

Compassion, Doubt, and Eternal Damnation: An Analysis of Sincere Belief and Doubt Under Religious Diversity — 31

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Central claim


A Christian God-concept—a specified conception of a deity—that is perfectly loving and just cannot coherently allow a nonresistant seeker’s evidence-proportionate uncertainty, by itself, to determine irreversible punitive exclusion or everlasting suffering under religious diversity. Compared with finite, corrective, or continuing-opportunity responses, belief-conditioned damnation lacks adequate discriminatory disclosure and responsible control over the required belief response; when sincere doubt is itself treated as guilt, proportionate culpability is missing too. This does not disprove Christianity or every doctrine of hell; it targets doctrines that make sincere doubt decisive without informed rejection.

Preview: The governing dilemma

Target doctrine	Justice requires	Pressure from the case	Rational conclusion
Irreversible fate turns on correct religious belief, whether as the trigger of condemnation or the condition of rescue.	Accessible discriminatory guidance, responsible control, and consequence proportioned to culpability.	Religious location shapes evidence access; belief is not normally chosen at will; nonresistant inquiry is not informed refusal.	Either exempt the sincere doubter or surrender the claim that this outcome expresses perfect love and justice.

The argument is conditional and case-specific: culpable evidence avoidance and informed, continuing rejection require separate assessment.

Visual preview:



The preserved graphic is conceptual, not empirical: 45–45–10, equal likelihoods, and its effective-sample-size note are illustrative. Its legacy “Cutter 2025” label refers to the forthcoming paper listed in References, while “infinite sanction” means unending or final punishment rather than mathematically infinite severity. Read its deity labels as God-concepts and its three strands only as support for the conditional conclusion tested here.

Abstract

A perfectly loving and just Christian God-concept cannot coherently allow a nonresistant seeker's evidence-proportionate uncertainty, by itself, to determine irreversible punitive exclusion or everlasting suffering under religious diversity. This paper tests belief-conditioned damnation through a cumulative comparison: what accessible guidance the doctrine supplies, what responsible control the seeker has over the required belief response, and whether the consequence is proportioned to culpability. Mariam, a stipulated sincere inquirer who finds Christian and Islamic claims comparably supported, makes the problem concrete without pretending that a numerical credence profile is measured or uniquely rational. Divine hiddenness and religious diversity do not by themselves disprove theism, but they undercut the claim that every conscientious person receives clear, tradition-specific disclosure. Work on belief control distinguishes direct choice from indirect responsibility for inquiry, while the philosophy of hell exposes a further dilemma. If final fate turns on belief outcome under ambiguity—whether belief is called the trigger of condemnation or the condition of rescue—accessible guidance and responsible control over the required response are missing; if uncertainty itself is treated as guilt, proportionate culpability is missing too. If condemnation turns on informed and culpable rejection, Mariam-like doubt is outside its scope. The result survives the point that everlasting duration need not entail infinitely severe suffering: irreversible punitive exclusion still lacks a proportionate basis in nonculpable uncertainty. The conclusion is narrow. It does not refute Christianity, universalism, annihilationism, corrective accounts, or every self-exclusion view; it rules out sincere, evidence-responsive doubt as a just determinant of irreversible punitive fate.

Keywords: eternal punishment; religious diversity; divine hiddenness; nonresistant nonbelief; doxastic control; proportionality; philosophy of religion

1. The Narrow Claim

Consider Mariam, raised by one Christian parent and one Muslim parent. She studies both traditions, examines arguments and testimony, prays for guidance, and remains willing to follow whichever account is true. Yet she finds neither tradition sufficiently better supported to justify confident assent. A 45–45–10 division among Christianity, Islam, and neither is merely one way to picture her uncertainty. It is not a survey result, a uniquely rational allocation, or a posterior derived from invented likelihoods. The title-page visual is therefore a conceptual map rather than an evidential calculation; no premise below depends on its numerical priors, likelihood ratios, or effective-sample-size note. The important fact is structural: she is sincere, responsive to reasons, and unable to identify a decisive public discriminator.

