

Distinguishability and the "Inner Witness" of the Holy Spirit — 08

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Central claim


Christians should not treat the felt force of an “inner witness” as strong evidence that the Holy Spirit is its specifically Christian source. If that attribution is reliable, accessible features should distinguish it from rival religious, cognitive-cultural, and deceptive-source explanations. Instead, cross-tradition collisions, culture-linked content, ordinary scaffolding, and missing independent error controls leave the source underdetermined. This does not deny practical value, possible first-person warrant, or divine causation.

Preview:

Claim under test	Expected difference	Observed pressure	Rational conclusion
Felt assurance reliably identifies the Holy Spirit as its specifically Christian source	Christian cases should show source-specific accuracy, fewer rival positives, and correctable errors	Rivals report similar certainty; content tracks culture; independent low-error controls are missing	Experience alone does not strongly discriminate the Christian source claim from live alternatives

The conclusion concerns source-specific evidential weight, not the sincerity, value, or possible transcendence of religious experience as such.

Visual preview:



Four plausible source routes converge on felt assurance; independent accuracy and error controls, not intensity alone, are needed to identify the source. The map states a diagnostic burden, not a verdict that no experience is divine.

Abstract

Can the inner witness of the Holy Spirit rationally identify a specifically Christian source rather than a live rival? The accessible evidence does not presently support that strong source attribution. A sincere and life-shaping experience may have practical value, and an externalist Christian theory may grant it first-person warrant if Christianity is true and the Holy Spirit actually produces it. But felt force, transformation, and scriptural fit are not sufficiently source-specific: rival traditions report analogous certainty, experiential content varies with cultural formation, ordinary cognitive processes reproduce salient features, and independent error records are scarce. This paper separates occurrence, causal origin, propositional content, and epistemic authority; treats discernment as a classification problem requiring sensitivity and specificity; and compares a narrow Christian-authentication model with ordinary cognitive-cultural, pluralist-transcendent, and Christian deceptive-source alternatives. The cumulative profile weighs against models predicting accessible, distinctively Christian, low-error authentication because the observed features are not appreciably more expected under that model than under its competitors. Broader Christian models remain logically compatible by allowing ordinary mediation, ambiguity, widespread error, or hidden operation, but those permissions also reduce what the experience confirms. The conclusion is therefore bounded: the argument neither disproves theism nor shows that no experience is divine. It shows that an inner witness should not carry strong public or contrastive evidential weight until defenders supply independent error controls, asymmetric expectations, and a correction record that genuinely discriminates its proposed source.

Keywords: inner witness; Holy Spirit; religious experience; religious disagreement; Reformed epistemology; source discrimination; likelihood; evidential ambiguity; testimonial dependence; cognitive science of religion

1 The Question and Its Proper Scope

The language of an inner witness occupies a distinctive place in Christian epistemology. It can refer to conviction while reading Scripture, a felt divine presence, assurance of salvation, an apparent communication, or a non-inferential disposition to accept central Christian teachings. William J. Abraham treated the expression as an explicitly epistemological topic, and Alvin Plantinga later made the internal instigation of the Holy Spirit central to his extended Aquinas/Calvin model of warranted Christian belief (Abraham, 1990; Plantinga, 2000). The phrase therefore names more than an emotion in many Christian uses. It can be asked to explain how a person knows, or is rationally assured of, Christian truth.

The governing thesis is direct: accessible inner-witness features do not presently distinguish the Holy Spirit as their specifically Christian source strongly enough to bear substantial public or contrastive evidential weight. If Christians want these experiences to do that work, they need a difference that rival religious, cognitive-cultural, and deceptive-source accounts do not comparably predict. Throughout, *God-concept* means a specified conception of a deity. The argument tests one Christian God-concept and its account of the Holy Spirit; it does not treat theism as one undifferentiated hypothesis.

The question is easily mishandled because four claims are often compressed into one. Table 1 separates them.

Table 1: Four questions that should not be conflated

Question	What an affirmative answer establishes	What remains open
Did an experience occur?	The subject underwent peace, presence, conviction, seeming address, or another salient state.	What caused it and whether its interpretation is accurate.
What caused it?	A divine, psychological, social, neurological, mixed, or presently unknown process produced the state.	Which propositions, if any, the state supports.
What content does it carry?	The experience presents or prompts a proposition, image, affect, or practical orientation.	Whether that content is true and source-specific.
What authority does it have?	The experience warrants some level of belief or action for the subject or others.	How far that authority survives disagreement, defeaters, and rival explanations.

