

When a Promise of Reliable Access Meets Religious Diversity and Silence

Revised August 2026

The strong Christian sincere-seeking promise says that any genuinely open seeker can reliably gain access to the specified Christian God-concept. If that promise were a dependable public method, sincere outcomes should converge on its target, travel comparatively well across cultural boundaries, and leave little apparently nonresistant nonbelief. Instead, contradictory discoveries, cultural dependence, and apparently nonresistant nonbelief are more expected under ordinary human mediation, so the evidence weakens the promise as a reliability claim; it does not deductively disprove theism or every private religious experience.

The visual follows the paper's comparison. A strong promise points toward reliable access; the observed branches instead include contradictory outcomes, cultural dependence, and unanswered seeking. Human mediation better anticipates that pattern. The conclusion is deliberately limited: the promise is evidentially weakened, not deductively refuted, and theism is not disproved.

Abstract

A strong Christian sincere-seeking promise is evidentially vulnerable because the religious record does not display the kind of access the promise leads people to expect. This paper distinguishes that strong promise from modest invitations to seek, defines its target as a specified Christian God-concept, and derives three public expectations: meaningful convergence on the target, comparative portability across cultural boundaries, and accessible success conditions that leave little apparently nonresistant nonbelief. Each expectation meets pressure. Sincere seekers report incompatible discoveries; religious perception and affiliation depend strongly on inherited concepts and culturally trained attention; and some apparently open persons report sustained nonbelief despite serious inquiry. Those observations are not logically incompatible with a hidden deity, since purposive-hiddenness, relationship, and transformation accounts can accommodate them. The relevant question, however, is comparative: are the observations more expected if the promise reliably connects sincere seekers with its target, or if human cognition, testimony, expectation, and community mediate the outcomes? The latter account makes contradiction, cultural dependence, and nonbelief comparatively unsurprising. The cumulative record therefore disconfirms the strong public promise relative to ordinary human mediation. It does not entail atheism, invalidate every private experience, or settle every version of divine hiddenness.

Keywords: divine hiddenness; sincere seeking; religious disagreement; nonresistant nonbelief; religious experience; cultural transmission

1. The Promise Under Pressure

Some Christian speech offers more than an invitation to inquire. It promises that anyone who seeks with sufficient sincerity will find the religious target. When a seeker does not find it, the promise is often protected by relocating the failure into the seeker: the person was proud, resistant, morally compromised, impatient, or secretly unwilling to accept the answer. That response may occasionally be correct. Treated as a general explanation, however, it makes a public promise difficult to test and burdens the very people to whom the promise was addressed.

The target must be specified before the evidence can be assessed. A *God-concept* is a particular conception of a deity, including the attributed character, intentions, relationship to human beings, and mode of self-disclosure. The promise examined here concerns the Christian God-concept identified by recognizably Christian claims about revelation and relationship. It is not satisfied merely because a seeker finds meaning, feels awe, adopts a moral outlook, or reaches some incompatible religious conception. Those may be valuable outcomes, but they do not verify this promise's advertised target.

The target claim is also stronger than the claim that seeking sometimes helps, that some people experience an apparent divine presence, or that religious understanding may require patience. Call it the *strong sincere-seeking promise*:

Strong sincere-seeking promise

For any adequately informed person who honestly and persistently seeks the specified Christian God-concept and remains willing to respond, the seeking process provides reliable access to that target within a humanly significant interval.

Each qualification protects the promise from an obvious caricature. *Adequately informed* excludes a person who has never encountered the relevant claim. *Honestly and persistently* excludes a theatrical or momentary test. *Willing to respond* excludes inquiry arranged so that no answer could matter. *Humanly significant interval* avoids demanding an immediate spectacle while preserving the practical meaning of a promise addressed to finite lives. These qualifications still leave an empirical and epistemic claim: the method should connect open seekers with the named target more reliably than ordinary human mediation would.

