#01 ✓ Consider: Do we dare assess the character and actions of a proposed God before accepting the existence of that God?

Considerations

November 5, 2024

Consider the Following:

Summary: This post questions whether one should evaluate a proposed God’s character and actions before accepting that God as real, arguing that rational belief requires such scrutiny. It contends that any true deity would welcome honest inquiry rather than discourage it, and that assessing a God by their own standards rather than human standards is a circular and potentially misleading approach.

Imagine Cindy marries Roy simply because Roy claims to be a king. Without bothering to assess his character or actions, Cindy assumes Roy truly embodies the qualities of a king. Wouldn’t this seem naive? Wouldn’t it be wiser for Cindy to first verify Roy’s claims before committing her life to him? Now, picture Roy forbidding Cindy from questioning his character, arguing that any inconsistencies or oddities in his actions are beyond her understanding. He tells her, “My ways are not your ways,” asserting that her “lesser” intellect can’t grasp the depths of his character. Wouldn’t this prohibition against scrutiny cast doubt on Roy’s royal status in your mind?

Now, consider a proposed God who similarly prohibits scrutiny and demands unquestioning commitment. Should we accept such a God? Imagine a believer responds to your doubts with horror, saying, “How dare you question God! You lack the wisdom to understand his ways.” How would you respond?

As rational beings, our responsibility is to critically examine all available evidence, both confirming and disconfirming, before committing to a belief. A genuine search for truth should not place any questions off-limits. If an ideology discourages or forbids such questioning, it justifiably becomes suspect. A true ideology should withstand open inquiry and honest doubt.

The Need for Scrutiny in Divine Claims

Why dare to question an alleged God’s claims? Simply put, as honest seekers, we must not abandon our duty to critically assess every claim, especially those about divinity. For each proposed God, it is our duty to examine how their supposed attributes and actions align with what we’d expect from an actual deity. Do we, for instance, expect that an actual creator of the universe would demand child sacrifice when offended? If not, we can reasonably consider such a candidate God improbable. If a God claims to be loving yet permits suffering among those he professes to love, such behavior suggests a lack of coherence with the concept of a benevolent deity. Dismissing our questions as “mysteries” to be accepted without understanding is a deflection that undermines genuine belief.

Wouldn’t it be rational to weigh every candidate God against the qualities we would expect in a genuine deity? Is it not irrational to do otherwise?

Does Love Look Like Hate, and Justice Like Injustice?

Could a truly loving God act in ways that seem unloving to us? Possibly. But rational inquiry demands only that our beliefs align with the evidence as we honestly perceive it. If we are to conclude that a certain God’s character is consistent with justice or love, we must arrive at this through an honest evaluation. If we judge a God improbable because his character contradicts our reasonable expectations, then, any “holy book” condemnations of our honest inquiry ascribed to that God renders that God logically incoherent since we reasonably expect any actual God to encourage rationality.

^{Does genuine love discourage questions?}

Is it not dishonest to embrace belief in a deity despite unresolved questions surrounding his character and the coherency of his nature? Could a truly just God condemn someone for questioning honestly? Wouldn’t a just God invite scrutiny, rather than deflect absurdities as “mysteries”?

The sincere seeker need not fear that a true God would condemn a critical examination of his nature.

Defaulting to an Unsubstantiated God’s Standards

Sometimes, believers argue, “How can you judge God without a divine standard of morality?” Yet these same individuals often reject other deities whose actions seem problematic under the standards of their favorite deity, whose standards they accepted without scrutiny. Is it surprising that all Gods pass scrutiny when judged under their own standards?

We need not blindly accept the standards of a deity we’re still evaluating to judge that deity by those standards. Nor need we abandon our obligation to scrutinize all Gods before we accept them. We responsibly use our own sense of justice, love, and patience to assess if a deity truly possesses those traits. Though fallible, our standards are all we have. To adopt a God’s standards without first examining their validity is to reverse the proper order of belief and assessment.

Once we accept that “love” might look like hate or “justice” like injustice by some divine mystery, how do we distinguish a true God from a deceitful and malevolent God or demon?

In conclusion, a commitment to assess the description and actions of all proposed Gods for logical coherence is far from arrogance and the risk of eternal damnation. Assessing Gods for logical coherence is the transparent responsibility of all honest seekers and and would be welcomed and encouraged by any actual rational God.

Don’t let others circularly convince you that you must defer to the very God in question on the matter of his logical coherence.

