humans	
Barking puppies	Humans with an inherited sin disposition
Owner's rule (one bark ⟹ forever basement)	ECT for a single transgression
Barking: natural & nearly inevitable	Sin: unrequested, inevitable disposition
Training/commands	Moral law/teaching (general or scriptural)
Eternal confinement (no restoration)	Eternal torment (no rehabilitation)

We formalize the tension, confront live objections from responsibility theory, analyze proportionality, and consider restorative alternatives.[1]

Responsibility, Avoidability, and Control

A common principle states: *culpability requires the agent could have done otherwise*. Frankfurt (1969) challenged this "Principle of Alternate Possibilities" (PAP) by describing cases where a counterfactual intervener ensures an agent would act the same way if needed, yet the agent acts on their own reasons without intervention—and seems responsible. If PAP is false, a defender of eternal punishment might infer that responsibility persists even if one could not have done otherwise.

However, Frankfurt's lesson is better read as relocating responsibility from *alternative possibilities* to *the right kind of control*, such as "guidance control" and reasons-responsiveness (Fischer & Ravizza, 1998; McKenna & Coates, 2019). On these views, responsibility requires that one's behavior issues from a reasons-responsive mechanism the agent owns. This becomes crucial for doctrines positing an *inevitable* sin disposition. If a global fact about human nature ensures every human will (at some point)

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[1] We speak in terms of rational standards of blame, sanction, and institutional fairness; the argument does not presuppose moral realism.

perform the disfavored action, the question is whether the remaining control conditions suffice to justify *eternal* condemnation.

> **Conditions for Culpability (Quick Reference)**
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> 1. **Control:** Action issues from an agent-owned, reasons-responsive mechanism.
> 2. **Alternatives (disputed):** PAP is not necessary on semicompatibilist views, but *some* control conditions still are.
> 3. **Notice:** Awareness of norms/stakes (distinct from control).
> 4. **Proportionality:** Sanction scales with offense gravity.

Inevitability by Nature

Suppose: (i) humans have an unrequested disposition D making transgression T inevitable across a normal lifespan; (ii) no human in fact avoids T; (iii) sanction is *infinite* in duration or severity. The first worry is *attribution*: if D functionally guarantees T, the degree to which the action is attributable in a control-relevant sense is lowered. Even semicompatibilists must explain why eternal condemnation tracks such lowered control.

The second worry is *distribution*: if *every* human transgresses, sanction ceases to track meaningful differences in agency-quality and begins to track mere species membership plus exposure to ordinary triggers.

Steel-Manning the "Unrequested Yet Culpable" View

Guidance-control theorists contend that agents can be responsible even without access to alternate possibilities if their actions issue from a reasons-responsive mechanism they own (Fischer & Ravizza, 1998). Grant, for the sake of argument, that some culpability may persist despite an unrequested, undesirable disposition. Two constraints remain. First, when failure is *species-wide and guaranteed*, ownership is practically degraded: responsibility attributions become coarse-grained and less sensitive to individual control.

Second, even granting residual culpability, *eternal* condemnation is not thereby justified; proportionality and sanction aims still rule it out.

> **Why Proportionality Breaks with ECT**
>
> Finite offenses, even if serious, remain bounded. An *eternal* sanction is unbounded in duration (and typically construed as maximal in intensity). Any finite gravity-to-severity schedule yields a divergent ratio when mapped to eternal torment, defeating proportionality-based justification.

Proportionality and the Problem of Infinite Sanction

In sanction theory, proportionality demands that penalties scale with the seriousness of the offense (von Hirsch, 1993). Contemporary debates show this is nontrivial—some retributive theories struggle to vindicate proportionality, risking systematic over-punishment (Husak, 2021; Ryberg, 2021). Whatever view one adopts, the pair of claims—that (a) a single trivial transgression merits (b) infinite torment—faces a severe proportionality deficit. Formally:

$$\text{If Severity}(S) \propto \text{Gravity}(G), \text{ then } \frac{\text{Severity(ECT)}}{\text{Gravity(finite } T)} \to \infty \quad \text{(disproportion).} \quad (1)$$

Annotation: If sanction severity is meant to track offense gravity, assigning an unbounded (eternal) penalty to a bounded (finite, often minor) act yields an infinite ratio, which violates any finite proportionality schedule. This holds even if gravity scales *super-linearly* with the status of the offended party; for any finite transgression, the ratio to an eternal sanction still diverges.

