

The Inductive Cherry

Cosmic Origins, Selective Projection, and the Inductions Apologetics Leaves Behind

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Central claim


Invoking ordinary experience to reject an uncaused cosmic beginning does not, by itself, warrant a timeless, immaterial, personal creator. The same evidence base also supports expectations of embodied minds, temporally ordered agency, and causes with intelligible constraints; unless a principled transfer rule explains the asymmetry, selecting only the favorable causal pattern is cherry-picking. This defeats a popular shortcut, not every cosmological argument, and leaves independent metaphysical cases open.

Preview:

Starting move	Fair-transfer rule	Portfolio pressure	Bounded result
Ordinary beginnings have causes, so cosmic origins need a cause.	Project relevant ordinary patterns consistently, or give a principled reason for each exclusion.	Established minds are embodied; observed agency is temporal; ordinary causal explanation supplies constraints.	The causal slogan cannot carry the upgrade to a timeless, immaterial, personal creator by itself.

The issue is not whether causal principles can be defended. It is whether one ordinary-world induction may be treated as decisive while neighboring inductions from the same experience are ignored exactly where they become inconvenient.

Visual preview:



The scale contrasts one selected causal induction with a wider portfolio concerning minds, mechanisms, temporal causation, development, and comparison classes. Its imbalance represents an audit obligation, not a numerical measurement: the conclusion weakens only when excluded patterns lack principled defeaters.

Abstract

The familiar apologetic claim that “we have never seen something come from nothing” recruits ordinary experience to support a cause of the universe and often a timeless, immaterial, personal creator. The move is incomplete. Ordinary experience supplies a portfolio of patterns, not one: beginnings occur under conditions, but independently established minds are embodied, observed agency unfolds through temporal processes, and useful causal explanations impose counterfactual or structural constraints. A fair projection must include relevant patterns with comparable observational standing or explain why each excluded pattern does not transfer. The popular shortcut usually does neither.

This paper separates the generic demand for explanation from the successive upgrades to cause, agency, personhood, and a particular God-concept—a specified conception of a deity. It then applies a transfer audit, a comparison-class test, and a qualitative Bayesian check. The result is a dilemma. If ordinary-world induction carries substantial weight at the cosmic boundary, the broader portfolio places pressure on an unembodied, timeless agent and prevents the favorable causal generalization from deciding the case. If the boundary is too unlike ordinary cases for those neighboring patterns to matter, the slogan about ordinary beginnings loses the force claimed for it. This conclusion does not show that theism is false, that every causal principle fails, or that a personal creator is impossible. It shows that ordinary induction alone does not warrant the richly specified creator conclusion without a principled account of its exclusions.

Keywords: cosmological argument; induction; causal principle; cosmic origins; personal cause; Bayesian evidence; philosophy of religion

1. The Shortcut and the Actual Target

The sentence “we have never seen something come from nothing” is rhetorically efficient because it sounds like a report rather than a theory. We observe fires from fuel, houses from materials and labor, organisms from earlier organisms, and stars forming under physical conditions. The universe is then presented as one more beginning that must have a cause. In contemporary versions of the kalam cosmological argument, further reasoning attributes timelessness, spacelessness, immateriality, power, and personhood to that cause (Craig & Sinclair, 2009). The familiar sentence does not itself establish those further steps, but it lends them the authority of common experience.

The target here is narrow. It is not the bare causal principle, every principle of sufficient reason, every cosmological argument, or theism as such. It is the claim that ordinary induction can do selective work: ordinary experience may rule out an uncaused cosmic beginning, while ordinary patterns concerning minds, agency, temporal order, and explanatory constraint can be dismissed without an independent reason.

That selectivity matters because induction is never just repetition. Hume’s problem shows that projection from observed to unobserved cases requires more than deduction (Hume, 1748/2000). Goodman’s “new riddle” shows that indefinitely many generalizations fit the same past observations; responsible projection depends on which similarities are relevant (Goodman, 1983). Evidence is also comparative: a datum supports one hypothesis over another only insofar as it is better expected under the first (Sober, 2008). These lessons do not abolish induction. They explain why a single memorable regularity cannot be projected across a radical domain change without a rule for relevance.

Governing thesis

If ordinary experience is admitted as evidence at the boundary of the physical order, then all relevant ordinary patterns with comparable observational standing must be considered unless principled defeaters explain their exclusion. A method that selects the favorable causal pattern while leaving adjacent patterns unaudited does not warrant a timeless, immaterial, personal creator by ordinary induction alone.