The target is a doctrine under which such uncertainty, nonbelief, or selection of the wrong tradition can lead to *irreversible punitive exclusion* or *everlasting suffering*. The former means a final loss imposed as condemnation with no adequate later opportunity for informed reconciliation. The latter adds unending adverse experience. The argument applies most directly to belief-conditioned versions of eternal conscious punishment, but it also reaches any irreversible exclusion whose trigger is sincere religious error rather than informed, culpable rejection. It includes a scheme that calls belief the condition of rescue rather than the offense when failure to meet that condition makes the difference between otherwise irreversible fates.

This paper uses *theism* for the general position that at least one deity exists. A *God-concept* is a specified conception of a deity, including attributed character, intentions, actions, and relations to human beings. The model under examination is a Christian God-concept said to be perfectly loving and just, to desire rightly ordered relationship with human persons, and to attach eternal stakes to their response. The word *hell* names several importantly different doctrines in Christian thought—retributive punishment, self-exclusion, annihilation, corrective experience, and universalist or postmortem processes among them (Kvanvig, 1993; Talbott, 2025). A valid criticism must therefore identify its target rather than condemning a label.

The governing thesis is conditional. If eternal condemnation applies to a Mariam-like seeker because she did not reach or enact the correct belief, then the doctrine must explain three things: why the necessary guidance was accessible, how the relevant belief outcome was responsibly under her control, and why irreversible harm is proportioned to her culpability. If those conditions are not met, perfect love and justice exclude condemnation on

that basis. Further discriminatory disclosure, culpable resistance, or a nonpunitive continuing opportunity could change the case.

The argument is not an excuse for intellectual laziness. A seeker can manipulate inquiry, avoid unwelcome evidence, or protect a favored identity. Such conduct may be culpable even when belief itself is not selected at will. Mariam is stipulated to exclude those features so the doctrinal question cannot be evaded by redescribing every doubt as rebellion. The paper asks whether there is conceptual room, within the target doctrine, for conscientious error. If there is none, the doctrine treats honest inquiry as potentially damnable.

2. The Governing Test: Disclosure, Control, and Proportion

A salvation scheme may impose conditions. But the more severe and irreversible the consequence, the more the justice of the scheme depends on the agent's reasonable access to those conditions, meaningful ability to respond, and culpability for failure. These are familiar features of fair responsibility, not a demand that every truth be effortless to discover.

The due-epistemic-process argument

Premise 1. A perfectly loving and just deity would not allow failure to satisfy a belief condition to determine a sincere agent's irreversible punitive fate—whether by grounding harm or withholding rescue—unless the agent had reasonably accessible guidance and a responsible opportunity to respond; if the failure itself grounds punishment, culpability for that failure must also be proportionate to the harm.

Premise 2. A Mariam-like seeker lacks tradition-discriminating guidance, cannot directly choose conviction contrary to her assessment of the evidence, has conscientiously exercised the controllable parts of inquiry, and has neither culpably avoided evidence nor knowingly refused adequate disclosure.

Conclusion. A perfectly loving and just deity would not allow that seeker's uncertainty or mistaken religious selection, by itself, to determine irreversible punitive harm.

The form is valid: if the applicable conditions in Premise 1 are necessary and the stipulated case lacks them, the punitive conclusion is excluded. The philosophical dispute concerns the premises. A defender may deny that accessible guidance is required, expand the seeker's control, locate culpability in prior conduct, or deny that the consequence is punitive. Each route is considered below. What is not enough is to repeat that the scheme is just because the deity established it. That response makes the predicate *just* report authority rather than supply a moral characterization.

The argument is also cumulative. Hiddenness pressures the disclosure condition; belief control pressures culpability; and the severity of eternal loss pressures proportionality. No strand needs to prove a contradiction alone. Their force converges on one limited conclusion: nonresistant, evidence-responsive uncertainty is not an adequate ground for eternal punishment.