This paper's central thesis is therefore comparative. A strong Christian sincere-seeking promise predicts reliable, comparatively culture-independent access to the specified Christian God-concept. Contradictory out-

comes, cultural dependence, and apparently nonresistant nonbelief fit human mediation better, so that promise is evidentially weakened—not theism deductively disproved.

This thesis belongs to the literature on divine hiddenness but has a narrower object. Schellenberg's hiddenness argument emphasizes the possibility of nonresistant nonbelief and asks why a perfectly loving personal deity would permit it (Schellenberg, 1993, 2015). The present argument does not require a complete theory of perfect love. It begins with a promise people actually use as a public assurance and asks what evidential signature a reliable method should leave.

2. What Reliable Access Should Change

A claim of access has evidential content only if it makes some difference to what should be observed. The promise need not predict uniform personalities, identical churches, or agreement on every doctrine. It should nonetheless predict a discernible advantage over the processes by which human beings ordinarily acquire contested beliefs.

2.1 Convergence on the named target

Reliable inquiry need not produce complete unanimity. Medical diagnosis, historical research, and ordinary perception all permit error. Yet a reliable method should produce more target-specific agreement among sincere and adequately situated inquirers than would occur if prior expectation, testimony, social reinforcement, and interpretive habit were doing most of the work. If seekers repeatedly reach mutually incompatible religious conclusions while using the same sincerity defense, the mere fact that each reports a discovery cannot authenticate all of them.

Convergence here is modest but real. It means a tendency to identify the promised target strongly enough to distinguish success from a sincere arrival elsewhere. A promise whose success can include Christian conversion, Islamic conviction, Hindu devotional experience, nonsectarian spirituality, agnosticism, and silence no longer identifies a reliable route to one specified target.

2.2 Comparative cultural portability

All communication uses language and culture. The relevant expectation is not cultural blankness. It is comparative portability: if the target actively makes itself findable to sincere seekers, inherited culture should not dominate the result to the extent expected when people learn religious categories from families and communities. Exposure will matter, but the promised access should partly overcome that starting-point dependence.

This distinction prevents an overstatement. Cultural variation alone does not refute a transcendent source. It becomes evidence against the strong promise when the variation follows human channels—available concepts, authoritative testimony, social trust, ritual practice, and trained attention—without a comparably visible correction toward the named target.

2.3 Accessible success conditions

A usable promise must permit sincere persons to understand and meet its conditions. If every apparent counterexample can be assigned an invisible defect, then the promise cannot guide self-assessment or public evaluation. The seeker is told to be sincere, yet sincerity is retrospectively denied whenever the advertised result does not occur.

This does not mean sincerity is transparent or infallible. People misunderstand their motives. The narrower point is methodological: a reliability claim loses evidence when its failures are explained only by a condition that insiders infer from the failure itself. The result becomes circular:

1. Every sincere seeker finds the target.

2. This seeker did not find the target.
3. Therefore the seeker was not sincere.

The inference is valid only if the first premise is already known independently. It cannot serve as evidence for that premise.

Table 1 separates the strong claim from more modest claims that may survive the evidence.

Claim	Expected public trace	Failure condition	Status here
Strong promise	Reliable target-specific access among adequately informed, open, persistent seekers	Recurrent contradiction, cultural dependence, or apparently nonresistant nonbelief	Evidentially weakened
Modest invitation	Seeking sometimes deepens understanding, commitment, or experience	No benefit at all across relevant cases	Not rejected
Private testimony	A person reasonably interprets an experience within a religious framework	Defeat depends on the person's total evidence	Not globally invalidated
Hiddenness defense	A deity may have reasons not to provide unmistakable access	Defense must explain why the strong promise should have been expected	Philosophically open, but not a rescue of the strong promise by itself

Table 1: Different claims carry different evidential burdens. The argument targets the first row rather than treating all religious inquiry or experience as one proposition.