2. What the Slogan Actually Observes

The observation behind the slogan is weaker than its wording. No one has observed absolute nothingness and then watched an entity emerge from it. The sample consists of transformations and beginnings within an already structured world. A chair begins in a workshop; a tree begins within an ecology; a star forms within spacetime and a field of physical conditions. What experience directly supports is that ordinary changes and emergences occur under antecedent or surrounding conditions.

Three propositions are often compressed:

1. observed ordinary beginnings occur under causal or explanatory conditions;
2. any beginning of the total physical order falls under the same principle in the same way; and
3. the relevant cause is a timeless, immaterial, personal agent.

The first proposition is an ordinary empirical generalization. The second is a bridge from events within the world to the boundary or origin of the world. The third is an explanatory upgrade. Even if the first is granted, the bridge and upgrade need separate support. Morrision's analysis of the kalam argument presses precisely on the move from a beginning to a timeless personal cause (Morrision, 2000); Oppy's wider treatment likewise separates the structural premises of cosmological arguments from the richer conclusions drawn from them (Oppy, 2006).

The phrase "from nothing" can also shift meanings. Absolute non-being is not a quantum vacuum, a field state, a boundary condition, or an initial mathematical description. Rejecting one does not automatically reject the others. Conversely, calling a creator "timeless" or "sui generis" does not explain how the proposed dependence relation works. Semantic discipline applies to both sides: define the beginning, the cause, the target domain, and the conclusion before assigning evidential weight.

2.1 A Worked Example: Keeping One Feature and Dropping the Rest

Consider a stylized version of the argument using a house. This is not a quotation from any one defender. It isolates the evidence policy so that the alleged inconsistency can be inspected one move at a time.

- Step 1. Begin with one ordinary case.** A house begins. Its causes include embodied builders assembling existing materials at a place and time under physical constraints.
- Step 2. Extract the favorable pattern.** From the house and similar cases, the defender retains this generalization: things that begin to exist have causes. Call it the *causal cherry*. It may be reasonable within the observed class.
- Step 3. Project it to a new domain.** If the universe began, the defender says, it also has a cause. The target is no longer another object within spacetime but the boundary of the physical order. Suppose this bridge is provisionally allowed.
- Step 4. Drop the conditions that traveled with the sample.** The cosmic cause is said to need no prior material, place, time, or surrounding causal system because a cause of the physical order cannot depend on that order. This may be arguable, but most of the sampled structure has now been dropped.
- Step 5. Upgrade the cause to a person.** The argument moves from "there is some cause or ground" to "there is an agent who chose to create." Ordinary agency is invoked to make intention and choice intelligible.
- Step 6. Test neighboring patterns from the same experience.** Every independently established builder is embodied. Every observed decision unfolds in time, and known persons act under constraints that let us distinguish one intention from another.

Step 7. Exempt the proposed person from those patterns. When embodiment and temporal agency are raised, the reply may be that a transcendent creator is unique and therefore need not resemble ordinary persons in those respects. But uniqueness is now doing opposite jobs: the universe was similar enough to ordinary beginnings for the causal pattern to transfer in Step 3, while the creator is too different from ordinary agents for the embodiment and temporality patterns to transfer in Step 6.

Step 8. Identify what is missing. No contradiction follows merely from accepting the causal projection and rejecting the neighboring projections. The inconsistency arises when the only selection rule is whether a pattern helps the desired conclusion. A consistent account must identify a relevant difference that licenses Step 3 while blocking Step 6; otherwise the conclusion, rather than a prior rule, has chosen which parts of experience count.

Three consistent ways to finish the example

Strong transfer: let ordinary experience constrain the boundary, but include the causal, embodied-mind, temporal-agency, and explanatory-constraint patterns in the assessment. **Weak transfer:** treat the boundary as too unlike ordinary cases for those patterns to carry much weight, but then stop advertising the causal slogan as decisive ordinary evidence. **Differentiated transfer:** defend an independent principle explaining why the causal pattern transfers and why each neighboring pattern does not. The “cherry” is not the bare conclusion that a cause exists; it is the unargued asymmetry in how the evidence is admitted.

3. The Non-Selective Projection Rule

A projection from ordinary cases to a cosmic boundary needs four checks.

1. **Observed base.** What cases were actually observed? Transformations within spacetime should not be silently redescribed as origins of spacetime.
2. **Relevant similarity.** Which features of the observed cases are supposed to persist at the target? Similarity in the word *beginning* is not enough.
3. **Parity.** Which neighboring generalizations arise from the same observational base, and what principled reason includes or excludes each one?
4. **Comparator.** Does the evidence favor the proposed creator over live alternatives, or is it merely compatible with that creator?

