

Is the Christian God Sufficiently Visible in Nature to Justify Universal Culpability — 18

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Central claim

A strong reading of Romans 1:18–21 treats nature as a public disclosure of the Christian God-concept clear enough to make every responsible nonbeliever blameworthy. That charge requires evidence that is clear, specifically Christian, broadly accessible, and proportionate to the blame. Yet underdetermination, culturally mediated belief, and credible nonresistant nonbelief fit limited, socially interpreted natural evidence better than a universally clear Christian disclosure. Nature alone therefore does not justify universal culpability, although it may support generic theism for some and the argument does not deny personal revelation.

Preview:

Target claim

Nature publicly identifies the Christian God-concept sufficiently for universal blame.

Required implication

Every responsible person receives clear, specifically Christian, broadly accessible, proportionate evidence.

Observed pressure


Shared nature yields incompatible identifications, culturally patterned uptake, and credible nonresistant nonbelief.

Rational conclusion

This pattern fits limited, socially interpreted evidence better; nature alone cannot justify universal blame.

The argument concerns nature alone. It neither requires identical evidence for every person nor treats disagreement by itself as proof against theism.

Visual preview:



The infographic maps the paper's four fairness conditions and the gap between natural awe and identification of the Christian God-concept. It is a conceptual map, not a quantitative measure; its cultural panel denotes substantial mediation, not cultural determinism. Its phrase "unfounded culpability" means that nature alone does not establish the public case for universal blame, not that every person is innocent of every wrong.

Abstract

Romans 1:18–21 is often read as teaching that nature makes the Christian God-concept so evident that every responsible nonbeliever is “without excuse.” This paper argues that nature alone does not justify that universal charge. The governing comparison is between a universally clear Christian disclosure and limited natural evidence interpreted through culturally acquired concepts and testimony. Universal culpability requires evidence that is clear, specifically Christian, broadly accessible, and proportionate to the blame imposed. The public record pressures each condition: natural order remains compatible with incompatible metaphysical accounts; the distribution and transmission of belief show substantial cultural mediation; and credible nonresistant nonbelief challenges the claim that every responsible failure to believe is culpable suppression. Together, these strands fit limited, socially interpreted evidence better than a universally clear disclosure and block the move from possible creator-evidence to universal blame for failing to identify the Christian God-concept. Replies based on fine-tuning, a damaged *sensus divinitatis*, freedom-preserving hiddenness, extra-natural revelation, and weaker readings of Romans 1 either leave the specificity problem intact or change the evidential basis of the charge. The conclusion does not disprove theism or deny personal revelation. It requires a narrower intellectual practice: natural theology may be offered as evidence, but disagreement itself should not be treated as proof that a dissenter knowingly suppresses a specifically Christian conclusion.

Keywords: natural revelation; Romans 1; Christian God-concept; divine hiddenness; nonresistant nonbelief; culpability; religious diversity

1. The Charge in the Cosmic Courtroom

Imagine humanity called into a cosmic courtroom. The charge is not merely that people acted selfishly or ignored conscience. It is that every responsible nonbeliever failed to acknowledge a particular divine reality even though nature made that reality plain. The prosecution points to ordered skies, living systems, beauty, dependence, and moral experience. The apostolic phrase “without excuse” supplies the verdict. On this reading of Romans 1:18–21, disbelief is not simply mistaken; it is a culpable suppression of what all people already know.

That charge carries a demanding burden. The world contains the same stars and storms for everyone, but it has not produced one unmistakable religious identification. People have interpreted nature through polytheistic, deistic, pantheistic, monotheistic, non-theistic, and undecided frameworks. Many inherit a tradition; some leave it; some seek and remain unconvinced. If universal blame rests on natural revelation, the relevant evidence must do more than permit a religious interpretation. It must make the required conclusion sufficiently recognizable to all responsible people within the charge’s scope.

The phrase *God-concept* will mean a specified conception of a deity. The *Christian God-concept* therefore includes more than generic agency behind the cosmos: at minimum, the personal creator identified by the Christian tradition and, in orthodox forms, the triune deity disclosed through Israel and Jesus. *Theism* will refer more generally to belief in one or more divine realities. This distinction matters because evidence for generic theism is not automatically evidence for Christianity, just as evidence for design is not automatically evidence for the identity, character, or intentions of a designer.