3. Contradictory Discoveries

Religious experience can be epistemically serious for the person who has it. Alston argues that socially established practices of putative divine perception may confer *prima facie* justification on participants even when they cannot prove the practice from neutral premises (Alston, 1991). That proposal helps explain why a participant need not dismiss an experience merely because outsiders remain unconvinced. It does not make incompatible practices jointly reliable with respect to contradictory claims.

The central difficulty is symmetry. Seekers in different traditions can report sincerity, moral transformation, answered prayer, a sensed presence, and an increased willingness to live according to what they take themselves to have learned. Their conclusions may concern incompatible revelations, authorities, and conceptions of the deity. If Christian testimony is credited because it has these features, comparable non-Christian testimony cannot be dismissed merely because it leads elsewhere. Conversely, if incompatible outcomes show that sincerity and vivid experience can coexist with error, those same features cannot by themselves verify the Christian outcome.

The argument does not require pretending that all traditions are identical. Their texts, practices, histories, and claims differ. Nor does it require a census establishing equal numbers in each group. The problem arises once the same advertised route—sincere openness interpreted through experience and community—supports incompatible target claims. A target-specific method should show some discriminating advantage that the common features of testimony do not supply.

Debates collected by Howard-Snyder and Moser and by Green and Stump show how many conceptions of hiddenness, relationship, evidence, and reasonable belief remain live within philosophy of religion (Green & Stump, 2016; Howard-Snyder & Moser, 2002). That sophistication matters: there is no single crude hiddenness argument to which one reply settles everything. It also sharpens the present challenge. Once the promise is treated

as a method of public access, its defender owes a reason to expect the observed contradiction under reliable target contact rather than under fallible interpretation.

The symmetry constraint

A feature that equally accompanies incompatible outcomes cannot, without further discriminating evidence, establish that one of those outcomes was reliably reached by the shared route. Sincerity may be necessary for the promise; sincerity alone is not a truth-tracking mechanism.

One reply is that the promised target discloses itself in a form adapted to each culture, so surface contradiction masks a deeper unity. That proposal may explain diversity by broadening the success condition. It does so at a price: the stronger the incompatibilities admitted as successful contact, the less the promise identifies the specified Christian God-concept. A defense of generic transcendence is not yet a defense of target-specific access.

4. Culture, Training, and Religious Perception

The religious geography of the world is not random. Communities transmit sacred stories, exemplars, ritual skills, expectations, and vocabularies for interpreting unusual events. Maitzen argues that the uneven demographics of theistic belief create a hiddenness problem because birthplace and culture strongly affect the availability and uptake of theistic belief (Maitzen, 2006). His argument concerns theism's distribution broadly; for the sincere-seeking promise, the relevant lesson is that the starting environment powerfully shapes which target is even available to be found.

Cross-cultural psychological evidence makes the mediating process more specific. In a study of more than two thousand participants across five cultures and several religious settings, Luhrmann and colleagues found that cultural models of the mind and individual absorption were associated with reports of vivid spiritual presence (Luhrmann et al., 2021). The study does not show that all such experiences are false. It shows that experience reports are sensitive to learnable ways of attending to mental events and construing the boundary between mind and world.

That finding fits a familiar pattern. People notice what their concepts enable them to classify. They interpret felt presence, coincidence, inner speech, dreams, consolation, and distress through available models. Communities then stabilize some interpretations through testimony and practice. Under a human-mediation account, the pattern is unsurprising:

1. inherited concepts determine which interpretations are salient;
2. practices train attention toward certain experiences;
3. trusted testimony supplies a model of what success should feel like;
4. social reinforcement strengthens interpretations that fit the community;
5. the resulting conviction can be sincere, vivid, and behaviorally important.

None of these steps entails deception. Human mediation is not a synonym for cynical manufacture. It includes normal perception, memory, testimony, expectation, emotion, and social learning. A mediated belief may be true; the point is that these mechanisms predict dependence on prior formation whether or not the target exists.