The parity requirement does not say that all inductions have equal strength. Nor does it require a defender to accept every extrapolation. It requires the asymmetry to be argued rather than chosen by destination. An induction may fail to transfer because its observed cases depend on specifically intra-world conditions, because the target lacks a relevant similarity, or because an independent metaphysical argument defeats it. Those are possible reasons. “This pattern supports my conclusion and that one does not” is not.

Pruss offers a sophisticated defense of the principle of sufficient reason and explicitly distinguishes several causal and explanatory principles (Pruss, 2006). Such work is exactly what the popular slogan omits. Once the case rests on a defended metaphysical principle, it should be evaluated as metaphysics rather than presented as the automatic verdict of ordinary observation. The present argument leaves that route open while refusing to let common experience substitute for it.

4. The Inductive Portfolio

The wider portfolio contains at least five relevant patterns. Table 1 states their observational base, the pressure they create, and the limit on each projection.

Table 1: A non-selective ledger of ordinary inductions.

Pattern	Observed base	Pressure at the boundary	Proper limit
Conditioned beginnings	Ordinary emergences occur under prior or surrounding conditions.	A wholly unconditioned beginning is unlike familiar cases.	The total physical order is not obviously one more intra-world object.
Embodied minds	Every independently established mind is associated with an organized physical system.	An unembodied personal cause is unlike uncontested minds.	This is evidence about observed minds, not a proof of metaphysical impossibility.
Temporal agency	Observed deciding, intending, and acting involve ordered cognitive and causal processes.	Timeless choice requires an account unlike familiar agency.	A defender may offer a distinct theory of atemporal agency.
Constrained causation	Useful causal claims support stable relations, contrasts, or counterfactual expectations.	“The creator willed it” needs content that distinguishes outcomes.	Fundamental explanation need not be a mechanical process.
Developed personhood	Known persons acquire capacities through biological and social histories.	A fully formed, beginningless person is unlike known persons.	Development may be contingent rather than essential to personhood.

The ledger is not a scorecard in which four inductions automatically beat one. Its role is diagnostic. The same method that treats the first row as evidential must say what happens to the others. Some may transfer weakly. Some may be defeated. Some may expose only an explanatory burden. But they do not disappear merely because the preferred conclusion is described as transcendent.

The embodied-mind pattern is especially important. The argument does not say that an unembodied mind is contradictory. It says that personhood is being inferred beyond every uncontested case while the inference is advertised as continuous with ordinary experience. The more the creator is said to choose, intend, know, and act, the more the analogy to observed agency is invoked. The more that creator is exempted from embodiment, time, processing, development, and mechanism, the less ordinary agency supplies the promised familiarity.

5. The Boundary-Class Problem

Induction depends on choosing a comparison class. When someone says “things that begin have causes,” the relevant class might be artifacts, organisms, events, physical systems, or contingent entities. The universe understood as the total physical order is not plainly a member of any observed class. The composition of ordinary things also does not guarantee that a principle governing each member governs the totality in the same way.

This does not prove that causal principles fail at the boundary. It identifies a missing bridge. Grünbaum argued that familiar creation questions can be misapplied when physical cosmology does not contain the temporal or explanatory structure those questions presuppose (Grünbaum, 1989). Hartle and Hawking’s no-boundary proposal is one influential illustration of a physical model in which ordinary talk of a prior moment is not straightforward (Hartle & Hawking, 1983). Neither source establishes that reality is uncaused. Together they show why moving from temporal cases inside a model to the boundary conditions of the model is substantive work, not a grammatical consequence of the word *begin*.

The same warning applies in the opposite direction. A timeless personal creator is not a familiar member of the class *person*. If disanalogy blocks the embodiment and temporality inductions, it may also block the causal

induction. If analogy is strong enough to support the latter, the defender must identify why it is weak in precisely the former respects.

The symmetry question

What property makes ordinary causal cases relevant to the universe as a whole while making ordinary mental and agential cases irrelevant to the proposed personal cause? A successful answer may exist, but it must name a difference that bears on the projection. Merely calling the creator “transcendent” restates the exemption.