The present target is the transition from an accessible experience to a specifically Christian source attribution. It does not assume that every religious experience is illusory, pathological, valueless, or wholly constructed. Nor does it assume that natural and divine causes are mutually exclusive. A theologian may coherently hold that the deity specified by a Christian God-concept works through ordinary cognitive mechanisms. The narrower issue is whether the features available to a subject or public inquirer identify the Holy Spirit rather than a live alternative.

This scope also distinguishes private rationality from public evidence. A belief can be rational for a person given information or a reliable process unavailable to others. Externalist epistemologies make that possibility especially clear. Public or contrastive support asks a different question: does the accessible evidence favor one source model over competitors? The same event can have substantial personal importance and little comparative power. That is not a contradiction; it is a difference in evidential role.

An evidential ladder.

Occurrence evidence bears first on whether a state happened; longitudinal outcomes can bear on benefit; recurrence beyond ordinary baselines may bear on broad transcendence; source-specific Christian authentication requires a differential pattern that rival sources do not comparably generate. Support does not automatically climb from a lower rung to a higher one.

Religious disagreement makes the difference urgent. Religiously serious and reflective people report experiences that support incompatible God-concepts, revelations, accounts of salvation, spirits, and ultimate realities. Such disagreement need not force immediate skepticism, but it supplies a reason for critical examination and tentativeness, especially when the rival subjects appear relevantly competent and sincere (Dormandy, 2023b; McKim, 2001). The task is not to pronounce all parties equally reliable. It is to identify what could make one source attribution more reliable than another without simply assuming the favored theology.

2 The Strongest Christian Models

An adequate critique must address models stronger than the claim that an intense feeling proves Christianity. Three families are especially important.

2.1 Properly basic Christian belief

Plantinga's extended Aquinas/Calvin model is conditional and externalist. On the model, Scripture, faith, and the internal instigation of the Holy Spirit cooperate in producing belief in central Christian teachings. If Christianity

is true and the relevant cognitive process functions according to a successful design plan in an appropriate environment, the belief can possess warrant without being inferred from publicly shared premises (Plantinga, 2000). The model does not say that every confident religious impression is warranted. Its favorable verdict depends on truth, proper function, environment, and the actual operation of the Holy Spirit.

That conditional structure matters. Cross-religious parity does not straightforwardly refute it. If Christianity is true and the Holy Spirit reliably produces Christian belief, superficially similar beliefs in other traditions may be unwarranted even when their subjects cannot tell the difference. Externalism permits two internally similar subjects to differ in epistemic status because their causal relations to truth differ.

The cost is that a theory of warrant and a method for identifying warrant can come apart. Plantinga can describe how Christian belief would be warranted if the Christian story is true without giving a religiously uncommitted inquirer a non-circular way to determine that those conditions obtain. The distinguishability problem concerns this second task. It asks what accessible mark identifies one process as the Holy Spirit rather than as culturally mediated conviction, error, or another claimed spiritual source.

2.2 Perceptual and credulity models

William Alston compared Christian mystical practice with socially established doxastic practices that generate *prima facie* justified beliefs, while Richard Swinburne's principle of credulity holds, roughly, that appearances should be accepted in the absence of sufficient counterevidence (Alston, 1991; Swinburne, 2004). These approaches resist a blanket demand that religious experience first be validated by an independent proof unavailable in ordinary perception. Everyday perceivers normally trust experience unless defeaters arise.

More recently, Khramov argues that religious diversity can weaken confidence by multiplying epistemically parallel rivals without automatically removing *prima facie* justification; his proposed theistic reply relies on further naturalistic premises to exclude many of those rivals (Khramov, 2025). Whatever one makes of those premises, the structure reinforces a distinction important here: the experience alone does not select the specifically Christian source. That selection depends on further claims about how rival experiences arise and why those claims should be trusted.

The analogy has force. No epistemic practice can validate every part of itself from a completely neutral standpoint, and religious experience should not be rejected merely because it is affective, unusual, or tradition-embedded. Yet the analogy also makes reliability and defeaters central. Sense perception benefits from cross-modal checks, repeatable interaction, independent observers, stable object tracking, and a large error-correction record. Where religious experiences generate mutually incompatible source attributions and their content covaries with prior formation, those facts are not an automatic refutation; they are candidates for undercutting confidence in the source interpretation.