The strong promise adds an active corrective: sincere seekers are supposed to gain reliable access to the particular target. If that correction operates, one should expect some target-specific signal that is not largely traceable to the distribution of concepts and training. The evidence does not have to be culture-free. It must be sufficiently culture-transcending to distinguish promised access from ordinary transmission.

The defender may answer that all perception is trained. Expertise changes what a radiologist sees in an image and what a musician hears in a performance. True. But training supports reliability when there is an

independent feedback structure: pathology, repeatable measurement, interobserver checks, predictive success, or publicly correctable performance. Religious training often supplies interpretation without a comparably shared adjudicator among competing traditions. The analogy therefore identifies what is needed rather than providing it.

5. Apparently Nonresistant Nonbelief

The third strand concerns people who report neither an incompatible discovery nor a rejected disclosure, but absence. Some persons study, pray, participate, seek counsel, examine their motives, and remain willing to respond, yet report no belief-producing contact with the promised target. Schellenberg calls attention to *nonresistant nonbelief*: lack of belief in persons who are not culpably closed to relationship with a perfectly loving personal deity (Schellenberg, 1993, 2015).

The sincere-seeking argument and the nonresistant-nonbelief argument overlap without being identical. A nonresistant person may not be engaged in an intense search at every moment. A sincere seeker may still harbor forms of resistance. The evidential intersection is enough: apparently open and serious inquirers sometimes remain unconvinced despite conditions that resemble the promise's advertised antecedent.

No observer can inspect another person's motives perfectly. That limitation applies in both directions. Defenders cannot simply certify every professed seeker as wholly transparent, but neither can they know that each unsuccessful seeker concealed resistance. The proper response to uncertain inner states is calibrated evidence, not a universal verdict against the absent party.

A responsible assessment therefore distinguishes three claims:

- **Certain counterexample:** a particular person's sincerity and total absence of access are known beyond doubt. The argument does not require this.
- **Best interpersonal judgment:** some people display the persistence, openness, cost-bearing, and self-correction normally used to judge sincerity. This is often available.
- **Population-level expectation:** it is improbable that every apparently sincere unsuccessful seeker has a hidden disqualifying defect. This gives the evidence cumulative force.

The strong promise may survive any single case by citing an unknown defeater. It becomes less credible as those defeaters are multiplied without independent evidence. A theory that predicts success but repeatedly explains apparent failure through inaccessible personal defects is not deductively falsified. It is insulated at the cost of predictive and pastoral usefulness.

6. The Cumulative Comparison

The three strands matter together because they press distinct expectations. Contradiction challenges target specificity. Cultural dependence challenges portability. Apparently nonresistant nonbelief challenges accessible success conditions. Table 2 displays the comparison without claiming that each observation has equal weight.

The comparison is probabilistic. Let the observed record be the conjunction of substantial incompatible discovery, cultural dependence, and apparently nonresistant silence. Human mediation plainly permits all three. The strong promise can also permit them if auxiliary explanations are added: defective seekers, delayed disclosure, culturally adapted revelation, soul-making distance, or divine reasons beyond human grasp. The question is not bare compatibility. It is how expected the combined record is under each account before those observations are used to tailor the explanation.

This distinction blocks a common mistake. Showing that a theory *can* accommodate evidence does not show that the evidence fails to count against it. A fair coin can produce twenty heads, but that result favors a heavily heads-biased coin. Likewise, a strong promise plus enough auxiliary reasons can accommodate contradiction,

Evidence strand	Strong-promise expectation	Human-mediation expectation	Evidential contribution
Contradictory outcomes	Open, informed seeking tends toward the specified target	Sincere people interpret experience through different concepts and authorities	Favors mediation when common authenticity markers accompany incompatible conclusions
Cultural dependence	Target access partly corrects inherited starting points	Belief and reported presence vary with concepts, training, testimony, and social trust	Favors mediation to the extent that outcomes track formation without a clear target-specific correction
Apparently nonresistant nonbelief	Accessible conditions yield contact within a humanly significant interval	Some persistent inquirers remain unconvinced when cognition and evidence do not produce belief	Favors mediation when failure is explained only by inferred hidden resistance

Table 2: Evidence ledger for the comparative argument. Each row bears on a different public implication of the strong sincere-seeking promise.

culture, and silence. If those features are more natural under ordinary human mediation, they shift comparative support toward that account.