6. The Personal-Cause Upgrade

Even a successful causal premise yields less than the familiar conclusion. The inferential path contains several stages:

1. the total physical order has some explanation or ground;
2. the explanation is causal rather than mathematical, modal, axiological, or brute;
3. the cause is outside or not constituted by the physical order;
4. the cause is an agent;
5. the agent is personal in a recognizable sense; and
6. the personal cause has the richer attributes of a particular God-concept.

Each step can be argued. None is supplied simply by noticing that ordinary beginnings have conditions. Elimination is not generation: ruling out a physical, spatial, or temporal cause does not by itself produce awareness, intention, discrimination among alternatives, or purposive selection. Morriston’s critique focuses on the difficulty of deriving a personal cause from a timeless first cause, while Craig and Sinclair offer a positive defense of that transition (Craig & Sinclair, 2009; Morriston, 2000). The dispute itself confirms that the upgrade is an argument, not an observation.

Mechanism requires similar care. Woodward’s influential account connects causal explanation with stable counterfactual relations under interventions (Woodward, 2003). A cosmic first cause need not be a machine, and a fundamental explanation may not decompose into lower-level parts. Still, explanatory content requires more than a label. What follows from positing this cause rather than another? Which outcomes would be less expected? What relation connects intention and physical order? If no answer is possible even in principle, the proposal may remain metaphysically compatible with the universe while contributing little public discrimination among hypotheses.

7. Probability Without Decorative Numbers

The probability point is simple even when no responsible numbers are available. Evidence favors one hypothesis over another when the evidence is more expected under the first. The relevant comparison is a likelihood ratio, not merely the fact that the preferred hypothesis can accommodate the evidence.

$$\text{LR}(E; H_T, H_N) = \frac{P(E \mid H_T)}{P(E \mid H_N)}.$$

Plain-English annotation. The evidence E favors the theistic creator hypothesis H_T over a non-theistic boundary hypothesis H_N only when E is more expected if H_T is true. Compatibility is not enough: if both hypotheses make E about equally expected, E does little to choose between them. The formula does not assign numbers or settle the hypotheses' prior probabilities.

Suppose E is the ordinary fact that events within the universe exhibit causal regularity. A theistic creator hypothesis may predict an orderly world, but many non-theistic hypotheses also include stable laws and causal structure. The observation therefore cannot be treated as a large boost for theism without comparing its expectedness across alternatives. Sober's treatment of evidence emphasizes this contrastive structure (Sober, 2008). Van Fraassen's insistence on empirical constraint likewise warns against confusing a model's ability to redescribe an outcome with a discriminating prediction (van Fraassen, 1980).

The missing denominator is only half the problem. A rich creator conclusion is a conjunction: cause, independence from the physical order, timelessness, immateriality, agency, and personhood. Evidence for one component is not automatically evidence for all. Even if ordinary causal experience raises confidence that there is some explanatory cause, the observed dependence of minds and agency on embodied temporal structures may lower confidence that the cause is personal in the proposed way. No exact posterior is needed to see why inspecting only the favorable term is incomplete.

An everyday analogy helps. If a physician considers two diagnoses, one symptom does not support the first merely because the first can cause it. The symptom is useful only in relation to how often each diagnosis produces it, what other symptoms accompany it, and how probable the diagnoses were before the symptom appeared. Cosmic-origin reasoning is harder, but it does not escape the same comparative discipline.

8. The Two-Horn Test

The selective appeal to ordinary experience faces a dilemma.

Horn 1: ordinary induction transfers

If ordinary patterns genuinely constrain cosmic-boundary hypotheses, then the causal pattern enters together with relevant patterns concerning minds, agency, time, and explanatory constraint. The portfolio does not entail naturalism, but it prevents one favored induction from carrying the richly personal conclusion alone.

Horn 2: the boundary is sui generis

If cosmic origins and a transcendent creator are too unlike ordinary cases for the neighboring inductions to matter, then the slogan about what we have observed in ordinary cases loses the very continuity that gave it force. The argument must proceed through independent metaphysics rather than selective appeal to experience.

This is not a dilemma for every cosmological argument. A defender may take the second horn and offer an a priori causal principle, a principle of sufficient reason, a theory of necessary being, or a broader abductive case. A defender may take the first horn and argue that the neglected inductions have principled defeaters. What fails is the easy combination: familiarity when ordinary causation helps, radical exception when ordinary mentality and agency create costs.

9. Strong Replies and What They Preserve

9.1 The causal principle is metaphysical, not inductive

This reply cleanly escapes the accusation of selective induction. If “whatever begins to exist has a cause” is defended as necessary, self-evident, or grounded in a principle of sufficient reason, its warrant does not depend on a sample of observed beginnings. Pruss develops versions of this route in detail (Pruss, 2006). The cost is not incoherence; it is a change of argument. The popular appeal to what “we have seen” is no longer doing the decisive work, and the metaphysical principle must answer objections on its own merits.