2.3 Transformative and embodied accounts

A third family relocates epistemic significance from doctrinal information to embodied disclosure and transformation. Jung's recent defense, for example, argues that a constrained class of religious experiences may disclose phenomenological attributes or a practical orientation without delivering detailed propositional knowledge about a transcendent object (Jung, 2025). This view takes cross-tradition recurrence as potentially favorable to a common experiential or transformative core rather than as a simple defeater.

That response is important because it shows that parity cuts differently against different claims. Cross-tradition similarity may support a common-core or pluralist account even while weakening a uniquely Christian authentication claim. A profound experience could be spiritually or practically reliable in a broad sense while underdetermining Trinity, incarnation, scriptural authority, or the identity of the Holy Spirit. The present argument is compatible with that possibility.

3 Distinguishability as a Classification Problem

Suppose a subject reports a positive inner-witness experience, denoted by R^+ . Let W_C denote a genuinely Holy-Spirit-produced event that authenticates specifically Christian content, and let $\neg W_C$ cover occasions on which that specific condition is absent. A reliable accessible test needs both sensitivity, $\Pr(R^+ \mid W_C)$, and specificity, $\Pr(\neg R^+ \mid \neg W_C)$. High sensitivity means genuine witness events tend to be recognized. High specificity means non-witness cases rarely generate the same positive mark.

Religious discussion often attends to sensitivity and neglects specificity. A Christian reports that genuine encounters produce peace, conviction, illumination, moral seriousness, or a sense of being addressed. Even if those features frequently accompany W_C , they do little discriminative work when they also occur frequently under $\neg W_C$. A test that returns positive for incompatible religions, intense secular practices, suggestion, absorption, or misinterpretation may be experientially powerful and diagnostically weak.

The base rates also matter. The evidential impact of a positive report depends not only on how often genuine witness produces the report, but also on how many alternative processes can do so and how plausible those processes were beforehand. The point does not require numerical probabilities. It requires resisting a common inference:

$$\text{This experience would occur if } W_C \quad \Rightarrow \quad \text{this experience strongly favors } W_C. \quad (1)$$

Evidence favors W_C over an alternative M only when the accessible profile is more expected under W_C than under M . An experience can be compatible with divine authentication without confirming it. This distinction between compatibility and differential expectation is central to likelihood reasoning (Sober, 2008).

3.1 The source-identification bridge

The paper's central bridge can be stated without technical notation:

1. For the available record to justify treating accessible inner-witness features as strong evidence for a specifically Christian source, it must establish that those features are appreciably more expected under reliable Holy-Spirit authentication than under live rival sources.
 2. Felt certainty, transformation, scriptural fit, and communal confirmation also arise through incompatible religious traditions, culturally shaped interpretation, ordinary cognitive processes, and possible misattribution.
 3. No independent low-error discriminator currently shows that the Christian cases form an appreciably more source-specific or reliable class.
 4. Taken together, the comparative overlap in item 2 and the missing discriminator in item 3 support the judgment that the available record does not establish the expectation difference required by item 1.
- C. Therefore the available record does not justify treating those accessible features, by themselves, as strong evidence for the specifically Christian source attribution over its live rivals.

The move from items 2 and 3 to item 4 is a defeasible inductive judgment. Once items 1 and 4 are granted, however, the conclusion follows: the record has not met a necessary condition for strong source-specific evidence. Better source-specific accuracy, asymmetric prediction, or correction data could therefore weaken the empirical case rather than being ruled out in advance.

Three forms of indistinguishability should be kept separate.

- *Phenomenological overlap*: subjects report similar felt qualities, such as presence, certainty, peace, awe, or seeming communication.
- *Interpretive overlap*: the same broad experiential materials can be classified through different religious vocabularies.

- *Error-control overlap*: rival communities use structurally similar confirmation rules, such as coherence with their own scripture, recognized fruits, authorized testimony, or intensified conviction.

None entails that all experiences have the same cause. Together, however, they raise the false-positive problem for any accessible criterion claimed to identify a uniquely Christian source.