3. Religious Diversity: Evidence Access Without a Theological Shortcut

3.1 Why diversity matters

Religious diversity matters because a belief-sensitive salvation condition is encountered through testimony, family, language, institutions, texts, experiences, and local standards of plausibility. Mariam does not choose a neutral starting line. She inherits partially competing evidence streams and interpretive communities. Robert McKim's account of religious ambiguity emphasizes that serious, incompatible traditions can be experienced as evidentially live rather than as one obvious truth surrounded by transparent error (McKim, 2001). The case does not assume

that every tradition is equally supported. It assumes only that some sincere agents reasonably fail to see a decisive discriminator.

Schellenberg's hiddenness argument gives this pressure a relational form. If a perfectly loving deity is always open to personal relationship with capable creatures, the existence of nonresistant nonbelief is difficult to explain (Schellenberg, 1993). Howard-Snyder's critical treatment shows why the inference remains contested: a defender can dispute whether perfect love requires belief at every time, whether the nonbelief is genuinely nonresistant, or whether goods served by hiddenness justify delay (Howard-Snyder, 1996). This paper does not require the full hiddenness argument against theism. Even if ambiguity serves soul-making, freedom, or epistemic growth, pairing that ambiguity with irreversible punishment for the uncertainty it predictably sustains creates a distinct problem. A condition may be pedagogically hidden without being justly enforceable through final harm.

Public demographic evidence supplies context, not a theological verdict. The Pew Research Center's 2025 global analysis draws on more than 2,700 sources of demographic data across 201 countries and territories. It documents durable geographic distributions of affiliation and uses reported childhood and adult identities to estimate religious switching (Hackett et al., 2025). These data do not measure sincerity, divine action, private evidence, or the truth of a tradition. They do show that affiliation and change are deeply situated in social and demographic histories rather than converging straightforwardly on one globally unmistakable salvific message.

Cognitive-scientific and cultural-evolutionary accounts add a related caution. Barrett examines ordinary cognitive dispositions that make some supernatural-agent concepts easy to acquire, while Norenzayan examines how moralizing deity concepts spread and stabilize through cultural processes (Barrett, 2004; Norenzayan, 2013). These mechanisms do not show religious concepts false. The title-page visual compresses their limited role as the claim that cognitive predispositions shape reception; it does not treat them as a truth test.

Philosophers disagree about what follows. Maitzen treats demographic clustering as pressure on theistic explanations of belief distribution, while Baker-Hytech argues that mutual epistemic dependence—the ordinary reliance of persons on testimony and community—may explain such patterns without indicting theism (Baker-Hytech, 2016; Maitzen, 2006). The limited inference here accommodates that reply. Social dependence need not make belief irrational or prove a deity absent. It means that a just assessment of Mariam cannot pretend her evidential position is self-created or that geographic distribution demonstrates universally equal access to tradition-specific truth.

3.2 The discriminator burden

General revelation may support generic theism without selecting Christianity over Islam, or either over other God-concepts. Awe, conscience, order, and religious experience are interpreted across traditions. If the punishment condition requires affirming a particular incarnation, scripture, prophet, sacrament, or atonement account, the relevant disclosure must discriminate at that level. Evidence for some deity cannot silently become evidence that a particular soteriology is clear enough to ground eternal liability.

The burden is not certainty. Ordinary decisions often rest on incomplete evidence. The burden is fit between the clarity available and the severity assigned to error. A finite, revisable consequence may tolerate substantial uncertainty. An irreversible condition with ultimate stakes requires a correspondingly strong reason to classify sincere error as culpable. Otherwise the doctrine uses ambiguity to test faith and then treats the predictable result of that ambiguity as rebellion.