The inference remains limited in three ways. First, the comparison is between the strong promise and human mediation as an explanation of seeking outcomes, not between exhaustive worldviews. Second, human mediation can operate even if a deity exists. Third, weakening a promise does not identify which larger theology, if any, is correct. The result concerns the public reliability of the advertised route.

7. The Strongest Replies and Their Costs

7.1 The seeker was not truly sincere

Some failed searches undoubtedly involve hostility, haste, vanity, or impossible demands. The reply becomes evidentially costly when it is generalized from outcome to motive. If sincerity is denied because the target was not found, the promise becomes immune to counterevidence by definition.

A stronger version would identify success conditions independently, apply them prospectively, and accept that a person can meet them without producing the expected result. Such a version would be testable. It might also become a probabilistic promise—sincere seeking often helps—rather than the strong universal assurance examined here. That retreat can be reasonable, but it concedes the paper’s central point.

7.2 Hiddenness protects freedom or relationship

Perhaps unmistakable disclosure would coerce belief, cheapen relationship, or obstruct moral formation. Moser develops a transformative approach in which suitable evidence is purposively available to persons willing to be morally transformed rather than merely to spectators seeking detached proof (Moser, 2008). This reply rightly rejects the assumption that a personal deity must behave like a laboratory object.

It does not automatically rescue the strong promise. Belief that another person exists does not compel love, trust, or obedience. Moreover, the promise already conditions access on openness and willingness to respond. If suitably willing seekers still encounter contradiction or silence, the appeal to relationship needs an account of why clearer target identification would defeat rather than enable relationship.

The reply may instead narrow the promise: disclosure occurs only when, how, and to the extent that it serves a transformative purpose known to the deity. That position can be internally coherent. It is no longer a public guarantee that all sincere seekers will find the target within conditions they can recognize. It exchanges predictive reach for theological flexibility.

7.3 Human expectations misconstrue transcendence

Rea argues that divine hiddenness should be considered within a broader theology of divine personality and presence, cautioning against imposing human expectations on a transcendent personal reality (Rea, 2018). The caution is important. No finite observer should assume that a deity must satisfy every preferred mode of evidence.

Yet the present expectations are derived from the promise, not from a general demand for spectacle. A claim of reliable access entails some distinction between success and failure. If transcendence removes any expectation of convergence, cultural portability, or accessible conditions, it also removes the basis for assuring seekers that the route is reliable. Mystery can limit what a promise means; it cannot simultaneously preserve strong content and erase every observable implication.

7.4 Diversity is a pedagogical good

Religious diversity may cultivate humility, dialogue, or moral growth. Even if so, beneficial consequences do not establish that incompatible target claims are accurate. A teacher may use uncertainty productively while still leaving students unable to identify the promised answer.

The reply also faces distributional questions. Confusion and silence do not impose equal costs. Some seekers lose communities, marriages, vocational paths, or a stable self-understanding while trying to follow the promised route. A pedagogical defense needs more than the possibility that someone benefits; it needs a reason why these particular burdens accompany a promise of reliable finding.

7.5 Private experience supplies enough evidence

Private experience may justify belief for the subject even when it cannot settle public disagreement. Alston's account is strongest at precisely this first-person level (Alston, 1991). The present argument need not deny such justification categorically.