The paper addresses Christians and apologists who use Romans 1 to defend a public charge of universal culpability. It does not argue that this is the only possible reading. A mainstream commentary can treat creation as a genuine disclosure that leaves humanity accountable, while alternative Pauline scholarship reads the passage’s rhetoric and imagined interlocutor quite differently (Moo, 2018; Stowers, 1994). The question here is conditional: *if* the strongest culpability reading is advanced as a public argument, does nature provide the evidence it needs? The answer defended throughout is no. The observed pattern fits limited natural evidence interpreted through culture and testimony better than a universally clear Christian disclosure. Nature alone therefore cannot carry the identity and moral burden of universal blame.

2. What the Strongest Reading Requires

The target is best stated as the **strong natural-revelation thesis**: for every morally responsible person, the natural world makes the Christian God-concept sufficiently evident that a failure to believe results from blameworthy resistance rather than reasonable uncertainty, limited access, or nonculpable error. The thesis concerns persons capable of the relevant judgment; it does not turn infants or people without that capacity into counterexamples. Its strength lies in the words *every*, *sufficiently*, and *Christian*.

Four fairness conditions follow from the evidential use of the thesis.

1. **Clarity.** Nature must make a divine conclusion recognizable rather than merely compatible with what is observed. Evidence can be genuine yet too ambiguous to ground blame.
2. **Specificity.** The evidence must identify the Christian God-concept, or at least the content for which rejection is condemned. Generic creator-evidence cannot silently carry the full doctrinal burden.
3. **Broad accessibility.** The evidence must be available and intelligible across the relevant range of cultures, education, cognitive styles, histories, and circumstances. Universal exposure to nature is not the same as universal access to one interpretation of it.
4. **Proportionality.** The strength of the evidence must be proportionate to the seriousness and universality of the blame. The greater the charge, the less acceptable it is to infer guilt from contestable evidence alone.

These conditions do not assume that a deity must overwhelm every mind with a demonstration or remove all possibility of doubt. Ordinary responsibility rarely requires mathematical certainty. It does require a fair opportunity to recognize what one is blamed for rejecting. Nor do the conditions require identical evidence for each person. They require adequacy for each person included in the universal charge.

The conditions also separate two questions that are often blurred. First, can a person reasonably interpret nature theistically? Second, does nature make non-theistic judgment culpable for everyone? The first can be true while the second is false. C. Stephen Evans, for example, develops an account of natural signs whose force depends partly on a person's disposition and interpretive setting (Evans, 2010). Such signs may rationally contribute to belief without functioning as a public proof of universal guilt.

The burden of the universal charge

1. Universal culpability based on nature alone is justified only if nature gives every responsible person evidence that is clear enough, specific enough, accessible enough, and proportionate to the blame imposed.
2. Public evidence about nature and belief gives serious reason to think these conditions do not hold together for every responsible person.
3. Therefore nature alone does not justify the charge of universal culpability.

The second premise is the disputed one. It should not be asserted from disagreement alone. The next sections develop a cumulative case from distinct but converging pressures.

3. Nature Underdetermines Religious Identity

Natural theology begins from real features of experience: contingent existence, apparent order, intelligibility, consciousness, moral awareness, beauty, or parameters hospitable to life. The important point is not that these features are evidentially empty. It is that their interpretation is contested and often underdetermined. Evidence is

underdetermined when more than one incompatible account can explain or accommodate it without the evidence decisively selecting among them.

The classic design debate illustrates the problem. Even if order suggests intelligence, further questions remain about the number of designers, their power, goodness, relation to the world, and resemblance to traditional religious concepts. Hume's dialogue presses precisely this gap between an observed effect and the rich identity assigned to its cause, while Oppy's contemporary treatment develops a wider comparative case against theism (Hume, 2007; Oppy, 2013). The identity problem does not disappear merely because a creator hypothesis is possible.

Suppose, for the sake of argument, that fine-tuning raises the probability of purposive agency over an unguided alternative. That conclusion would still not establish a triune creator, incarnation, resurrection, scriptural authority, or a universal human history of culpable suppression. Further premises would be required. Those premises may come from testimony, religious experience, historical claims, or revelation, but then the case is no longer based on nature alone.