Public Policy Analogy: Genetic-Condition Sanctions

Consider a legislature that criminalizes symptomatic outbursts caused by a degenerative genetic condition and mandates life-long solitary confinement for a *single* unpreventable episode. Even if the policy announced the rule in advance (notice), it would

fail control and proportionality: the triggering behavior is functionally inevitable for those with the condition, and the penalty is unbounded relative to a bounded event. By parity, ECT for inevitable sin fails the same two tests.

Defenders sometimes appeal to "infinite offense" against an infinitely worthy deity, associated historically with satisfaction theories (Anselm) (of Canterbury, 1998). Yet this move imports a controversial value metric and still leaves open whether *eternal conscious torment* is the uniquely rational response compared to annihilation or restorative processes (Fudge, 2011; Zehr, 2015). Even if some augmented censure is fitting when the victim's status is elevated, it does not follow that infinite temporal extension is the only or best-fitting response on proportionality grounds.

Awareness, Guidance, and the "Law on the Heart"

Biblical appeals to an innate norm sensitivity (e.g., "law written on their hearts," Rom 2:14–15) are often used to ground accountability (*The Holy Bible: New Revised Standard Version*, 1989). Even granting pervasive norm awareness, two distinctions matter:

(a) **Specific content vs. generic conscience.** A general sense of "ought" does not equal informed assent to a specific doctrinal system with specified infinite stakes.

(b) **Control conditions vs. notice conditions.** Awareness that T is disfavored differs from having the control conditions needed to avoid T when D renders T inevitable.

On standard responsibility theories, notice is insufficient; control conditions do the crucial work (Fischer & Ravizza, 1998; McKenna & Coates, 2019). If control is degraded by inevitability, appeals to generic conscience underdetermine eternal sanction.

From Retributive Permanence to Restorative Aims

If sanction aims include prevention, rehabilitation, and reintegration, perpetual torment uniquely frustrates those aims (Zehr, 2015). The structure of *eternity* removes prospects for character change, reconciliation, and community repair. Alternatives within

Christian theology—e.g., conditional immortality/annihilationism (Fudge, 2011)—and outside theology (restorative justice) supply options that align penalties with constructive ends without entailing infinite disutility.

The Problem of Heavenly Knowledge

A further downstream tension arises if perfect bliss in heaven coexists with awareness of loved ones in eternal torment. Proposed solutions (full endorsement of ECT from a "divine point of view," distraction by infinite goods, or forgetfulness/insulation) each carries costs: empathy inversion, engineered ignorance, or identity erosion. None seems to enhance the rational case for ECT; rather, they compound doubts about its coherence as a perfected order of love and understanding. Philosophical treatments of horrendous evils amplify this pressure by centering the experiential weight of suffering in any adequate theodicy (Adams, 1999). Thus, if ECT requires empathy inversion or memory surgery, it also undermines the claimed goods of perfected community and reconciliation.

Objections and Replies

Objection: PAP is false; responsibility survives inevitability.

Reply. Frankfurt shows that *some* cases of inability to do otherwise are compatible with responsibility when agents act through their own reasons-responsive mechanisms (Fischer & Ravizza, 1998; Frankfurt, 1969). The present case alleges something stronger: a species-wide, unrequested disposition that guarantees failure at least once for every agent. That broad inevitability undercuts fine-grained attribution and raises the question why *eternal* sanction, rather than calibrated censure, tracks such diminished control.

Objection: Offense against an infinite deity warrants infinite punishment (Anselm).