9.2 A fundamental cause need not have a mechanism

Agreed, if *mechanism* means smaller moving parts. Explanations eventually reach something fundamental or terminate in laws, structures, or primitives. The portfolio claim is narrower: ordinary causal vocabulary earns explanatory value by supporting stable contrasts and consequences. A fundamental creator need not contain gears, but a public explanation still needs enough content to distinguish what follows from it. Otherwise “personal cause” risks functioning as a restatement of the outcome.

9.3 Agent causation is familiar even if divine agency is not

Observed agents do initiate actions for reasons. But observed agency also involves bodies, temporal deliberation, changing informational states, and a distinction between deciding and acting. A theory of timeless agency may revise those features coherently. It cannot simultaneously rely on familiar agency to make the conclusion intuitive and declare every difficult feature of familiar agency irrelevant. The theory must specify which features constitute agency and why those features survive the revision.

9.4 The creator is necessarily unique and exempt

A unique first cause may differ from all dependent entities. Uniqueness, however, does not tell us which differences follow. It does not by itself yield mind, intention, freedom, goodness, or relation to a religious tradition. Treating every disanalogy as evidence of transcendence makes the hypothesis difficult to test because any missing expected feature becomes another mark of uniqueness. Logical possibility is preserved, but ordinary inductive confirmation is not.

9.5 The best case is cumulative rather than a slogan

This is the strongest reply because it accepts the paper’s central demand. A cumulative argument can combine causal, modal, fine-tuning, moral, consciousness, and religious-experience considerations, while critics offer competing accounts and costs. Mackie and Oppy present influential critical evaluations of such broader cases (Mackie, 1982; Oppy, 2006). The present paper does not adjudicate that whole debate. It insists only that the causal slogan receive no evidential credit beyond the part of the bridge it actually supports.

10. A Better Inductive Audit

A non-selective argument can be both more modest and more rigorous. It should proceed in seven questions:

1. **What is the exact explanandum?** A first temporal event, a finite past, contingent reality, lawlike order, or the existence of anything at all?

2. **What cases form the observed sample?** Do they concern transformations within spacetime or anything relevantly closer to the total boundary?
3. **What bridge licenses projection?** Name the similarity that is causally or explanatorily relevant.
4. **Which neighboring inductions enter?** List them before judging whether they help or hurt.
5. **What defeats an excluded induction?** Supply a reason tied to the domain rather than the desired conclusion.
6. **Which alternatives are compared?** Include the relevant non-theistic, impersonal, deistic, and theistic hypotheses at the same level of specificity.
7. **Which upgrades remain?** Separate explanation, cause, agency, personhood, and a tradition-specific God-concept.

This procedure may leave a generic explanatory demand intact. It may even leave a personal creator as the best conclusion after further argument. But it makes the confidence level visible at each step. It also prevents a common rhetorical slide from “uncaused beginnings are unlike ordinary cases” to “a timeless personal creator is therefore like ordinary causal explanation.”

The constructive replacement is not suspension for its own sake. It is comparative inquiry. Ask which hypothesis has the best total evidential profile, which commitments produce discriminating expectations, and which exemptions are independently motivated. Do not count a favored view’s compatibility with the evidence as confirmation while treating a rival view’s compatibility as evasion.

11. Conclusion

The sentence “we have never seen something come from nothing” is not irrational. It is underdescribed. We have not observed absolute nothingness; we have observed changes within a structured physical order. Projecting that record to the boundary of the whole order requires a bridge, and projecting from some cause to a timeless, immaterial, personal creator requires several further premises.

Once ordinary experience is admitted, it arrives as a portfolio. The same record that supports conditioned beginnings also contains embodied minds, temporal agency, developed personhood, and causal explanations with intelligible constraints. None of these neighboring inductions disproves a transcendent creator. Their force is methodological: they must be included, defeated, or explicitly set aside by a theory that no longer pretends to be a simple extension of common observation.

The two-horn result is therefore stable. If ordinary induction transfers strongly, selective use is illegitimate and the full portfolio blocks the slogan from deciding the rich creator conclusion. If the cosmic boundary is too exceptional for the portfolio to transfer, the slogan loses its ordinary-evidence authority and independent metaphysics must carry the case. Theism, a generic cause, a principle of sufficient reason, and several non-theistic boundary accounts remain live beyond that result.