4. Belief Is Not a Switch

The literature on *doxastic voluntarism*—voluntary control over belief—distinguishes several kinds of agency. Direct control would allow a person to believe a proposition simply by deciding to do so. Indirect influence operates through actions such as seeking evidence, attending to objections, choosing information sources, cultivating habits, or avoiding inquiry. Alston's influential analysis denies that ordinary belief is under the sort of immediate

voluntary control often presupposed by duties to believe (Alston, 1988). A recent survey confirms that direct control remains highly controversial while indirect influence is broadly acknowledged (Boespflug & Jackson, 2024).

This distinction matters morally. Mariam may choose to read, listen, pray, investigate, and expose herself to correction. She cannot simply decide that the Christian claims now look decisively true while continuing to judge their support roughly on a par with Islamic claims. She can assent performatively, join a community, repeat a creed, or act in hope. But demanding those actions as proof of belief would reward performance rather than conviction. Demanding conviction at will would require a power she may not possess.

Indirect influence preserves responsibility without making every belief blameworthy. Peels argues that agents can be responsible through their influence over evidence, habits, and intellectual conduct even without direct control over resulting beliefs (Peels, 2017). That more demanding account strengthens rather than weakens the paper's scope limit. Culpable avoidance, selective exposure, dishonest standards, or stubborn refusal can matter. Yet when a seeker has exercised the relevant responsibilities conscientiously, the residual belief outcome is not a free choice to reject disclosed truth.

Theology often moves too quickly from *commitment is voluntary* to *belief is voluntary*. Trust, practice, loyalty, and acceptance may be chosen under uncertainty. Their voluntariness does not make propositional conviction equally selectable. A just doctrine may assess how a person treats evidence, neighbors, and perceived duties. It cannot assume that failure to feel convinced is equivalent to a chosen personal refusal.

The control bridge

If culpability for a belief outcome depends on responsible control, and a seeker has exercised the controllable parts of inquiry without acquiring the required conviction, then the absent conviction cannot by itself carry the culpability needed for irreversible punishment. A defender must identify culpable conduct beyond the mere state of doubt.

5. Proportion After the Infinity Distinction

The classic proportionality objection says that everlasting punishment for finite wrongdoing is excessive. Adams argues that the traditional doctrine raises a conflict with divine justice, while Kvanvig diagnoses both moral and epistemological defects in retributive accounts of hell (Adams, 1975; Kvanvig, 1993). The intuitive force is especially strong in Mariam's case: the alleged wrong is not cruelty, exploitation, or defiant malice, but a conscientious failure to prefer the correct revelation under uncertainty.

The objection requires care. Cutter argues that everlasting suffering need not amount to infinitely severe punishment. An endless sequence may contain finite total suffering, and infinite suffering need not translate straightforwardly into infinitely negative well-being (Cutter, forthcoming). That distinction blocks a quick equation: *everlasting* does not by definition mean *infinitely severe*. A serious paper should not rest on arithmetic rhetoric.

The central challenge survives. Even a mild but irreversible punitive exclusion requires a desert basis. If Mariam's uncertainty is nonculpable, no punitive burden is proportionate to it as guilt; if her culpability is limited to ordinary human fallibility, final deprivation with no remedial opportunity still demands an explanation. Duration is not the only dimension of severity. Finality, lost goods, absence of appeal, foreclosed reconciliation, and the agent's epistemic access all matter.

Strong defenses shift the basis of punishment. Walls develops a free-will account in which decisive self-chosen evil can make hell compatible with divine goodness (Walls, 1992). Hershenov answers fairness objections by appealing to continuing defiance and unpaid moral debt rather than treating a finite initial wrong as the whole basis of endless punishment (Hershenov, 2019). These replies are more plausible for informed, stable rejection than for Mariam. The stronger they make the voluntariness and persistence conditions, the clearer it becomes that

sincere uncertainty is not the relevant state. A person willing to revise upon adequate disclosure is not eternally incorrigible merely because present evidence has not convinced her.