Steel-man. On a satisfaction model, offenses against an infinitely worthy God inherit an infinite disvalue; finite creatures cannot offset this debt, hence the need for either infinite satisfaction (Christ) or the agent's own unending punishment.

Reply. (i) **Control gap:** Mapping inevitability to infinite sanction ignores degraded control conditions. (ii) **Form-of-sanction gap:** Even if offense disvalue scales with divine status, it underdetermines that *eternal torment*—rather than annihilation or finite, reparative measures—is uniquely fitting. (iii) **Proportionality gap:** For bounded acts, any schedule that assigns an unbounded penalty yields divergence (Eq. 1), conflicting with censure theories that aim to communicate calibrated condemnation (von Hirsch, 1993). (iv) **Teleology gap:** ECT forecloses restoration-oriented goods (Zehr, 2015).

Objection: Mercy is available; ECT only befalls those who freely reject it.

Reply. If the same unrequested disposition that makes transgression inevitable also degrades agents' capacity to apprehend or embrace the offered remedy, then the pathway to avoidance piggybacks on the very impairment in question. Responsibility for rejecting mercy is then entangled with the inherited disposition, reintroducing the control problem.

Formal Core (Logical Skeleton)

Let $N(x)$ be "x has an unrequested, inevitable disposition D toward T"; $C(x)$ be "x satisfies the control conditions sufficient for eternal condemnation for T"; J be "eternal condemnation is a just sanction".

(P1) $\forall x\,[N(x) \rightarrow \neg C(x)]$ *(Inevitability by unrequested disposition undermines sufficient control.)*

$$(2)$$

(P2) $\forall x\,[\neg C(x) \rightarrow \neg J]$ *(Without sufficient control, eternal condemnation is not a just sanction.)*

$$(3)$$

(P3) $\forall x\, N(x)$ *(All humans possess D making T inevitable.)*   (4)

(C1) $\Rightarrow \neg J$ *(Therefore, eternal condemnation is not a just sanction.)*   (5)

Annotation: P1 encodes the control requirement; P2 links control to sanction

legitimacy; P3 states the theological premise of universality. The conclusion follows by modus ponens and generalization. Even if one weakens P1 to allow some residual responsibility under guidance-control, the proportionality and sanction-aim arguments independently rule out ECT.

Conclusion

The core question pursued here is whether eternal torment—or even genuine culpability—is rationally defensible if every human being inherits an unrequested and undesired disposition that guarantees transgression. The analysis has revealed several converging difficulties for the doctrine of eternal conscious torment (ECT). First, on responsibility theory, inevitability by nature undermines the control conditions that typically ground culpability. Even granting compatibilist concessions that allow for responsibility without alternate possibilities, a species-wide guarantee of failure degrades ownership to the point where eternal condemnation cannot be proportionately anchored. Second, proportionality theory shows that mapping finite, often trivial transgressions onto infinite sanction yields an infinite disanalogy, even if one accepts super-linear scaling in offense gravity. Third, the aims of just sanction—deterrence, rehabilitation, restoration—are systematically frustrated by eternal torment, which forecloses reconciliation and repair. Fourth, the problem of heavenly knowledge underscores that ECT not only challenges justice but also corrodes the coherence of heavenly bliss, requiring empathy inversion, distraction, or forgetfulness to shield the redeemed from awareness of endless suffering.

Taken together, these threads indicate that eternal torment fails as a rationally defensible sanction. But the critique extends further: if inevitability erodes the very conditions under which blame can be meaningfully assigned, then culpability itself becomes dubious under such a framework. This means that not only is eternal punishment indefensible, but the assignment of guilt for inevitable acts is already undermined at the root.

At most, alternative theologies such as annihilationism or restorative models could preserve proportionality and sanction aims without collapsing into absurdity. On balance, eternal conscious torment—and indeed the very premise of culpability for inevitable dispositions—lacks a rational warrant. The doctrine dissolves under both responsibility theory and proportionality analysis, leaving in its wake the need for either radical theological revision or the rejection of eternal punishment altogether.