The problem is sharpened by symmetry. The same natural grandeur that one observer experiences as a Christian sign may be experienced by another as evidence of a remote creator, an immanent sacred order, many agencies, or no agency at all. The fact that an observation fits the Christian God-concept does not show that it identifies that conception. **Awe is not identification. Compatibility is not culpability.**

Religious ambiguity is therefore not an afterthought. McKim argues that religious diversity and ambiguity should affect the confidence with which believers assess their own outlook, while De Cruz treats disagreement as a possible prompt for epistemic self-improvement rather than an automatic defeater (De Cruz, 2016; McKim, 2001). Both points are consistent with the present argument. Diversity does not prove all traditions false. It does show that movement from shared nature to a particular religious identity is not transparent enough to assume universal blame without further support.

Specificity verdict. Nature may support a creator conclusion, but nature alone does not identify the Christian God-concept. This strand therefore pressures the clarity and specificity required by the universal charge.

4. Cultural Mediation Pressures Universal Access

If nature publicly identified the Christian God-concept with roughly equal adequacy for all responsible observers, religious affiliation should not depend as heavily as it does on family, institutions, migration, switching, and local religious ecologies. This is a comparative expectation, not a demand for a perfectly uniform world. Even clear evidence can be resisted or interpreted differently. Yet a strongly patterned distribution is more natural if religious belief is substantially transmitted and socially maintained than if one highly specific conclusion is independently plain to everyone.

Large-scale demographic data show both persistence and change. Pew Research Center's global study draws on more than 2,700 censuses and surveys across 201 countries and territories. It documents substantial regional differences, demographic reproduction, and religious switching rather than a simple world of isolated inferences from nature (Hackett et al., 2025). The responsible conclusion is not the slogan that belief merely tracks geography. People reason, convert, leave traditions, and encounter multiple sources of evidence. The narrower conclusion is that social location strongly shapes which live interpretations people receive, trust, and examine.

Maitzen argues that the uneven demographics of theism create a hiddenness problem for a perfectly loving deity, especially where religious affiliation is geographically concentrated (Maitzen, 2006). Hick's pluralist account likewise treats religious responses as historically and culturally diverse engagements with a transcendent reality rather than uniform access to one tradition's full description (Hick, 1989). These arguments have generated replies, and cognitive science does not yield a clean prediction that every mind is naturally theistic. Green emphasizes that cognitive dispositions, cultural scaffolding, and the distribution of belief interact in complex ways (Green, 2023). This complexity limits any simple demographic proof. It simultaneously weakens the claim that one specific divine identity is naturally obvious to every responsible person.

The key distinction is between *exposure* and *identification*. Everyone is exposed to some part of nature. Not everyone is exposed to the same concepts, testimony, arguments, vocabulary, counterarguments, or religious practices. A person cannot identify the Trinity in a sunset without acquiring concepts that the sunset itself does not supply. If those concepts arrive mainly through historically contingent communities, nature is not doing all the evidential work attributed to it.

This cultural mediation also complicates moral assessment. A Christian raised in a Christian setting may interpret natural order through familiar doctrine without consciously reconstructing an argument. A Hindu, Muslim, Buddhist, traditional practitioner, secular humanist, or religiously unaffiliated observer may encounter the same order through a different inherited framework. Calling only the first interpretation an unmediated recognition and all others a willful suppression assumes the verdict that the public argument was meant to establish.

Accessibility verdict. Social formation does not decide whether a belief is true. It does show that universal exposure to nature is not universal access to one specifically Christian interpretation. This strand therefore pressures broad accessibility rather than the truth of theism itself.

5. Nonresistant Nonbelief Pressures Universality

The strongest direct challenge comes from apparently sincere, capable people who are open to relationship with a perfectly loving deity yet remain unconvinced that such a deity exists. Schellenberg's hiddenness argument makes nonresistant nonbelief central: if a perfectly loving personal deity exists, one would expect that no capable person who is open to relationship would be left without belief through no fault of that person's own (Schellenberg, 1993, 2015). The full hiddenness argument is broader than this paper's target, but its cases matter immediately for universal culpability.

One need not accept every disputed self-description at face value. People misunderstand their motives, resistance can be subtle, and belief is affected by character as well as evidence. The universal charge nevertheless needs more than the possibility of hidden resistance. It claims that *every* responsible nonbeliever culpably suppresses adequate revelation. Treating nonbelief itself as proof of suppression makes that claim immune to counterevidence: sincere inquiry can never count because its failure is redescribed as guilt.