This produces an important concession. The paper need not show that no person could freely maintain destructive rejection forever. It argues that such a model cannot classify nonresistant religious doubt as the same phenomenon. If a defender says Mariam would receive postmortem clarity and a continuing opportunity, the target doctrine has been revised in the direction the argument requires. If the defender says her earthly uncertainty irreversibly fixes her fate, the problems of disclosure, control, and proportion remain.

6. The Final-Fate Dilemma

Table 1 displays the two main routes. The fork matters because popular defenses often move between them. When belief is demanded, the doctrine sounds belief-conditioned. When fairness is challenged, the same doctrine is redescribed as punishment only for knowing rejection. Those are not equivalent conditions.

Final-fate route	What the route must establish	Result for a Mariam-like seeker
Belief-sensitive outcome	The correct tradition was accessible enough and the required response was responsibly controllable; if error itself grounds punishment, culpability was proportionate to the harm	The stipulated case defeats those conditions; sincere uncertainty cannot justly determine irreversible fate
Informed rejection	The agent recognized the relevant truth and freely sustained culpable refusal despite adequate disclosure and genuine opportunity	The stipulated seeker remains willing to respond; she is outside the condemned class unless uncertainty is simply relabeled as rejection

Table 1: The final-fate fork. It does not settle every account of hell; it prevents a doctrine from making belief outcome decisive—as a condemnation trigger or rescue condition—and then appealing to informed rejection as its fairness defense without showing that the two coincide.

The dilemma can be stated compactly:

The two-route dilemma

Route A. If eternal fate turns on arriving at the correct belief under genuine ambiguity, whether as the trigger of condemnation or the condition of rescue, then adequate disclosure and responsible control over the required response are missing in the stipulated case; if uncertainty itself is treated as guilt, proportionate culpability is missing too.

Route B. If eternal condemnation turns instead on informed, culpable, and continuing rejection after adequate disclosure, then a nonresistant, evidence-responsive doubter is not condemned.

Therefore. A perfectly loving and just deity does not eternally condemn the stipulated seeker merely for sincere uncertainty.

The conclusion is invariant across the routes. Route A cannot justly make the required belief response decisive; Route B exempts the person described. A doctrine can escape by denying that any Mariam-like person exists, but then it incurs an empirical and pastoral burden: it must show that apparently sincere doubters are actually culpably resistant. Declaring that resistance is hidden in every case protects the doctrine from counterexample by definition, but it also makes the claim inaccessible to public assessment and invites moral misjudgment of real people.

7. The Strongest Replies

7.1 Divine predicates exceed human categories

A defender may say that divine love and justice exceed human moral concepts. Transcendence can caution against simplistic projection, but total non-analogy empties praise of guidance. If *loving* and *just* retain no recognizable connection to care, fairness, culpability, or proportion, then asserting them tells finite hearers nothing about what to trust or imitate. If they retain enough analogy to support worship and moral teaching, the due-epistemic-process question returns. Mystery may limit confidence in the objection; it cannot selectively make apparent cruelty count as perfect justice while ordinary benevolence still confirms love.

7.2 Universal revelation is sufficient

The appeal to nature and conscience may support generic theism or moral accountability. It does not automatically identify a specific revelation or the belief conditions attached to salvation. The religious-diversity evidence is relevant precisely because reasonable people interpret general evidence through incompatible God-concepts. A defender can answer with tradition-specific historical or experiential evidence, but that evidence must do the discriminating work. Calling it universally sufficient does not establish that every sincere inquirer has reasonable access to its force.

7.3 An offense against an infinite deity has infinite gravity

The infinite-offense reply shifts attention from the agent's knowledge and control to the status of the one offended. That move threatens proportionality. An accidental or nonculpable error does not become maximally blameworthy because its object has maximal worth. Moral desert tracks what the agent knowingly and avoidably did, not only the value of the affected party. Even if some defiance has grave significance, Mariam's uncertainty is not defiance unless the conclusion is assumed in advance.