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Appendix A

Appendix A: The Barking Puppies Analogy

A.1 Scenario Specification

Agents. A set of puppies $\{p_1, \ldots, p_n\}$ with a species-typical disposition to bark.

Rule. (One-bark policy) If any puppy ever emits a bark event, it is confined to a dark basement forever.

Owner Actions. Basic training and posted commands (*Do not bark*).

Environment. Ordinary stimuli (doorbells, sirens, other dogs) occur intermittently and unpredictably.

Sanction. Eternal confinement (no rehabilitation, no prospect of restoration).

A.2 Control vs. Notice Conditions

Notice: Puppies can be trained to associate cues with silence, but their cognitive limitations constrain semantic understanding of the rule's gravity and *eternal* stakes (analogous to generic conscience vs. doctrinal specifics).

Control: Even with training, the disposition and environment make a first bark highly probable. Control is degraded where stimulus-response pathways are biologically ingrained and occasionally override training.

A.3 Modeling Inevitability

Let bark events for each p_i be a point process with baseline intensity $\lambda_i > 0$ modulated by random stimuli. The probability of *no bark* over time horizon T under a Poisson approximation is

$$P(\text{no bark in } [0, T]) \approx e^{-\lambda_i T}.$$

Thus, for any $\lambda_i > 0$, as $T \to \infty$, $P(\text{no bark}) \to 0$ and $P(\text{at least one bark}) \to 1$. Training may reduce λ_i but, absent $\lambda_i = 0$, *inevitability* holds across a normal lifespan. Hence, the policy functionally guarantees eternal confinement for every puppy.

Annotation: The inevitability claim is *structural*, not empirical bravado: for any positive hazard rate, first-event probability tends to 1 over long horizons.

A.4 Proportionality Assessment

Define gravity $G(b)$ for a single bark b as finite (bounded nuisance). Define sanction severity $S(\cdot)$ where $S(\text{eternal confinement})$ is unbounded in duration. Any finite proportionality schedule $S \propto f(G)$ with $f(G(b)) < \infty$ is defeated by mapping $b \mapsto \infty$. As in Eq. (1), the resulting ratio diverges:

$$\frac{S(\text{eternal confinement})}{f(G(b))} \to \infty.$$

A.5 Sanction Aims

Deterrence: A single-bark trigger plus eternity is not marginally deterrent relative to substantial finite penalties in creatures with limited foresight.

Rehabilitation: Eternity forecloses behavioral improvement.

Restoration: Permanent isolation impedes reintegration; the owner's professed love is practically undermined.

A.6 Theological Mapping

- Puppies $\leftrightarrow$ Humans; barking disposition $\leftrightarrow$ inherited sin disposition.
- Owner's rule $\leftrightarrow$ Divine sanction scheme (ECT).
- Training/commands $\leftrightarrow$ Moral law / conscience / revelation.
- Baseline hazard $\lambda_i > 0 \leftrightarrow$ Structural inevitability ("all have sinned").
- Eternal confinement $\leftrightarrow$ Eternal conscious torment (no rehabilitation).

Claim: If inevitability plus unbounded sanction is unjust in the toy model, its theological analog inherits the same rational defects unless disanalogies (perfect understanding, perfect control, non-inevitability) are independently defended—but these are precisely the disputed points.

A.7 Addressing Common Pushbacks

(1) Better training eliminates culpability concerns. Training lowers the hazard rate λ but does not eliminate inevitability unless $\lambda = 0$. For any $0 < \lambda < \infty$, Pr(a first bark by time T) $\to 1$ as $T \to \infty$. Thus, the regime effectively converts a probabilistic but near-certain first event into an *infinite* sanction. If justice requires that penalties track *individualized control*, then a policy insensitive to the residual hazard (and to startle/trigger conditions) is overbroad and fails proportionality.