A Companion Technical Paper:

FF_02_DONE_Personal_Gods_Shadows_Holy_Books Download

The Logical Form

Argument 1: Rational Requirement for Belief in a God

P1: Any true God would want belief in Him to be rational.
P2: Rational belief requires evaluating all evidence relevant to an alleged deity.
P3: A true God would want humanity to examine all evidence for any alleged deity.
P4: Some versions of Christianity promote a God who discourages this examination.
Conclusion: Therefore, some versions of Christianity promote a God who is unlikely to be actual.

Argument 2: The Duty of Scrutiny in Divine Claims

P1: Honest seekers must critically assess every claim, especially those about divinity.
P2: If a proposed God’s actions or attributes contradict expected divine qualities, we may reasonably doubt that God’s existence.
P3: Some religious teachings discourage such scrutiny.
Conclusion: Therefore, some religious teachings may support belief in a deity whose existence is unreasonable.

Argument 3: Coherency and the Nature of God

P1: A truly just God would not condemn someone for honest questioning.
P2: Some believers assert that doubting God’s character leads to damnation.
Conclusion: Therefore, a God who condemns honest seekers for doubt contradicts the nature of a just God.

Argument 4: The Incoherence of “Divine Mysteries”

P1: If “divine mysteries” allow love to appear as hate and justice as injustice, then these terms lack objective meaning.
P2: Without objective meaning, we cannot distinguish a true God from a deceitful demon.
Conclusion: Therefore, accepting “divine mysteries” that obscure objective meaning prevents us from distinguishing a true God from a deceitful demon.

#01 Formalization

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A Dialogue

Questioning Divine Justice

CLARUS: Chris, if your God is truly just and loving, shouldn’t we be free to question his actions without fear of punishment?

CHRIS: Clarus, that sounds like pride talking. Who are we to question God’s ways? His wisdom far exceeds our own, and we can’t expect to understand everything he does.

CLARUS: But if God’s wisdom is so great, shouldn’t his actions make more sense to us, not less? It seems odd that we’re asked to believe in a being whose actions often contradict the very qualities of justice and love we’re supposed to admire.

CHRIS: You’re thinking too humanly. God’s love might not always look like our version of love. Sometimes, what appears as suffering to us is part of a greater divine plan that we can’t comprehend.

CLARUS: So, you’re saying love could look like suffering and justice could look like injustice, all depending on some “mystery” we aren’t meant to understand?

CHRIS: Exactly! We have to trust that God knows what he’s doing, even if we can’t see it.

CLARUS: But if that’s the case, how can we tell the difference between a truly just God and a demon who just claims to be one? If “love” and “justice” can look like anything, then they mean nothing. We’d have no way to determine if we’re actually following a good being or a deceitful one.

CHRIS: Well, the Bible gives us God’s standards. We aren’t following some random deity; we’re following the God of Scripture.

CLARUS: But that’s circular, isn’t it? You’re judging other gods as false based on the standards of your own God, without any objective measure. Isn’t that like me declaring that only my friend’s definition of “honesty” is valid, so anyone else must be dishonest?

CHRIS: But Clarus, if you use your own understanding, you’ll inevitably misunderstand divine things. That’s why you have to submit to God’s standards before you can truly understand his nature.

CLARUS: But that’s backwards. I’d need to see that this God’s actions match basic standards of justice and love before I believe. You wouldn’t marry someone without verifying their character, would you?

CHRIS: I see your point, but belief requires faith, and faith is trusting in what we can’t fully see or understand.

CLARUS: I get that, but blind faith seems risky. If an ideology discourages questioning, it’s usually hiding something. If God is just and good, wouldn’t he welcome honest inquiry rather than condemn it?

CHRIS: Perhaps, but at some point, faith requires humility to accept things beyond our understanding.

CLARUS: Humility, yes, but not at the cost of reason. A God who would condemn honest questioning seems more insecure than loving. If he truly values justice, he’d want us to pursue truth—even if that includes questioning him. Right?

◉ The Companion #01 Video

◉ The Companion #01 Podcast

Notes:

Helpful Analogies

Analogy 1: The Blind Judge

Imagine a judge who is instructed to assess cases of justice but is told that justice could look like injustice or cruelty. If any action could theoretically be justified as “just,” then justice loses its objective meaning, and no measure of justice remains through which the judge’s decisions can be assessed. Similarly, if divine mysteries allow love to resemble hate or justice to appear as injustice, then distinguishing a true God from a deceptive force becomes impossible.