7.4 Punishment is for sin; faith is the offered rescue

A defender may deny that Mariam is punished for uncertainty. On this account, all persons face condemnation for independent wrongdoing, while faith merely accepts an undeserved rescue. This reply usefully narrows the dispute: if sincere doubt neither grounds condemnation nor constitutes culpable refusal, the paper's central claim is no longer denied. If, however, two otherwise relevantly similar persons receive opposite irreversible fates because one can form or enact the tradition-specific response and the other cannot under genuine ambiguity, epistemic luck still determines access to rescue. Calling the rescue gracious does not show that its belief-sensitive distribution expresses perfect love, nor does it establish that the underlying punishment is proportionate. The defense must identify independent culpability proportionate to final harm and explain why the nonresistant seeker had a responsible opportunity to accept the rescue.

7.5 The condemned continually reject relationship

Continuing-sin and self-exclusion accounts are stronger because they seek an ongoing basis rather than an infinite penalty for a finite act. They also intensify the need for informed refusal. A choice is not meaningfully self-excluding when the agent cannot identify which alleged relationship is real and remains open to correction. If adequate disclosure occurs after death and rejection continues, the case changes. If no such disclosure occurs, eternal persistence may be a predictable product of the same ambiguity rather than a fully informed choice.

7.6 Faith is a morally assessable act of trust

Faith may include voluntary trust, loyalty, hope, and practice. The control argument does not deny this. It denies that choosing those attitudes guarantees the corresponding conviction or that refusing to simulate certainty is culpable. A seeker might commit practically while retaining divided credence. More importantly, rival traditions can each demand trust beyond what shared evidence discriminates. Eternal liability cannot be grounded merely in the failure to take one tradition's leap unless a fair basis identifies which leap is required.

7.7 The argument domesticates divine authority

The paper does not claim that finite agents legislate moral law for a deity. It conducts an internal coherence test. The target theology itself uses the predicates perfectly loving and just to characterize the deity. If any treatment whatsoever becomes compatible with those predicates simply because the deity performs it, the characterization loses independent content. If the predicates constrain what counts as an adequate theology, nonresistant doubt must be assessed through those constraints.

8. What the Conclusion Preserves

Several live alternatives remain. A doctrine may deny that belief is a condition of salvation. It may hold that every person receives adequate disclosure unavailable to public observation, though that claim carries its own evidential burden. It may include postmortem opportunity, correction, restoration, or eventual reconciliation. It may understand annihilation as nonpunitive rather than retributive, though questions of deprivation and fairness remain. It may reserve condemnation for informed, stable, culpable rejection and explicitly exempt sincere uncertainty. These positions are not all equally plausible, but the argument here does not refute them as a class.

Nor does the paper infer that Christianity or Islam is false from disagreement. The fact that a belief is socially transmitted does not show it false; every person's inquiry relies on testimony. The narrower point is ethical: social location affects access, salience, and interpretation, so a just assignment of blame must take those conditions seriously. A deity may know the heart perfectly. Human defenders do not, and should not turn doctrinal anxiety into confident accusations of resistance.

The positive alternative is epistemic patience. A compassionate soteriology can value inquiry, humility, responsiveness, and honesty while offering further opportunities proportioned to finite agents. It can distinguish rejection of truth from inability to identify it. It can treat disclosure as an aid rather than a trap. If a theology cannot make those distinctions, the cost is not merely philosophical awkwardness. It makes credal bravado safer than intellectual integrity.

9. Conclusion

A perfectly loving and just Christian God-concept cannot coherently allow a nonresistant seeker's evidence-proportionate uncertainty, by itself, to determine irreversible punitive exclusion or everlasting suffering under religious diversity. The cumulative case supplies the reason. Religious diversity and hiddenness pressure the claim that tradition-specific guidance is universally clear; the distinction between direct belief control and indirect influence blocks the assumption that conviction can simply be chosen; and proportionality demands a culpable basis for final harm even after one concedes that everlasting duration need not equal infinite severity.