Recent work strengthens the challenge. Blanton argues that nonresistant nonbelief is pervasive, focusing on people who lack responsibility for acquiring belief rather than merely on unusually reflective seekers (Blanton, 2025). Elbert connects recognizability directly to just accountability: blaming people for a failed divine relationship requires adequate evidence and a fair opportunity to respond (Elbert, 2026). These arguments remain contestable, but they make a crucial burden visible. To justify universal culpability publicly, an advocate must establish not only that resistance occurs but that no responsible counterexample exists.

The cumulative point is modest but consequential. The existence of one genuine nonresistant nonbeliever would defeat the universal psychological claim. Public evidence may not let outsiders certify every person's interior state. It does provide credible testimony, diverse life histories, and no reliable method for diagnosing universal suppression. In a courtroom analogy, uncertainty about every defendant's guilt does not help a universal prosecution. It limits the verdict that the available evidence can support.

Culpability verdict. Credible nonresistance prevents a public presumption that every nonbeliever received adequate evidence and then culpably suppressed it. This strand therefore pressures the universality and proportionality of the charge.

6. Why the Pressures Converge

The three pressures play different roles. Table 1 states what the universally clear-disclosure view leads us to expect, what the public record instead pressures, and what each strand contributes without overclaiming.

Evidence strand	Expected under clear disclosure	Observed or argued pressure	Comparative force	Limit
Religious specificity	Nature makes the Christian God-concept recognizable, not merely possible.	Natural order remains compatible with incompatible accounts and supplies no distinctively Christian history or doctrine.	Pressures clarity and specificity; extra-natural content is still required.	Does not show that every natural-theology argument fails.
Belief distribution	One specific conclusion is broadly accessible despite cultural difference.	Affiliation and interpretation are substantially shaped by family, region, institutions, and switching.	Pressures broad accessibility.	Demographic patterns do not decide truth and are not culturally deterministic.
Nonresistant nonbelief	Every responsible nonbelief results from culpable resistance to adequate evidence.	Credible seekers and other nonbelievers appear to lack belief without rejecting a recognized divine reality.	Directly pressures universality and proportionality.	Interior motives are difficult to verify case by case.

Table 1: Evidence ledger for the central comparison. The three strands are not treated as statistically independent or converted into numerical probabilities. Their joint role is to test the four fairness conditions required by the public charge.

No row independently proves that the Christian God-concept is false. Underdetermination concerns specificity and shows why additional Christian content must come from beyond nature. Demographics concern access and mediation. Nonresistant nonbelief concerns the universal claim about culpable suppression. The strands converge because each pressures a different condition required by the same public charge.

This is a cumulative induction, not a probability calculation. The inference asks which account better anticipates the pattern. If nature were a universally clear Christian disclosure, widespread interpretive ambiguity, strong social mediation, and credible nonresistant nonbelief would be surprising. If nature supplies limited cues that people interpret through culturally acquired concepts, testimony, and practice, the pattern is much less surprising. The public record therefore fits limited, socially interpreted evidence better than universally clear disclosure. That comparison does not prove theism false; it explains why nature alone fails to meet the burden of universal blame.

Two deductive bridges discipline that induction. First, universal blame requires all four fairness conditions; evidence that one condition fails for some responsible person blocks the universal conclusion. Second, evidence that leaves incompatible identities open cannot by itself justify blame for failing to select one of them. The cumulative evidence supports the premises of those bridges. It does not replace them.

The specificity bridge

1. Natural evidence uniquely identifies the Christian God-concept only if it discriminates that conception from incompatible alternatives.
2. The relevant features of nature do not discriminate the Christian God-concept from incompatible alternatives: they remain compatible with those alternatives and supply no distinctively Christian historical or doctrinal content.
3. Therefore nature alone does not uniquely identify the Christian God-concept.
4. A universal charge for failing to make that identification cannot be justified by nature alone.

7. The Strongest Replies

7.1 Fine-tuning can make generic theism reasonable

An advocate may argue that cosmic fine-tuning, contingency, consciousness, or moral experience makes purposive creation the best explanation. The present argument need not deny that such considerations can rationally support generic theism. It asks what follows about identity and blame. A creator conclusion does not specify Trinity, incarnation, scriptural history, or the interior culpability of every dissenter. The reply therefore helps with possible theistic support but leaves the specificity bridge intact.