The requested intellectual change is modest but consequential: stop treating one favorable induction as though it were the whole of experience. State the comparison class, defend the bridge, display the excluded patterns, and make each upgrade earn its own evidence. Induction is not the problem. The cherry is.

Formal Reconstruction of the Central Thesis

Target conclusion. Ordinary induction alone does not warrant the move from familiar causal regularity to a timeless, immaterial, personal creator when relevant neighboring inductions are excluded without principled defeaters. This conclusion does not entail that theism is false, that no explanation of the physical order is needed, or that an independently defended causal principle fails.

A. Plain-language reconstruction

1. If ordinary induction alone warrants a richly specified personal-creator conclusion, then the method must handle all relevant, comparably grounded ordinary inductions non-selectively: it must include them or supply principled defeaters for excluding them.
2. The popular slogan gives evidential weight to the ordinary causal pattern while excluding relevant ordinary patterns concerning embodied minds, temporal agency, developed personhood, and constrained causal explanation without supplying such defeaters.
3. Therefore the slogan's method does not satisfy the non-selective condition required for warrant by ordinary induction alone. (1–2)
4. Therefore ordinary induction alone does not warrant the richly specified personal-creator conclusion through that method. (1–3)
5. If the defender instead denies that ordinary patterns transfer reliably to the cosmic boundary, the slogan loses its ordinary-inductive force and the conclusion must be supported by independent metaphysical premises.
6. The failure of this shortcut is compatible with the truth of theism, a generic explanatory ground, a causal principle, or a personal creator supported on other grounds.

Validity and support. Premise 1 states a normative necessary condition on evidential warrant: selecting relevant evidence by whether it favors the conclusion does not warrant that conclusion. Premise 2 is the diagnosis defended by the portfolio and boundary analyses. Premises 3 and 4 follow by failure of a necessary condition. Premise 5 states the other horn of the dilemma. The inference is deductively valid conditional on those premises; the claims that the neighboring inductions are relevant and lack adequate defeaters in the slogan version are substantive, defeasible judgments.

B. Symbolic reconstruction

Symbols

- *S*: the popular shortcut gives ordinary causal induction weight at the cosmic boundary while excluding relevant neighboring inductions without principled defeaters.
- *N*: the method satisfies non-selective projection by including relevant comparably grounded inductions or supplying principled defeaters for their exclusion.
- *W*: ordinary induction alone warrants the richly specified personal-creator conclusion through this method.
- *T*: the relevant theistic creator hypothesis is true.
- *E*: the total physical order has some explanation or ground.

Necessary-condition argument

$$W \rightarrow N, \quad S \rightarrow \neg N, \quad S \vdash \neg W.$$

Plain-English annotation. If ordinary induction alone warrants the rich personal-creator conclusion, the method must treat relevant ordinary inductions non-selectively. The shortcut, by definition and by the paper's audit, does not meet that condition. Since the shortcut is the method under review, it follows by modus tollens that this method does not provide the claimed warrant. The formula concerns evidential warrant, not the truth or falsity of the creator hypothesis.

Scope limits

$$\neg W \not\models \neg T, \quad \neg W \not\models \neg E.$$

Plain-English annotation. Failure of warrant from this shortcut does not imply that the theistic hypothesis is false, and it does not imply that the physical order lacks every explanation or ground. Either claim may be supported by other arguments. These non-derivability signs preserve the paper's principal limit and prevent a criticism of selective evidence from becoming a deductive disproof of theism.

The two-horn result

$$(N \wedge \text{ordinary projection is strong}) \vee (\text{ordinary projection is weak at the boundary}).$$

Plain-English annotation. On the first horn, the wider inductive portfolio must be considered and the favorable causal pattern cannot decide the personal-creator upgrade alone. On the second horn, ordinary cases are too disanalogous to carry the slogan's advertised force, so independent metaphysical premises must do the work. This is an exhaustive methodological contrast about how the slogan is defended, not an exhaustive list of all metaphysical positions.

Validity and support of the symbolic version. The necessary-condition derivation is valid by modus tollens. Its soundness depends on the non-selective warrant condition and the paper's diagnosis of the shortcut. The scope formulas explicitly block invalid converse inferences. The two-horn formula is a methodological partition whose substantive force depends on the degree of domain transfer a defender claims. Together they reconstruct the same bounded conclusion stated on page 1, in the abstract, in the governing thesis, and in the conclusion.

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