4 The Empirical Profile

4.1 Cross-cultural recurrence and cultural shaping

The most relevant empirical evidence concerns not whether spiritual-presence events are real experiences, but how their occurrence and interpretation vary. Luhrmann and colleagues conducted four complementary studies across the United States, Ghana, Thailand, China, and Vanuatu, using interviews and quantitative measures with participants from charismatic Christianity and other locally salient traditions. Cultural models of a porous mind-world boundary and individual absorption predicted reports of vivid spiritual-presence events across sites and faiths (Luhrmann et al., 2021). The study does not establish that every report has a non-divine cause. It shows that socially learned models and styles of attention help explain who reports such events, how often, and in what form.

That finding bears directly on specificity. If culturally variable expectations and attentional practices predict the occurrence or classification of experiences, then phenomenology is not an independent channel that simply deposits doctrine into a passive subject. Ann Taves's building-block approach similarly directs inquiry away from treating "religious experience" as a *sui generis* object and toward the processes by which experiences are selected, deemed special, and attributed religious meaning (Taves, 2009). Interpretation is not necessarily fabrication; it is part of the causal and epistemic history that a source claim must address.

The empirical evidence does not imply that religious subjects are irrational or mentally ill. Luhrmann and colleagues explicitly study vivid events within ordinary religious lives, and sensed presence exists on a broad continuum. Nor does cultural shaping distinguish religion from every other epistemic domain. Perception and testimony are also theory-laden and socially scaffolded. The relevant comparison is whether a practice has correction mechanisms capable of separating truth-tracking influence from context-driven appearance.

4.2 Ordinary mechanisms and the genetic-fallacy constraint

Predictive-processing and neurocognitive accounts describe mechanisms through which prior expectations, interoception, agency attribution, multisensory integration, and error monitoring may contribute to religious and spiritual experiences (van Elk & Aleman, 2017). More recent work urges a complex-systems perspective and warns against both crude reductionism and a simple dualism between brain process and spiritual meaning (Jedlicka & Havenith, 2025). This caution improves the argument.

A neural or psychological explanation is not, by itself, a disproof of divine action. Every ordinary veridical perception has a neural history. A defender may hold that the Holy Spirit works through normal cognition. Debunking arguments require more than a genealogy; they need an epistemically problematic connection between the process and truth (Thurrow, 2023). The evidential point is therefore conditional:

If the same accessible features arise through processes that are not reliably connected to specifically Christian truth, then those features alone have reduced power to identify a specifically Christian source.

This is an undercutting argument about source attribution, not a deductive argument for naturalism. Ordinary mechanisms matter because they enlarge the false-positive class and explain variation without presupposing the target doctrine. They do not prove that the deity described by the Christian God-concept is absent from the process.

4.3 Conflicting content

The strongest pressure comes not from generic recurrence alone but from doctrinal collision. Reports interpreted as communications from the Holy Spirit can support beliefs incompatible with reports attributed to other deities, spirits, ancestors, or nondual realities. Even within Christianity, apparent guidance conflicts across denominations and communities. Massive disagreement does not show that every party is equally reliable, but it prevents confidence from serving as its own discriminator (Dormandy, 2023b).

One response distinguishes an ineffable or common experiential core from later doctrinal interpretation. That move may preserve a broad transcendent reading. It simultaneously limits how much specifically Christian content the experience supplies. If the common core is peace, unity, presence, or transformation while Trinity and gospel claims enter through subsequent interpretation, then the experience may support transcendence or practical reorientation more readily than exclusive Christian doctrine (Jung, 2025).

5 A Qualitative Likelihood Comparison

Likelihood analysis compares model packages, not bare labels. Let D denote the observed profile: cross-tradition recurrence, culture-linked content, prediction by absorption and porosity, and conflicting source attributions. Let M_C be a specified Christian-authentication model and M_O an ordinary cognitive-cultural model. Their likelihood ratio is

$$\text{LR}_{C/O}(D) = \frac{\Pr(D \mid M_C)}{\Pr(D \mid M_O)}. \quad (2)$$

Equation (2) does not assign numbers and does not produce posterior odds without priors. It disciplines the question: which features were expected before the observations were used to reshape the models? Broad labels such as “Christianity” and “psychology” are too elastic. Table 2 states five more useful packages.