(2) Some puppies never bark; the rule is therefore fair. Heterogeneity in λ does not rescue the rule. First, the policy is *ex ante* designed such that *most* subjects (those with $\lambda > 0$ over normal lifespans) will trigger the infinite penalty. Second, even if a measure-zero subset happens not to bark, a sanctioning system is not justified by its accidental mercy to outliers. Third, the theological analogue typically denies genuine exceptions (universal sin), so the "silent puppy" case is not available to defenders of the doctrine.

(3) The first bark is willful defiance, not startle/reflex. The model distinguishes reflexive/startle barks from volitional barks by conditioning on stimulus type. The one-bark policy does not; it imposes the same infinite penalty regardless of whether the triggering event manifests impaired control (startle) or ordinary disobedience. A just system must be sensitive to *excusing conditions*; otherwise, it collapses distinctions central to responsibility theory (akrasia vs. compulsion; guidance control vs. bypassed mechanisms).

(4) Prior forewarning renders the penalty fair. Notice conditions are not sufficient for culpability; control conditions carry the normative weight. Creatures with limited comprehension cannot internalize the infinite stakes in a way that reliably modulates all future behavior. Even for agents with high comprehension, inevitability shows that the feasible set does not include a lifetime path with zero barks except under unrealistic suppressants or redesign (§A.3). Forewarning without feasible compliance does not ground

infinite liability.

(5) The owner is uniquely worthy; status upgrades justify infinity. Let $w > 1$ weight the victim's status and f map offense gravity to censure. Even if $G(b)$ is scaled to $w \cdot G(b)$, for finite $G(b)$ one still has $S(\text{eternity})/f(w \cdot G(b)) \to \infty$. Status-sensitivity therefore cannot by itself vindicate an *unbounded* temporal sanction. Moreover, status does not determine the *form* of sanction; teleological considerations (rehabilitation, restoration) still rule out perpetual incapacitation when less destructive responses are available.

(6) Mercy is offered; only the obstinate choose the basement. If avoiding the penalty requires overcoming the same disposition $(\lambda > 0)$ that grounds inevitability, then access to mercy depends on capacities already degraded by nature. In the analogy, suppose a door out of the basement opens only if the puppy refrains from *ever* barking again; the condition is effectively unattainable given the hazard process. Conditional mercy that presupposes non-inevitability does not answer the control objection.

(7) Self-exclusion: the puppies *choose* the basement. Re-describing confinement as self-chosen trades on an equivocation between *proximal desire* (avoiding further punishment by remaining quiet in confinement) and *originating choice* (the bark under conditions of degraded control). If the initial trigger is inevitable and the exit conditions are infeasible given the same disposition, "choice" is merely adaptive preference under coercive structure, not responsibility-grounding endorsement.

(8) Frankfurt-style responsibility survives inevitability. Frankfurt cases preserve responsibility where the agent acts through a reasons-responsive mechanism *without* the intervener's involvement. In this model, the mechanism is not robustly reasons-responsive across relevant nearby worlds because some classes of stimuli (e.g., sudden startle) bypass training-induced modulation. Where counterfactual sensitivity to reasons fails at key junctures, guidance control is not satisfied strongly enough to ground *eternal* condemnation

even if some thin responsibility remains.

(9) Aggregating harms can warrant unbounded penalties. Let $\{b_k\}$ be bark events and suppose f is superadditive, $F = \sum_k f(G(b_k))$. For finite histories (or even countable histories with $f(G(b_k))$ summable), F remains finite. The one-bark policy imposes an *infinite* sanction for a *single* bounded event, bypassing any aggregation rationale. If infinity is reached lexicographically at the first offense, proportionality is abandoned by construction.