Nor does the point require a neutral view from nowhere. All reasoning occurs within background beliefs. The fairness question is whether the evidence accessible to the accused is adequate for the charge. If substantial theological content must be imported from a tradition before nature becomes recognizably Christian, that tradition—not nature alone—is carrying the additional content.

7.2 A *sensus divinitatis* may be damaged by sin

Plantinga's model of warranted Christian belief includes a *sensus divinitatis*, a natural disposition that can produce theistic belief in appropriate circumstances, while sin disrupts its proper functioning (Plantinga, 2000). This can explain, from within a Christian framework, why evidence that seems evident to one person does not produce belief in another. It does not by itself establish a public charge against every nonbeliever.

The difficulty is evidential symmetry. If belief is taken as evidence that the faculty works and nonbelief as evidence that sin damaged it, every possible distribution confirms the model. The model may form part of a larger theology, but it cannot be used non-circularly to prove that each apparent counterexample is culpable. Baker-Hytch offers a sophisticated defense of sin-based responses and distinguishes different kinds of epistemic and moral failure (Baker-Hytch, 2023). That nuance helps avoid a crude claim that every doubt is consciously chosen. It also shows why a universal verdict requires person-specific moral argument rather than an inference from nonbelief alone.

7.3 Hiddenness may protect freedom or relationship

Another reply holds that greater divine obviousness would coerce belief, damage freedom, or prevent morally valuable relationship. The literature on divine hiddenness contains many versions of this response and many challenges to it (Howard-Snyder & Moser, 2002). The central distinction is between recognizing that someone exists and freely loving or obeying that person. Clear awareness of another agent normally leaves room for indifference, resentment, defiance, and love. It is therefore not obvious that evidence adequate for recognition would force a relationship.

More importantly, a freedom-preserving reason for ambiguity conflicts with the public culpability claim. If nature is intentionally ambiguous enough to preserve distance, one cannot then assume it is simultaneously clear enough to make every mistaken identification blameworthy. The same ambiguity cannot do opposite evidential work without an additional account of how it remains adequate for each person.

7.4 Religious experience, miracles, or scripture supply the remainder

Personal experience, reported miracles, historical testimony, and scripture may be offered to identify the Christian God-concept more specifically. An advocate might also argue that religious knowledge is intentionally social: people are meant to learn through communities rather than infer everything independently from nature. Such evidence and social transmission deserve assessment on their own terms. They cannot rescue the claim that *nature alone* renders every responsible nonbeliever culpable. Their use changes the argument's evidential base and concedes that shared nature does not supply the specifically Christian remainder by itself.

This reply therefore creates a legitimate but different project. The question becomes whether a person's total evidence—natural, historical, testimonial, experiential, and moral—supports Christian belief and what

responsibility follows in that person's circumstances. That individualized inquiry is more plausible than a universal verdict, but it surrenders the claim that shared nature already settles the case.

7.5 Romans 1 may make a weaker claim

A final response narrows the exegesis. Perhaps Romans 1 concerns recognition of divine power, dependence, or moral disorder rather than full identification of Christian doctrine. Perhaps its rhetoric addresses a particular interlocutor or condemns idolatrous practice rather than every intellectually sincere nonbeliever. Such readings may reduce the philosophical burden and deserve textual evaluation (Moo, 2018; Stowers, 1994).

The cost is equally clear. A weaker reading cannot support the strongest apologetic conclusion. If nature discloses only generic divinity or grounds a limited moral accountability, then additional argument is required before all non-Christian or non-theistic judgment can be classified as culpable suppression. The present critique is compatible with that retreat because its target is precisely the inference from shared nature to universal blame for failing to recognize the Christian God-concept.

8. What Rational Accountability Would Require

Rejecting the universal charge does not make belief involuntary in every respect or excuse every form of inquiry. People can avoid evidence, protect identity, reason carelessly, or reject unwelcome conclusions. Believers and nonbelievers alike can be intellectually irresponsible. The correct moral assessment must therefore attend to conduct: whether a person sought relevant evidence, represented opponents fairly, revised beliefs when warranted, and acted honestly within genuine limits.