The limitation is comparative and interpersonal. When similar confidence, transformation, and seeming presence accompany incompatible conclusions, those features underdetermine which target was reached. Private justification does not automatically aggregate into public confirmation of a universal promise. The person may remain reasonable while the method remains unverified for outsiders and unsuccessful seekers.

8. The Ethics of Blaming the Seeker

The argument matters beyond probability. A universal sincerity defense shifts the burden of a failed promise onto a person whose inner life others cannot inspect. It can transform epistemic disagreement into a moral diagnosis: if the target was not found, the seeker must have chosen darkness, loved wrongdoing, wanted autonomy, or refused relationship.

Such explanations may damage people in at least three ways. First, they encourage endless self-suspicion: any honest report of absence becomes evidence of a deeper hidden fault. Second, they authorize communities to discount testimony without examining the promise. Third, they make departure from belief appear morally corrupt even when the person incurred substantial costs in trying to remain.

Intellectual charity does not require accepting every self-description. It requires applying ordinary standards consistently. Communities routinely infer sincerity from long-term conduct, costly commitment, openness to correction, and the absence of obvious gain from deception. Those defeasible standards should not be suspended only when a person's conclusion threatens the promise.

A more responsible pastoral statement would be modest: seeking can be worthwhile; experiences vary; motives are mixed in every camp; no outsider can guarantee a particular result on a deadline; and lack of belief

should not by itself be treated as proof of bad faith. This formulation offers less apologetic certainty. It better fits the evidence and avoids claiming moral knowledge one does not possess.

9. What the Argument Shows—and Does Not Show

The paper supports four positive conclusions.

1. The strong sincere-seeking promise has observable implications because it advertises reliable access to a specified target.
2. Contradictory outcomes, cultural dependence, and apparently sincere silence press different parts of that reliability claim.
3. The combined pattern is comparatively expected if ordinary cognition, testimony, training, and community mediate religious outcomes.
4. Saving the promise through hidden motives or unrestricted divine reasons reduces its testability and practical content.

It does not follow that no deity exists, that Christianity is false in every respect, or that every religious experience is delusional. It does not show that culture causes only false beliefs; every human belief is culturally situated to some degree. It does not establish that every professed seeker is sincere. It does not settle whether a perfectly loving deity could have sufficient reasons for hiddenness.

The argument also does not make the human-mediation account metaphysically exclusive. Human mechanisms could mediate a genuine disclosure. The evidential problem is that the observed pattern does not clearly reveal the promised corrective. When the same mechanisms predict the pattern without a strong promise, the promise earns less support than its advocates often claim.

This bounded conclusion is not evasive. It locates exactly what must change if the promise is to be defended. Advocates can offer independent, target-specific evidence; provide prospectively usable success conditions; explain why reliable contact predicts the actual distribution better than mediation does; or replace the universal assurance with a more modest invitation. What they cannot do without circularity is treat every unsuccessful outcome as proof that its seeker failed the antecedent.

10. Conclusion

The strong Christian sincere-seeking promise is not merely a comforting possibility. It is a reliability claim: adequately informed, open, persistent seekers are told that they can find a specified Christian God-concept. Such a claim should leave a public trace. It should produce meaningful convergence on its target, show comparative portability beyond inherited culture, and provide success conditions that do not convert every failure into an invisible moral defect.

The observed record presses all three expectations. Sincere discoveries conflict. Religious experience and belief track culturally supplied concepts and trained attention. Apparently open people sometimes meet the promise with sustained silence. These facts are not logically impossible under a hidden deity, and sophisticated theories of divine relationship can accommodate them. But accommodation is not prediction. Ordinary human mediation makes the combined pattern comparatively unsurprising.

The defensible conclusion is therefore firm and limited. Contradictory outcomes, cultural dependence, and apparently nonresistant nonbelief weaken the strong sincere-seeking promise relative to human mediation. They do not deductively disprove theism, erase every private justification, or resolve every hiddenness debate. The evidential burden remains where a public promise places it: on the claim that its route reliably reaches its named destination, not on every seeker who reports that it did not.