Table 2: Model packages and their antecedent expectations

Model package	Expected accessible pattern	Fit with the observed profile
Narrow Christian authentication (M_C^*)	Distinctively Christian content, a low rate of rival positives, and recognizable defeat or correction conditions.	Cross-tradition collisions and culture-linked content are comparatively surprising unless additional auxiliaries are added.
Broad Christian mediation (M_C^B)	The deity described by the model may use ordinary mechanisms, allow ambiguous experiences, operate without accessible markers, and permit extensive error.	Compatible with the profile, but the profile then supplies little differential support for specifically Christian authentication.
Ordinary cognitive-cultural model (M_O)	Experience frequency and content vary with attention, practice, expectation, social learning, and individual traits; incompatible attributions occur.	Directly expects the major observed regularities without settling whether a transcendent cause also exists.
Pluralist-transcendent model (M_P)	Traditions encounter or enact a common transcendent reality while interpreting it through different conceptual schemes.	Fits shared phenomenology better than exclusive doctrinal content; may preserve broad spiritual significance while conceding Christian underdetermination.
Deceptive-spirit model (M_D)	Some vivid religious experiences are produced by non-divine spirits that imitate authentic marks.	Expands the false-positive class inside Christian theology; without independent limits, it can accommodate almost any outcome and predicts little.

The components of D also cannot simply be multiplied as though they were independent. Cultural training may jointly affect interpretation, practice, and reporting, while absorption may affect both event frequency and vividness. Several observations can therefore trace one causal pathway. A disciplined comparison asks whether each component adds a likelihood contrast after conditioning on the others and on selection or reporting processes. Convergence is strongest when evidential channels have genuinely separate error sources; otherwise a common cause can make many measurements repeat substantially the same information (Fitelson, 2001; Sober, 2008).

The evidence weighs most clearly against M_C^* , the model that promises an accessible and reliably source-specific witness. The same evidence does not straightforwardly refute M_C^B . A divine agent could choose ambiguity, employ ordinary cognition, allow competing experiences, or withhold public discriminators. Yet those permissions reduce the probability contrast that would make the observed experience evidence for the model. A theory can become harder to falsify by permitting more outcomes while becoming less confirmed by any one of them.

This is why the conclusion should not repeat the crude formula that “naturalistic causes are more likely than the Holy Spirit.” The comparison is model-relative. M_O gives a direct account of the accessible regularities, but it does not logically exclude divine concurrence. M_P can interpret recurrence positively. M_D treats some apparent spirituality as deception. What the evidence does robustly show is that phenomenology and confidence do not isolate M_C^* from this field.

Posterior judgment will also vary with prior commitments. A Christian with strong independent grounds may retain high confidence in M_C^B . The present evidence may then have a modest updating role rather than overturning the worldview. But the experience cannot be used to generate the strong prior and then be redescribed through that prior without circular amplification. The inner witness has substantial contrastive force only if its accessible profile was appreciably more expected under the favored model before the model was adjusted to fit it (Sober, 2008).

6 Intratheological Defeaters and Error Tests

Christian sources themselves recognize apparent spiritual error. The instruction to test the spirits in 1 John 4:1, the warning that Satan may appear as an angel of light in 2 Corinthians 11:14, and the demand to test everything in 1 Thessalonians 5:21 introduce a theological false-positive class. One need not believe that deceptive spirits exist to see the conditional point. A Christian who invokes these warnings accepts that vividness, sincerity, and apparent spirituality are insufficient identifiers within the Christian framework.

Three common tests follow. Each has a legitimate role, but none automatically resolves the public comparison.

6.1 Coherence with Scripture

Scriptural coherence can function as an internal consistency test: an apparent message that contradicts a community’s canonical commitments may be rejected. It cannot, without additional support, authenticate the canon and the experience simultaneously. Rival traditions can test experiences against their own authoritative sources. The result may be disciplined interpretation within a worldview, but it is not yet a worldview-neutral source discriminator.

This does not make the procedure irrational. Many epistemic practices use background commitments. The difficulty arises when coherence with Scripture is offered as independent evidence that the source is the Holy Spirit while the authority of Scripture is itself grounded partly in the same witness. The loop may be coherent and devotionally stable while remaining contrastively question-begging. Bagger’s insistence on explanatory and historical context is relevant here: experiences cannot be evaluated apart from the frameworks that make their interpretations available (Bagger, 1999).