Analogy 2: The Deceptive Leader

Suppose a politician assures people of their integrity but insists that honesty may sometimes look like deception under certain “higher purposes.” Without a stable, objective meaning for honesty, it becomes impossible to hold this leader accountable. Likewise, if divine mysteries allow terms like love and justice to have no fixed meaning, distinguishing a benevolent God from a malicious being becomes untenable.

Analogy 3: The Fake Currency

Imagine receiving currency that a bank claims may look like counterfeit but is still “genuine” under certain hidden conditions. If “genuine” currency can resemble fake money, then the concept of authenticity loses its value, and you can no longer trust the currency. In the same way, if divine mysteries allow justice to resemble injustice, the very concept of a just God loses meaning, preventing us from discerning true divine goodness from deception.

Addressing Theological Responses

Theological Responses

1. Divine Transcendence Beyond Human Understanding

Theologians might argue that God’s nature is transcendent and therefore surpasses human understanding. What may appear as injustice or hate to human minds might actually be expressions of a higher divine love or justice that we simply cannot fully comprehend. In this view, our conventional terms are limited and cannot encompass the fullness of divine reality.

2. Mystery as a Test of Faith

Another theological response might emphasize that divine mysteries serve as a test of faith for believers. By trusting that God is good even when his actions seem to contradict human moral standards, believers demonstrate faith in his ultimate wisdom and benevolence. This perspective holds that faith itself is strengthened by accepting that God’s ways are beyond our moral frameworks.

3. Redefinition, Not Rejection, of Moral Terms

Theologians may contend that divine mysteries do not reject objective meaning but rather redefine it within a divine context. From this standpoint, terms like love and justice retain their objective meanings, but these meanings are enhanced or broadened by God’s infinite nature. Thus, human understanding of love and justice is considered a partial reflection of God’s perfect qualities, rather than a complete framework for evaluating divine actions.

4. Historical Context of Divine Revelation

Some theologians argue that God’s actions must be viewed within the historical context in which they were revealed. They might assert that certain actions attributed to God in religious texts, which seem harsh or unjust by modern standards, were appropriate for the culture and moral understanding of that time. This perspective suggests that divine actions reflect an adaptive approach to guiding humanity, rather than a fixed adherence to modern ethical standards.

5. Moral Growth Through Divine Mystery

Another response might hold that divine mysteries prompt believers to engage in moral reflection and growth. By grappling with actions or attributes that seem contradictory to human ethics, believers are encouraged to deepen their understanding of moral complexities. This view interprets divine mystery not as moral relativism but as a challenge to grow spiritually and develop a more nuanced comprehension of love and justice.

See “Clarifications” for an explanation of the reference to morality.

Counter-Responses

1. Limits of Divine Transcendence as a Rational Justification

While divine transcendence is often cited as a reason why God’s actions are beyond human understanding, this response can undermine a behavioral assessment and objective meaning. If love and justice lose their fixed definitions due to divine transcendence, then these concepts are rendered ambiguous and can justify any action. For a term like justice to be meaningful, it must align with certain objective principles; otherwise, it risks becoming a vacuous label that supports any arbitrary claim about God’s nature.

2. Faith Testing and the Need for Coherent Moral Standards

Claiming that divine mysteries are a test of faith implicitly assumes that faith is more valuable when it disregards moral coherence. However, rational belief requires a degree of consistency between claims of goodness and observable actions. If God is depicted as both just and benevolent, then actions that appear as injustice or cruelty call for justification that aligns with these terms. Otherwise, the test of faith becomes a test of credulity, requiring believers to abandon their moral intuitions without any rational basis for moral trust.

3. Redefining Terms Erodes Objective Meaning

While theologians argue that divine mysteries merely broaden the meanings of terms like love and justice, this redefinition dilutes their objectivity. If love or justice can mean one thing to humans and another to God, then these terms lose their stability and fail to guide us in recognizing moral qualities. For objective moral standards to hold, they must be universally intelligible; without this, distinguishing a benevolent God from a malevolent being becomes impossible, as any behavior could be labeled just or loving under an undefined divine perspective.