The governing dilemma is straightforward. If irreversible fate turns on belief outcome under genuine ambiguity—as a condemnation trigger or rescue condition—the necessary disclosure and responsible control are missing; if uncertainty itself is treated as guilt, proportionate culpability is missing too. If condemnation turns on informed, culpable, continuing rejection, Mariam-like seekers are outside its scope. Either way, sincere uncertainty is not a just determinant of eternal punishment.

The principal limit is equally important. The argument does not disprove theism, Christianity, every doctrine of hell, or the possibility of culpable resistance. It does require theologians and apologists to stop treating nonresistant doubt as though it were already informed rebellion. The intellectual and practical change requested of the reader is to preserve that distinction. A doctrine worthy of the predicates *loving* and *just* must leave room for finite persons to be honestly mistaken without making their honesty the instrument of their ruin.

A. Formal Reconstruction of the Central Thesis

The reconstruction is conditional and case-specific. It does not infer that theism is false or that every doctrine called hell is unjust.

- P1.** If a deity is perfectly loving and just, that deity does not allow failure to satisfy a belief condition to determine a person's irreversible punitive fate—whether by grounding harm or withholding rescue—unless the person has reasonably accessible guidance and a responsible opportunity to respond; if the failure itself grounds punishment, culpability for that failure must also be proportionate to the harm.
- P2.** A Mariam-like seeker is nonresistant, conducts conscientious inquiry, remains willing to follow adequate disclosure, and nevertheless finds rival salvific traditions insufficiently discriminated by her evidence.
- P3.** A person does not normally acquire a contrary conviction merely by deciding to believe, although that person can exercise indirect responsibility over inquiry, attention, and evidence gathering.
- P4.** The stipulated seeker has exercised that indirect responsibility without acquiring the belief required by the target doctrine and, by stipulation, has not culpably avoided evidence or knowingly refused adequate disclosure.
- P5.** Therefore, in the stipulated case, the belief-sensitive route lacks reasonably accessible tradition-discriminating guidance and responsible control over the required response; when uncertainty itself is treated as guilt, it also lacks proportionate culpability of the kind required by P1.
- P6.** If condemnation instead requires informed, culpable, and continuing rejection after adequate disclosure, the stipulated seeker's present uncertainty does not satisfy that condition.
- P7.** Within the target defined in this paper, irreversible fate turns either on belief outcome under ambiguity—as a condemnation trigger or rescue condition—or on informed, culpable, and continuing rejection after adequate disclosure.
- C.** Therefore, a perfectly loving and just deity does not allow a Mariam-like seeker's evidence-proportionate uncertainty, by itself, to determine irreversible punitive exclusion or everlasting suffering under religious diversity.

Validity. P1 supplies the governing conditional constraint. P2–P5 show that the belief-sensitive route lacks the required disclosure and responsible control, and that uncertainty itself supplies no proportionate culpability when it is treated as guilt. P6 excludes the stipulated seeker from the informed-rejection route. P7 states the exhaustive routes within the paper's defined target, and C follows by cases. The inference is valid given that scope premise; it does not establish that every possible doctrine of final destiny falls within the target.

Support for the premises. P1 is a contestable moral bridge linking accessible guidance and responsible response to irreversible fate, with an added proportionality condition when doubt is treated as guilt. P2 is stipulated but made plausible, not proved, by work on nonresistant nonbelief and religious ambiguity. P3 applies the disputed but widely defended distinction between direct doxastic control and indirect influence. P4 excludes culpable evidence avoidance and knowing refusal without claiming that every doubter is blameless or that unrelated wrongdoing cannot merit a response. P6 follows because willing uncertainty is not informed rejection. P7 states only the paper's bounded final-fate routes, including belief-sensitive rescue. The inference is deductively valid within that target; soundness depends on the moral, empirical, and interpretive judgments defended in the body.

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