Appendix B

Appendix B: Bark-Nature Reductio (Predicate Form)

Let $B(x)$: "x exhibits behavior T"; $P(x)$: "x receives eternal punishment for T"; $A(x)$: "x is accountable for T"; I: "T is inevitable for the species/kind/nature."

$$(1) \quad I \rightarrow \forall x \left(B(x) \text{ is inevitable} \right) \tag{B1}$$

$$(2) \quad \forall x \left(\text{Inevitable}(B(x)) \rightarrow \neg A(x) \right) \tag{B2}$$

$$(3) \quad \forall x \left(\neg A(x) \rightarrow \neg P(x) \right) \tag{B3}$$

$$(4) \quad I \tag{B4}$$

$$(5) \quad \therefore \forall x \, \neg P(x) \tag{B5}$$

Annotation: If T is inevitable by nature, accountability fails; if accountability fails, eternal punishment is not fitting; hence, eternal punishment does not obtain. This reductio targets ECT specifically; it remains consistent with non-eternal sanctions or reparative responses.

Appendix C

Appendix C: Glossary of Key Terms

Culpability

The warranted attribution of blame to an agent for an action, typically requiring control

conditions and appropriate notice.

PAP (Principle of Alternate Possibilities)

The thesis that moral responsibility requires the ability to do otherwise; questioned by

Frankfurt-style cases.

Guidance Control

A semicompatibilist notion of responsibility grounded in an agent's ownership of a

reasons-responsive mechanism rather than access to alternatives.

Inevitability (by Nature)

A structural feature of human agents such that some transgression is guaranteed across

a normal lifespan.

Proportionality

The requirement that sanction severity tracks the gravity of the offense on a finite,

calibrated schedule.

ECT (Eternal Conscious Torment)

A doctrine positing unending punitive suffering as the final sanction for the wicked.

Annihilationism

The view that the unredeemed are ultimately destroyed (cease to exist) rather than

tormented forever.

Restorative Justice

A sanction philosophy aiming at repair of harm, reintegration of offenders, and

community restoration rather than mere retribution.

Symbolic Logic Formalization

$\forall x \left(N(x) \rightarrow \neg C(x) \right)$
Annotation: If every person x is born with an inevitable tendency $N(x)$, then that person cannot meet the control requirements $C(x)$ needed for fair judgment.

$\forall x \left(\neg C(x) \rightarrow \neg J \right)$
Annotation: If someone lacks the right kind of control $C(x)$, then punishing them eternally J cannot be fair.

$\forall x \, N(x)$
Annotation: In fact, every human x does have this built-in, unrequested tendency $N(x)$.

$\therefore \neg J$
Annotation: Putting these together, eternal punishment J is not fair or justified.

$Severity(S) \propto Gravity(G)$
Annotation: The seriousness of a punishment $Severity(S)$ should match the seriousness of the wrongdoing $Gravity(G)$.

$\frac{Severity(ECT)}{Gravity(finite_T)} \longrightarrow \infty$
Annotation: When a limited act $finite_T$ is matched with eternal torment ECT, the punishment becomes infinitely out of proportion to the offense.

$P(\text{no bark in } [0,T]) \approx e^{-\lambda_i T}$
Annotation: If each being has even a small chance λ_i of failing, then over time T the chance of never failing drops almost to zero.

As $T \rightarrow \infty$: $P(\text{no bark}) \rightarrow 0$ and $P(\text{at least one bark}) \rightarrow 1$
Annotation: In other words, given enough time, failure is guaranteed.

$\frac{S(\text{eternal confinement})}{f(G(b))} \longrightarrow \infty$
Annotation: Giving an eternal penalty for something as small as a single bark $G(b)$ makes the punishment infinitely larger than the act.

$I \rightarrow \forall x \left(B(x) \text{ is inevitable} \right)$ (B1)
Annotation: If inevitability I is true, then for everyone x the wrong act $B(x)$ will eventually happen.

$\forall x \left(Inevitable(B(x)) \rightarrow \neg A(x) \right)$ (B2)
Annotation: If an act $B(x)$ is unavoidable, then the person x cannot be held accountable $A(x)$.

$\forall x \left(\neg A(x) \rightarrow \neg P(x) \right)$ (B3)
Annotation: And if someone is not accountable $A(x)$, then eternal punishment $P(x)$ is not fitting.