4. Historical Context Doesn’t Excuse Moral Contradictions

Appealing to historical context suggests that God’s nature adapts to cultural morals rather than transcends them, which contradicts the idea of eternal moral standards. If God’s actions are interpreted as just for one era and unjust by today’s standards, then moral relativism is unavoidable, even in divine contexts. A truly just and loving God would act in ways that reflect consistent moral principles across all times and cultures, rather than adapting to the limitations of each historical period.

5. Divine Mystery Should Not Compromise Moral Clarity

While divine mysteries are often invoked to compromise moral clarity. If believers are expected to grow through moral ambiguities attributed to God’s actions, this growth becomes subjective and unpredictable without an objective moral foundation. Mysteries that erode clear standards for love and justice lead to moral confusion rather than enlightenment, as they provide no stable moral framework for believers to genuinely distinguish good from evil.

Clarifications

The inclusion of the term “morality” in the article above is merely a reductio ad absurdum tool to explore the internal coherence of Christianity and does not imply actual morality exists.

From a moral non-realist perspective, the term “morality” is not taken as an indicator of any objective moral truths or inherent moral realm. Instead, it is used as a reductio ad absurdum device to assess the internal logic of Christian doctrines that claim moral authority and ethical absolutes. In this view, the invocation of “morality” serves purely as a conceptual tool, adopted to highlight potential inconsistencies within a framework that professes absolute moral standards but may fail to uphold them in practice or theology.

For a moral non-realist, moral terms like “good,” “evil,” “justice,” and “love” are understood as expressions of human emotions, cultural conventions, or social agreements without intrinsic truth-value. By temporarily engaging with the language of morality as defined by Christian doctrine, the moral non-realist can question the coherence of these doctrines by examining whether Christianity’s moral claims remain logically consistent within its own terms. However, this does not imply an endorsement of objective morality; rather, it acknowledges that Christianity operates within a moral framework it purports as real and binding.

Thus, when analyzing Christianity’s ethics, a moral non-realist employs moral language only to reveal internal contradictions or logical gaps. The aim is not to affirm any moral truths but to demonstrate that Christianity must, at minimum, adhere to the standards it prescribes if it is to be self-consistent. The use of morality here is, therefore, instrumental and hypothetical—it is a lens through which internal coherence can be evaluated without conceding the existence of moral facts.

That said, the author does encourage those who feel they can articulate a moral system that does not reduce to mere emotions or blind obedience to present coherent grounding for that moral system.

The tactic of feigned horror and the exclamation, “How dare you judge God!” serves as a form of social and intellectual intimidation designed to halt inquiry by appealing to authority and devotion rather than reason.

When someone challenges God’s actions or character, this response implicitly assumes that questioning divine authority is arrogant or blasphemous, attempting to shift the focus from the substance of the critique to the presumed attitude of the questioner. By suggesting that humility equates to unquestioning acceptance, this tactic discourages believers from engaging with potential contradictions or logical gaps within their faith’s moral framework.

For a moral non-realist or a rational inquirer, the notion that one must “humble oneself” before God by suspending all questioning undermines the pursuit of truth and internal coherence. If God’s nature is truly just and benevolent, then genuine inquiry and rational reflection should not be seen as defiant but as sincere efforts to establish the logical coherence of the alleged deity and accompanying morality. Feigned horror implies that faith requires submission without scrutiny, thus sidelining critical examination and potentially allowing for moral contradictions to remain unaddressed. Ultimately, this tactic diverts from a reasoned discussion and introduces an atmosphere where devotion replaces clarity as the measure of faithfulness, which can render belief more about loyalty than logical integrity.

◉ Formalization:

1) Language Domains

$G$ — Set of proposed God-concepts. Variables $g$ and $h$ refer to specific concepts within this set.

$s$ — Constant representing the honest seeker.

Predicates on $g$

$C(g)$ — Predicate meaning “ $g$ is coherent” (internally consistent without logical contradictions).

$K(g)$ — Predicate meaning “ $g$ is consistent with its attributed actions/record” (its descriptions and actions do not conflict).

$D(g)$ — Predicate meaning “ $g$ is desirable” (allegiance to g promotes human well-being or trustworthiness).

$Op(g)$ — Predicate meaning “ $g$ is open to independent evaluation” (no prohibition on questioning).

$Cir(g)$ — Predicate meaning “ $g$ is circular” (assessment of $g$ depends only on g’s own authority).

$W(g)$ — Predicate meaning “ $g$ is worthy of worship or allegiance.”

$H(g)$ — Predicate meaning “commitment to $g$ is high-stakes” (significant consequences for the seeker).