6.2 Fruits and transformation

Enduring patience, courage, generosity, sobriety, or reconciliation are morally and practically important. They can be evidence that a practice benefits a person. Yet transformation occurs across religions and secular disciplines, and improvement in one domain does not entail the truth of a complete doctrine. To discriminate sources, fruits would need a specified relation to truth, appropriate comparison groups, prospective measures, and an accounting of harms and failures rather than a curated success archive.

An embodied or pragmatic account may willingly stop at practical reliability. Jung's proposal gives transformation a central epistemic role while restricting doctrinal content (Jung, 2025). That is a coherent option. It supports the claim that an experience can matter deeply without uniquely authenticating Christianity.

6.3 Self-authenticating certainty

The strongest internal claim is that the Holy Spirit produces a certainty with its own mark, one that genuine recipients recognize without inference. If that claim describes an externalist relation to truth, parity at the level of conscious access does not refute it. If it is offered as an accessible method of discrimination, however, it faces the central problem: incompatible claimants report an analogous immunity to doubt, and no shared error test identifies which certainty carries the truth-linked mark.

Calling the experience self-authenticating therefore has two readings. On the metaphysical reading, a genuine witness may have a special relation to truth even if outsiders cannot identify it. On the methodological reading, felt certainty licenses source attribution. The first remains a conditional possibility; the second confuses confidence with specificity.

7 Strong Replies and Their Limits

The argument can now be tested against its strongest replies.

Table 3: What the principal replies preserve

Reply	What it successfully protects	What remains unresolved
Externalist warrant	A true Christian belief may be warranted through a truth-linked process unavailable to reflection.	How finite agents identify that process among internally similar rivals.
Principle of credulity	Religious experience need not be rejected merely for lacking an antecedent proof.	Whether disagreement, cultural shaping, and alternative generators supply defeaters.
Divine use of ordinary mechanisms	Neural and psychological explanation does not exclude divine action.	What pattern differentiates divine use from ordinary operation alone.
Common transcendent core	Cross-tradition recurrence may support broad spiritual disclosure.	How specifically Christian propositional content follows from the common core.
Transformative fruit	An experience or practice can have real moral and therapeutic value.	Whether the benefit is source-specific and truth-conducive rather than nonexclusive.
Expected divine ambiguity	A relational or non-coercive theology may predict inconclusive public evidence.	Why the ambiguous experience itself should strongly identify a specifically Christian source.
Cumulative testimony	Multiple reports can increase evidential weight when they are conditionally independent and source-specific.	Whether shared formation, authorities, selection, or reporting filters explain the apparent convergence.

7.1 “The argument demands an impossible neutral standpoint”

No inquiry begins from nowhere. The requested independence is local, not absolute. A discriminator need not be accepted by every possible worldview; it must avoid deriving all of its positive verdict from the very source claim under assessment. Corroboration can be partial: prospective accuracy, cross-checking by independently informed observers, stable error rates, or predictions that constrain later interpretation. Ordinary perception is not incorrigible or theory-free, but its correction loops extend beyond repeating that perception is reliable.

7.2 “A deity is not a laboratory object”

The argument does not require experimental control over a deity. It requires clarity about what the claim predicts. If the witness is said only to establish an unobservable covenant relation with no accessible consequences, then laboratory demands are misplaced and public evidence is correspondingly limited. If it is said to generate recognizable knowledge, guidance, doctrinal content, or reliable discernment, those effects create ordinary comparative questions. The scope of evidence follows the scope of the causal claim.

7.3 “The deity may intend evidential ambiguity”

A Christian theology may antecedently expect ambiguity because non-coercive relationship, soul-making, or responsible inquiry would be impaired by overwhelming disclosure. This is a substantive reply: ambiguity is not surprising under every Christian model, and it may itself call for investigation rather than dismissal (Baker-Hytch, 2023). The limit is internal to the reply. A model that predicts an ambiguous experiential field cannot simultaneously treat an ambiguous experience as strong source-specific evidence without adding some independent discriminator. The appeal is strongest when its theological rationale precedes the observed pattern; introduced only after a result, it functions as an unconstrained auxiliary.