That approach is more exacting than a blanket acquittal and fairer than guilt by category. It also separates propositional error from moral failure. A person can reach a false conclusion without culpable negligence; a person can hold a true conclusion for prejudiced or careless reasons. Universal culpability based on religious affiliation collapses those distinctions.

The result matters for apologetic practice. An advocate may present natural-theology arguments as invitations, explanatory proposals, or parts of a cumulative personal case. What the advocate should not do is convert their contestable conclusion into evidence about an opponent's hidden motives. The move from "I find this persuasive" to "you already know it and suppress it" bypasses the very disagreement that needs argument.

It matters theologically as well. A doctrine of judgment may appeal to conscience, action, response to available light, or divine knowledge of each person's circumstances. Those possibilities fall outside the public thesis assessed here. They do not require humans to diagnose every nonbeliever as culpable from the mere fact of nonbelief. Restraint about that diagnosis is not a denial of Christian theology; it is recognition that a universal public charge needs public evidence.

9. Conclusion

Nature alone does not justify the universal culpability charge. The public record fits limited natural evidence interpreted through culture and testimony better than a universally clear Christian disclosure. Natural order can be interpreted theistically, yet it remains underdetermined among incompatible identities and supplies no distinctively Christian history or doctrine. Religious belief is substantially mediated rather than independently read from the sky. Credible nonresistant nonbelief blocks the presumption that every responsible failure to believe is culpable suppression.

These pressures work cumulatively. Together they undermine clarity, specificity, broad accessibility, and proportionality—the four conditions that a fair universal charge requires. The deductive bridges then block two moves: from possible creator-evidence to unique Christian identification, and from a contested identification to

universal blame. Fine-tuning or natural signs may support generic theism for some observers; personal revelation or testimony may add specifically Christian content. Neither route establishes that nature alone made every responsible dissenter culpable.

The conclusion does not make nature religiously meaningless, disprove theism, deny personal revelation, or settle every reading of Romans 1. It does require a change in apologetic practice. Natural theology may be offered as an argument, but disagreement itself should not be treated as evidence that an opponent knowingly suppresses a specifically Christian conclusion. In the cosmic courtroom, compatibility is not identification, and contested identification is not a sufficient basis for universal blame.

A. Formal Reconstruction of the Central Thesis

A.1 Argument from the conditions of just blame

1. A public charge that every responsible nonbeliever is culpable on the basis of nature alone is justified only if the public evidence establishes that nature gives every such person evidence that is sufficiently clear, specifically Christian, broadly accessible, and proportionate to the blame imposed.
2. The public evidence does not establish those conditions for every responsible person if nature remains religiously underdetermined, its interpretation is substantially culturally mediated, and credible unresolved cases of responsible nonresistant nonbelief remain.
3. Nature remains religiously underdetermined, its interpretation is substantially culturally mediated, and credible unresolved cases of responsible nonresistant nonbelief remain.
4. Therefore the public evidence does not establish the four conditions for every responsible person.
5. Therefore nature alone does not justify the public charge of universal culpability.

The inference is valid as a conditional argument: the second and third premises yield the fourth, and the first and fourth yield the conclusion. Its soundness depends on whether the four conditions are necessary for a just public charge and whether the three pressures accurately characterize the public record. The body supports those claims cumulatively rather than claiming mathematical proof. The conclusion concerns what nature publicly justifies; it does not claim direct access to every person's interior state or disprove theism.

A.2 Argument from religious specificity

1. Natural evidence uniquely identifies the Christian God-concept only if it discriminates that conception from incompatible alternatives.
2. The order and intelligibility of nature do not discriminate the Christian God-concept from incompatible alternatives: they remain compatible with those alternatives and contain no distinctively Christian historical or doctrinal content.
3. Therefore nature alone does not uniquely identify the Christian God-concept.
4. Universal blame for failing to identify the Christian God-concept is justified by nature alone only if nature uniquely identifies that conception.
5. Therefore nature alone cannot justify universal blame for failing to identify the Christian God-concept.

This inference is valid if the first, second, and fourth premises are granted. The primary dispute concerns whether natural order contains enough discriminating content to favor the Christian God-concept over incompatible alternatives. Even a successful argument for purposive creation would establish at most a creator conclusion unless further historical, testimonial, or experiential premises supplied Christian identity. The result therefore remains limited to the evidential gap between generic theism and the universal Christian culpability claim.

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