Policies attached to a concept

$Forbid(g)$ — Predicate meaning “ $g$ forbids independent questioning.”

$SelfOnly(g)$ — Predicate meaning “ $g$ requires only its own standards to assess itself.”

Doxastic / Normative

$B_s(g)$ — Predicate meaning “seeker $s$ believes in or commits allegiance to $g$ .”

$E_s(g)$ — Predicate meaning “seeker $s$ has critically evaluated $g$ on the relevant dimensions.”

$R_s(g)$ — Predicate meaning “it is rationally permissible for seeker $s$ to believe $g$ .”

Deontic operator (relative to $s$ )

$O_s(\varphi)$ — Means “seeker $s$ ought that φ.” This marks obligation claims.

2) Core Axioms / Premises

$\forall x , [ H(x) \rightarrow O_s(E_s(x)) ]$

— P1 (High-stakes duty): For any entity $x$ , if commitment to x is high-stakes, then seeker $s$ ought to evaluate $x$ .

$\forall g \in G , H(g)$

— P2 (Theistic stakes): All God-concepts in set $G$ are high-stakes commitments.

$\forall g , [ E_s(g) \rightarrow ( C(g) \wedge K(g) \wedge D(g) \wedge Op(g) \wedge \neg Cir(g) ) ]$

— P3 (What “evaluated” entails): If seeker $s$ has evaluated $g$ , then $g$ must be coherent, consistent with its record, desirable, open to independent evaluation, and not circular.

$\forall g , [ (\neg C(g) \vee \neg K(g) \vee \neg D(g) \vee \neg Op(g) \vee Cir(g) ) \rightarrow \neg R_s(g) ]$

— P4 (Failure bars rational permission): If $g$ fails on coherence, consistency, desirability, openness, or non-circularity, then it is not rationally permissible for $s$ to believe $g$ .

$\forall g , [ R_s(g) \rightarrow E_s(g) ]$

— P5 (Permission requires evaluation): If it is rationally permissible for $s$ to believe $g$ , then $s$ must have evaluated $g$ .

$\forall g , [ W(g) \rightarrow Op(g) ]$

— P6 (Worthiness welcomes scrutiny): If $g$ is worthy of worship, then it must be open to independent evaluation.

$\neg Op(g) \rightarrow \neg W(g)$

— Contraposition of P6: If $g$ is not open to independent evaluation, then $g$ is not worthy of worship.

$\forall g , [ B_s(g) \rightarrow W(g) ]$

— P7 (Belief aiming at allegiance presupposes worthiness): If $s$ believes in $g$ , then $g$ must be worthy of worship.

$\forall g , [ Forbid(g) \rightarrow \neg Op(g) ]$

— P8a (Forbidding ⇒ closed): If $g$ forbids independent questioning, then $g$ is not open to evaluation.

$\forall g , [ SelfOnly(g) \rightarrow Cir(g) ]$

— P8b (Self-standard ⇒ circular): If $g$ allows only its own standards for assessment, then $g$ is circular.

$P8 := P8a \wedge P8b$

— Optional: P8 can be defined as the conjunction of P8a and P8b.

$\exists h \in G , [ h \neq g \wedge Competes(h,g) ] \rightarrow O_s(E_s(g))$

— P9 (Plurality trigger): If there exists another God-concept $h$ in G that is different from $g$ and competes with it, then $s$ ought to evaluate $g$ .

$PB_s(g) \wedge O_s(E_s(g)) \rightarrow (\text{evaluate post-formation})$

— P10 (Stability of permissibility): Even if belief in $g$ is properly basic $(PB_s(g))$ and $s$ ought to evaluate $g$ , then evaluation should still occur after belief formation.

3) Immediate Derivations

$\forall g \in G , O_s(E_s(g))$

— D1 (Obligation to evaluate God-concepts): From P2 and P1, for all God-concepts $g$ in G, seeker $s$ ought to evaluate $g$ .

$R_s(g) \rightarrow [ C(g) \wedge K(g) \wedge D(g) \wedge Op(g) \wedge \neg Cir(g) ]$

— D2 (What permission entails): From P5 then P3, if it is rationally permissible for $s$ to believe $g$ , then $g$ must be coherent, consistent with its record, desirable, open to independent evaluation, and not circular.

$Forbid(g) \rightarrow \neg Op(g) \rightarrow \neg R_s(g)$

— D3a (Forbid defeats permission): From P8a and P4, if $g$ forbids questioning, then it is not open to evaluation, and therefore it is not rationally permissible to believe $g$ .