A. Formal Reconstruction of the Central Thesis

A.1 Plain-language argument

1. A strong sincere-seeking promise claims that adequately informed, open, persistent seeking reliably provides access to the specified Christian God-concept.
2. If that claim is reliable, the public record should show meaningful target convergence, comparative cultural portability, and accessible success conditions that leave little apparently nonresistant silence.
3. The record instead includes incompatible sincere discoveries, substantial dependence on cultural formation, and apparently open seekers who remain unconvinced.
4. Ordinary human mediation through cognition, testimony, expectation, training, and community makes that combined record comparatively expected.
5. A theory may accommodate an observation while still being disconfirmed by it when a live comparator makes the observation more expected.
6. Therefore, the combined record disconfirms the strong sincere-seeking promise relative to human mediation.
7. This comparative result neither entails the nonexistence of every deity nor invalidates every private religious experience.

A.2 Symbols

Let:

- T : the strong sincere-seeking promise defined in premise 1;
- H : the human-mediation account of religious seeking outcomes;
- E_C : substantial incompatible discovery among apparently sincere seekers;
- E_D : substantial cultural dependence in religious belief and reported presence;
- E_S : apparently nonresistant nonbelief;
- E : the conjunction of E_C , E_D , and E_S ; and
- P : a probability measure used for the qualitative comparison.

A.3 Comparative inference

The combined record is defined by:

$$E := E_C \wedge E_D \wedge E_S. \quad (1)$$

The central comparative premise is:

$$P(E \mid H) > P(E \mid T). \quad (2)$$

For positive prior probabilities assigned to H and T , Bayesian odds updating gives:

$$\frac{P(H \mid E)}{P(T \mid E)} = \frac{P(E \mid H)}{P(E \mid T)} \times \frac{P(H)}{P(T)} > \frac{P(H)}{P(T)}. \quad (3)$$

Thus $E_C \wedge E_D \wedge E_S$ shifts the comparative odds toward H and away from T . The inequality expresses the paper's conclusion without assigning artificial numerical values. Its defense rests on the three evidence strands developed in Sections 3–5.

The comparison does not assume that H and T exhaust all possibilities. Nor does H entail atheism: ordinary human mediation could operate in a theistic world. The conclusion is only that the observed record favors H over T as an account of the relevant seeking outcomes. Additional independent evidence could alter the total assessment.

References

- Alston, W. P. (1991). *Perceiving god: The epistemology of religious experience*. Cornell University Press. <https://doi.org/10.7591/9780801471254>
- Green, A., & Stump, E. (Eds.). (2016). *Hidden divinity and religious belief: New perspectives*. Cambridge University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139939621>
- Howard-Snyder, D., & Moser, P. K. (Eds.). (2002). *Divine hiddenness: New essays*. Cambridge University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511606090>
- Luhrmann, T. M., Weisman, K., Aulino, F., Brahinsky, J. D., Dulin, J. C., Dzokoto, V. A., Legare, C. H., Lifshitz, M., Ng, E., Ross-Zehnder, N., & Smith, R. E. (2021). Sensing the presence of gods and spirits across cultures and faiths. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America*, 118(5), Article e2016649118. <https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2016649118>
- Maitzen, S. (2006). Divine hiddenness and the demographics of theism. *Religious Studies*, 42(2), 177–191. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0034412506008274>
- Moser, P. K. (2008). *The elusive god: Reorienting religious epistemology*. Cambridge University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511499012>
- Rea, M. C. (2018). *The hiddenness of god*. Oxford University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198826019.001.0001>
- Schellenberg, J. L. (1993). *Divine hiddenness and human reason*. Cornell University Press.
- Schellenberg, J. L. (2015). *The hiddenness argument: Philosophy's new challenge to belief in god*. Oxford University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198733089.001.0001>