I (B4)
Annotation: Inevitability I does apply to human nature.

$\therefore \forall x \, \neg P(x)$ (B5)
Annotation: Therefore, no one x deserves eternal punishment $P(x)$.

A Fitch-Style Proof.

1. $\forall x \left(N(x) \rightarrow \neg C(x) \right)$ Premise
Annotation: If a person x has the built-in, unrequested tendency $N(x)$, then they lack the needed control $C(x)$.

2. $\forall x \left(\neg C(x) \rightarrow \neg J \right)$ Premise
Annotation: If someone does not have that control $C(x)$, then eternal punishment J is not justified.

3. $\forall x \, N(x)$ Premise
Annotation: Everyone x in fact has the unrequested tendency $N(x)$.

4. Let a be arbitrary Arbitrary object (UI target)
Annotation: We pick a generic individual a without assuming anything special about them.

5. $N(a) \rightarrow \neg C(a)$ from 1, UI
Annotation: Instantiating line 1 at a: if $N(a)$, then not-in-control $\neg C(a)$.

6. $N(a)$ from 3, UI
Annotation: From the universal claim, a has the tendency $N(a)$.

7. $\neg C(a)$ from 5,6, MP
Annotation: Putting 5 and 6 together, a lacks the needed control.

8. $\neg C(a) \rightarrow \neg J$ from 2, UI
Annotation: If someone like a lacks control, then $\neg J$.

9. $\neg J$ from 7,8, MP
Annotation: Therefore, eternal punishment J is not justified.

10. $\therefore \neg J$ Discharge of arbitrary a
Annotation: Because $\neg J$ does not mention a, the result holds generally: eternal punishment is not justified.

Proportionality add-on (as a supporting mini-proof)

11. $Severity(S) \propto Gravity(G)$ Proportionality principle
Annotation: Punishment size $Severity(S)$ should track offense seriousness $Gravity(G)$.

12. $Gravity(finite_T) < \infty$ Finite act
Annotation: A human transgression $finite_T$ is bounded in gravity.

13. $Severity(ECT) = \infty$ Eternal sanction
Annotation: Eternal torment has unbounded severity.

14. $\frac{Severity(ECT)}{Gravity(finite_T)} \rightarrow \infty$ from 12,13
Annotation: The punishment-to-offense ratio blows up to infinity.

15. Hence proportionality fails for ECT on finite acts from 11,14
Annotation: An infinite penalty for a finite act breaks the stated matching rule, reinforcing $\neg J$.

Bark-Nature reductio (Fitch-style)

1'. $I \rightarrow \forall x \left(Inevitable(B(x)) \right)$ Premise
Annotation: If inevitability I holds for the kind, then everyone x will eventually do the act $B(x)$.

2'. $\forall x \left(Inevitable(B(x)) \rightarrow \neg A(x) \right)$ Premise
Annotation: If an act is unavoidable, accountability $A(x)$ does not stick.

3'. $\forall x \left(\neg A(x) \rightarrow \neg P(x) \right)$ Premise
Annotation: Without accountability, eternal punishment $P(x)$ does not fit.

4'. I Premise
Annotation: The inevitability condition I obtains.

5'. $\forall x \, Inevitable(B(x))$ from 1',4', MP
Annotation: So the act is inevitable for all x.

6'. Let a be arbitrary Arbitrary object
Annotation: Consider any individual a.

7'. $Inevitable(B(a))$ from 5', UI
Annotation: For this a, the act is unavoidable.

8'. $\neg A(a)$ from 2',7', UI, MP
Annotation: Then a is not accountable.

9'. $\neg P(a)$ from 3',8', UI, MP
Annotation: And eternal punishment does not fittingly apply to a.

10'. $\therefore \forall x \, \neg P(x)$ UG on 9'
Annotation: Since a was arbitrary, the result generalizes: for every x, $\neg P(x)$.

Figure C1

Extended Symbolic Logic Formulation.