$SelfOnly(g) \rightarrow Cir(g) \rightarrow \neg R_s(g)$

— D3b (SelfOnly defeats permission): From P8b and P4, if $g$ requires only its own standards for assessment, then it is circular, and therefore it is not rationally permissible to believe $g$ .

$\neg Op(g) \rightarrow \neg W(g)$

— D4a (Closed concepts are unworthy): From the contrapositive of P6, if $g$ is not open to evaluation, then it is not worthy of worship.

$B_s(g) \rightarrow W(g)$

— D4b (Belief presupposes worthiness): From P7, if $s$ believes in $g$ , then $g$ must be worthy of worship.

Conclusion from D4: If $g$ is closed to evaluation ( $\neg Op(g)$ ), then it fails the worthiness requirement for belief, so belief is blocked.

$\forall g \in G , ( O_s(E_s(g)) \ \wedge \ ( [ \neg C(g) \vee \neg K(g) \vee \neg D(g) \vee \neg Op(g) \vee Cir(g) ] \rightarrow \neg R_s(g) ) )$

— D5 (Headline norm): For every $g$ in $G$ , seeker $s$ ought to evaluate $g$ , and if $g$ fails in coherence, consistency, desirability, openness, or non-circularity, then it is not rationally permissible to believe $g$ .

4) Fitch-style Proof of the Central Theorem

Goal 1: $\forall g , O_s(E_s(g))$

— Target claim A: For every God-concept g, seeker $s$ ought to evaluate $g$ .

$\forall g , ( [ \neg C(g) \vee \neg K(g) \vee \neg D(g) \vee \neg Op(g) \vee Cir(g) ] \rightarrow \neg R_s(g) )$

— Target claim B: For every God-concept g, if $g$ is incoherent, inconsistent with its record, undesirable, closed to scrutiny, or circular, then belief in $g$ is not rationally permissible for $s$ .

$\forall g , H(g)$

— From P2: All God-concepts are high-stakes for the seeker.

$\forall x , [ H(x) \rightarrow O_s(E_s(x)) ]$

— From P1: Anything high-stakes should be evaluated by $s$ .

$\text{Let } g \text{ be arbitrary.}$

— Begin universal generalization by reasoning with an arbitrary but fixed $g$ .

$H(g)$

— Instantiation of P2 for the arbitrary $g$ : commitment to $g$ is high-stakes.

$O_s(E_s(g))$

— Modus ponens on P1 with H(g): therefore $s$ ought to evaluate $g$ .

$\forall g , O_s(E_s(g))$

— Universal generalization: since $g$ was arbitrary, the obligation to evaluate holds for all $g$ .

$\forall g , ( [ \neg C \vee \neg K \vee \neg D \vee \neg Op \vee Cir ] \rightarrow \neg R_s )$

— From P4 directly: the failure-conditions bar rational permission for any $g$ ; this establishes Target claim B.

$\square$ — Goal 1 established: both the universal obligation to evaluate and the failure-bar on permission are derived.

Goal 2 (Corollaries for prohibitions/circularity):

$Forbid(g) \rightarrow \neg R_s(g)$

— Target claim (a): If $g$ forbids independent questioning, then it is not rationally permissible for $s$ to believe $g$ .

$SelfOnly(g) \rightarrow \neg R_s(g)[$

— Target claim (b): If $g$ demands only self-referential standards, then it is not rationally permissible for $s$ to believe $g$ .

$Forbid(g)$

— Assume, for conditional proof of (a), that $g$ forbids questioning.

$Forbid(g) \rightarrow \neg Op(g)$

— From P8a: forbidding implies lack of openness.

$\neg Op(g)$

— Modus ponens: thus $g$ is not open to independent evaluation.

$(\neg C(g) \vee \neg K(g) \vee \neg D(g) \vee \neg Op(g) \vee Cir(g)) \rightarrow \neg R_s(g)$

— From P4: any failure on the listed dimensions defeats rational permission.

$\neg R_s(g)$

— Modus ponens using the specific disjunct $\neg Op(g)$ : rational permission is defeated; hence $Forbid(g) \rightarrow \neg R_s(g)$ .

$SelfOnly(g)$

— Assume, for conditional proof of (b), that $g$ requires only its own standards.