7.4 “Many Christian testimonies form a cumulative case”

Aggregation can strengthen evidence. If separately situated witnesses report a source-specific feature that a Christian model predicted and rival models did not, their agreement may raise the likelihood ratio. But a large count is not automatically a large evidential gain. Shared liturgy, teaching, authorities, elicitation practices, social networks, and publication filters can make testimonies conditionally dependent. Treating each as a fresh confirmation then counts a common source repeatedly. A cumulative case becomes stronger when it models those dependencies, reports the full denominator, and finds convergence across channels with genuinely different error sources (Fitelson, 2001; Sober, 2008).

7.5 “Nonbelievers lack the relevant faculty”

That response is possible within Plantinga’s model. It also risks insulating the model from error: agreement confirms the faculty, disagreement is explained by its absence or malfunction, and no independent observation settles which diagnosis applies. Dormandy argues that such divine-help epistemologies can encourage noetic entrenchment when alleged insider advantages dismiss impartialist evidence; her proposed corrective is not to erase tradition-specific evidence but to make it answerable to common evidential checks (Dormandy, 2023a). The response gains evidential content only by specifying antecedent conditions under which the faculty should operate, recognizable outputs, and cases that would count against the diagnosis. Otherwise it remains a conditional theological explanation rather than a public discriminator.

7.6 “Religious diversity is no worse than disagreement elsewhere”

Disagreement does not automatically destroy rational belief. Science, ethics, and politics contain deep disputes. The comparison turns on error correction. Scientific communities can disagree while sharing measurement protocols, predictive tests, and public records that sometimes force convergence. Religious communities also possess serious disciplines of interpretation and communal discernment, but source attributions often remain tied to the authorities whose reliability is disputed. Diversity is therefore not a knockdown objection; it is pressure to

identify the mechanisms by which error is exposed rather than redescribed.

8 A Constructive Discriminator Program

A source-specific witness model need not promise infallibility or spectacular miracles. It does need some account of what a true positive, false positive, false negative, and correction look like. The following program turns that demand into answerable questions rather than an ultimatum.

Table 4: Prospective tests for a source-specific witness claim

Dimension	Potential positive evidence	Required error control
Content specificity	Prospectively recorded content that exceeds what prior teaching, cues, and inference make likely.	Blind coding, comparison traditions, and a record of incorrect or vague content.
Calibration	Confidence in apparent guidance tracks later accuracy rather than remaining uniformly maximal.	Pre-outcome confidence records, scoring rules, and no retrospective reclassification of failures.
Cross-tradition symmetry	The same standards applied to Christian and non-Christian reports yield a stable differential.	Matched cases, shared criteria, and adjudicators blind to the favored identity where possible.
Robustness	The claimed signature persists when expectancy, group pressure, and elicitation practices vary.	Controls for absorption, prior belief, social reinforcement, and demand characteristics.
Correctability	The community can identify mistakes, lower confidence, and improve future discernment.	A public denominator of successes and failures plus explicit defeat conditions.
Independent convergence	Information or guidance is corroborated by evidence not causally downstream from the same testimony or authority.	Source-independence analysis and safeguards against shared leakage or reinterpretation.
Denominator transparency	All prospectively recorded promptings and guidance outcomes, not only striking successes, are available for comparison.	Predefined coding of hits, misses, vague reports, withdrawals, and post hoc reinterpretations.

The program is deliberately plural. A defender might reject laboratory elicitation yet accept longitudinal records of guidance. Another might deny that the witness conveys novel information yet claim it reliably produces appropriate confidence in gospel truths. The relevant tests would differ. What cannot do the work is an unspecified promise that every outcome is compatible with genuine witness.

Denominator transparency is especially important because memorable successes travel while mundane failures disappear. A prospective registry would not presume that every prompting makes a testable prediction; it would first classify the claim being made and then preserve its outcome without retroactive upgrading, narrowing, or deletion. Such a record would let defenders distinguish evidential silence from failure and would make genuinely exceptional accuracy more visible rather than less.

Ethical and theological constraints matter. No responsible study should provoke distress, manipulate sacred practices deceptively, or treat people as specimens. Many useful controls are observational: timestamped reports, prospective predictions, error ledgers, matched comparisons, and independent corroboration. The first improvement is often conceptual rather than experimental: state what the witness is expected to accomplish and what would lower confidence in a particular attribution.