$SelfOnly(g) \rightarrow Cir(g)$

— From P8b: self-standard implies circularity.

$Cir(g)$

— Modus ponens: thus $g$ is circular.

$(\neg C(g) \vee \neg K(g) \vee \neg D(g) \vee \neg Op(g) \vee Cir(g)) \rightarrow \neg R_s(g)$

— From P4: circularity is among the defeat conditions.

$\neg R_s(g)$

— Modus ponens using the specific disjunct Cir(g): rational permission is defeated; hence $SelfOnly(g) \rightarrow \neg R_s(g)$ .

$\square$ — Goal 2 established: prohibitions and self-referential standards each defeat rational permission.

Goal 3 (Unworthiness under prohibition):

$\neg Op(g) \rightarrow \neg W(g)$

— From the contraposition of P6: lack of openness entails lack of worthiness.

$Forbid(g) \rightarrow \neg Op(g)$

— From P8a: forbidding questioning implies not open.

$Forbid(g) \rightarrow \neg W(g)$

— Hypothetical syllogism on the two prior lines: a forbidding concept is unworthy.

$B_s(g) \rightarrow W(g)$

— From P7: belief presupposes worthiness.

$\text{Thus, Forbid}(g) \text{ blocks the worthiness presupposed by belief.}$

— If $g$ forbids questioning, then it cannot meet the worthiness condition required by belief.

$\square$ — Goal 3 established: prohibitions undermine worthiness and thereby block belief that presupposes worthiness.

5) Compact Sequent Summary

$\vdash \ \forall g , O_s(E_s(g))$

— From P1 and P2, it follows that $s$ ought to evaluate every God-concept.

$\vdash \ \forall g , ( [ \neg C \vee \neg K \vee \neg D \vee \neg Op \vee Cir ] \rightarrow \neg R_s )$

— From P4, any failure on coherence, consistency, desirability, openness, or non-circularity defeats rational permission.

$Forbid(g) \vdash \neg R_s(g)$

— From P8a with P4, forbidding evaluation defeats rational permission.

$SelfOnly(g) \vdash \neg R_s(g)$

— From P8b with P4, self-referential standards defeat rational permission.

$Forbid(g) \vdash \neg W(g) \quad \text{and} \quad B_s(g) \vdash W(g)$

— From P6 (contraposed) and P7, forbidding undermines worthiness while belief requires worthiness; thus forbidding defeats belief-worthiness.

6) Optional “Properly Basic” Add-on

$PB_s(g)$

— Premise: s’s belief in $g$ begins as properly basic (non-inferentially formed).

$\exists h \in G , [ h \neq g \wedge Competes(h,g) ] \rightarrow O_s(E_s(g))$

— From P9: the existence of competing peer concepts triggers an obligation to evaluate $g$ .

$O_s(E_s(g))$

— When the plurality condition is met, $s$ is obligated to evaluate $g$ even if belief was properly basic.

$PB_s(g) \wedge O_s(E_s(g)) \rightarrow (\text{evaluate post-formation})$

— From P10: proper basicality does not cancel the duty to evaluate; evaluation proceeds after belief onset.

$R_s(g) \rightarrow [ C(g) \wedge K(g) \wedge D(g) \wedge Op(g) \wedge \neg Cir(g) ]$

— By D2, continued rational permissibility requires coherence, consistency with record, desirability, openness, and non-circularity.

Conclusion: even with proper basicality, plural competition and high stakes sustain a duty to evaluate, and permission still requires $C \wedge K \wedge D \wedge Op \wedge \neg Cir.$

— Properly basic onset does not exempt $g$ from meeting the same rational-permission profile.

7) Plain-English Gloss

$\forall g \in G , \big( O_s(E_s(g)) \ \wedge \ ( [ \neg C(g) \vee \neg K(g) \vee \neg D(g) \vee \neg Op(g) \vee Cir(g) ] \rightarrow \neg R_s(g) ) \big)$

— For any proposed God-concept $g$ , the honest seeker $s$ ought to evaluate it; and if $g$ is incoherent, inconsistent with its record, undesirable, closed to scrutiny, or defended circularly, then believing $g$ is not rationally permissible.

Christian Apologists Group Responses

◉ These quotes are some of the most salient, representative quotes in response to this issue from a Facebook group called “Christian Apologetics.” This group consist of quite civil and well-educated apologies, many of them, pastors, or ministers.