Positive results would not prove every Christian doctrine. They would establish a differential pattern requiring explanation and would increase the likelihood of models that anticipated it. Negative or null results would not

prove that the Holy Spirit never acts. They would lower confidence in the tested difference-making claim and motivate a narrower theology. This symmetry is the mark of a genuine test: both success and failure constrain belief.

The core norm.

A source claim becomes evidentially stronger when it risks accessible error. The more a model permits every phenomenology, every doctrinal distribution, and every correction failure, the less any particular inner experience can confirm it.

9 Conclusion

The inner witness should not be evaluated by asking whether religious experiences are real or meaningful. Many clearly are both. The decisive question is what those experiences distinguish. Occurrence, causal origin, propositional content, and epistemic authority are separate achievements. A person may undergo genuine peace, conviction, presence, or transformation without thereby acquiring an accessible mark of a uniquely Christian source.

The strongest Christian models survive a crude parity objection. Plantinga's externalism allows genuine and counterfeit experiences to feel alike while differing in warrant; Alston and Swinburne rightly resist treating religious experience as guilty until independently proven innocent; embodied accounts preserve a practical or transcendent role that is thinner than doctrinal authentication. Those successes clarify rather than dissolve the central burden. Conditional warrant is not a method of source identification, *prima facie* trust remains answerable to defeaters, and broad transcendence does not entail specifically Christian content.

Cross-cultural recurrence, culture-linked interpretation, ordinary cognitive scaffolding, incompatible attributions, and Christian warnings about deception jointly undermine specificity. They do not establish naturalism. They show that accessible phenomenology has multiple plausible generators. Nor should correlated observations or socially dependent testimonies be counted as independent confirmations. A narrow model predicting distinctively Christian, low-error authentication is pressured by that profile. A broad Christian model can absorb it, including by predicting ambiguity, but only by surrendering much of the differential expectation that would make the experience strong evidence for the model.

The appropriate verdict is therefore neither dismissal nor certification. Inner assurance may nurture devotion, guide a life, or possess conditional first-person warrant. In public and comparative inquiry, however, it should move confidence only to the extent that it comes with independent error controls, asymmetric predictions, and a record of correction. Until such discriminators are supplied, the rational posture is calibrated underdetermination: take the experience seriously, take its alternatives seriously, and do not ask felt certainty to identify a source it cannot yet distinguish.

Calibrated verdict. The inner witness may have personal, practical, or conditional epistemic value, but its accessible features do not presently distinguish a specifically Christian source from live alternatives strongly enough to bear substantial public evidential weight.

A Formal Reconstruction of the Central Thesis

The central inference is comparative and defeasible. It does not attempt a deductive disproof of theism, divine causation, or every possible first-person warrant.

- P1.** For the available record to justify treating accessible inner-witness features as strong evidence that the Holy Spirit is their specifically Christian source, it must establish that those features are appreciably more expected under reliable Holy-Spirit authentication than under live rival religious, cognitive-cultural, and deceptive-source explanations.
 - P2.** Felt certainty, transformation, scriptural fit, and communal confirmation are also expected under live rivals and are observed across incompatible traditions and ordinary cognitive-cultural pathways.
 - P3.** The available record supplies no independent low-error discriminator establishing that the Christian cases are appreciably more source-specific or reliable than those rival positives.
 - P4.** Taken together, P2 and P3 support the judgment that the available record does not establish the expectation difference required by P1.
- C.** Therefore accessible inner-witness features do not presently provide strong public or contrastive evidence that the Holy Spirit is their specifically Christian source.

Validity. The transition from P2 and P3 to P4 is inductive rather than deductive. Given P1 and P4, however, C follows validly: the available record has not met a necessary condition for strong source-specific evidence. This is an inference about what the evidence presently justifies, not a deduction that no source-specific difference could exist. The conclusion remains bounded to the evidential role of accessible features; it does not entail that no experience is divine or that an externalist Christian account could not be true.

Support for the premises. P1 expresses the conceptual requirement that strong comparative evidence discriminate a target from relevant alternatives. P2 and P3 are supported by cross-tradition recurrence, culture-linked interpretation, ordinary cognitive scaffolding, conflicting attributions, dependence among testimonies, and the absence of a public correction record. P4 is the defeasible assessment of that cumulative profile. These empirical and interpretive premises are substantial but revisable: prospectively successful, source-specific tests with transparent errors could reduce their support and change the conclusion.

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