Not all of the responses were problematic. The list below contains only the clearly flawed responses, posted here for educational purposes. The last check revealed that there were a total of 340 comments in the thread.

“God’s ways are higher than ours.”

Why it fails: Appeal to mystery. Evades the question about textual clarity and humanitarian knowledge.

“Other gods are fallen angels or Satan himself.”

Why it fails: Assumes the truth of Christianity without argument. Does not address the content critique.

“You are not a serious seeker.”

Why it fails: Ad hominem. Dismisses the arguer instead of the argument.

“You’re in an Apologetics group.”

Why it fails: Irrelevant procedural point. No engagement with the theological critique.

“It’s illogical to claim we can judge God.”

Why it fails: Begs the question. The original post is questioning whether such a God is worthy of belief.

“Apologetics is defending, not questioning.”

Why it fails: Focuses on method, not content. Dodges the criticism.

“We don’t have to question our beliefs to defend them.”

Why it fails: Evades the issue of whether unexamined belief deserves defense.

“You’re dictating how God should act.”

Why it fails: Mischaracterizes the post. It questioned the internal coherence of God’s supposed traits.

“God tells us who he is in the Bible.”

Why it fails: Circular reasoning. Uses the text under critique to justify the critique.

“God is worthy not by any standard, but because He is God.”

Why it fails: Divine command theory. Assumes authority without epistemic justification.

“Science happened for me because of God.”

Why it fails: Post hoc fallacy. Personal narrative doesn’t engage with the general critique.

“A true seeker will find the truth.”

Why it fails: No True Scotsman. Reframes criticism as insincerity.

“You judge God by human standards.”

Why it fails: Avoids internal coherence checks. Shifts burden away from explanatory adequacy.

“You assume God’s unworthiness means he doesn’t exist.”

Why it fails: Straw man. The argument critiques divine authorship, not mere existence.

“You must show worthiness and existence are logically distinct.”

Why it fails: The original post does not argue they are equivalent, but critiques the coherence of worship-worthiness.

“You only want to win a debate.”

Why it fails: Ad hominem. Assumes motive instead of answering the challenge.

“You have been told enough.”

Why it fails: Evasion. Dismisses continued engagement without addressing content.

“I came to faith through research.”

Why it fails: Personal testimony. Doesn’t engage with the systemic critique.

“Faith isn’t blind.”

Why it fails: Doesn’t explain why faith remains credible without basic empirical grounding.

“You have a Western intellectual mind.”

Why it fails: Red herring. Impugns methodology rather than arguments.

“God doesn’t owe us anything.”

Why it fails: Avoids the original question of whether a compassionate deity would act.

“The Bible’s clarity is proven through faith.”

Why it fails: Circular. Uses faith to validate what is under scrutiny.

“You can’t limit God to human logic.”

Why it fails: Special pleading. Exempts God from the standards applied to all other truth claims.

“You just don’t want God to be real.”

Why it fails: Psychological projection. Does not refute the argument.

“You sound angry at God.”

Why it fails: Ad hominem. Emotional speculation about the arguer.

“I trust God’s plan even if I don’t understand it.”

Why it fails: Appeal to ignorance. Defers to mystery rather than engaging evidence-based criticism.

“We can’t expect to understand everything with our limited minds.”

Why it fails: Special pleading. Dismisses rational evaluation.

“Atheists always twist the Bible.”

Why it fails: Ad hominem and sweeping generalization.

“You wouldn’t believe even if God appeared to you.”

Why it fails: Mind-reading fallacy. Avoids the substantive argument.

“The Bible isn’t a science textbook.”

Why it fails: Straw man. The critique is not that it should be, but that it omits crucial life-saving knowledge.

“Your logic is flawed because it lacks faith.”

Why it fails: Category error. Faith and logic are different epistemic tools.

“God works in mysterious ways.”

Why it fails: Appeal to mystery. Non-response.

“You need the Holy Spirit to truly understand.”

Why it fails: Unfalsifiable and excludes nonbelievers from rational inquiry.

“God’s justice is perfect even if we can’t see it.”

Why it fails: Circular and unverifiable.

“You’re using man’s reasoning, not God’s.”

Why it fails: Special pleading. Evades shared reasoning standards.

“Why should God care about disease? It’s part of the fall.”

Why it fails: Theodicy deflection. Avoids the question of divine authorship.

“All truth is God’s truth.”

Why it fails: Tautological. Doesn’t address omissions in Scripture.

“Your question shows you don’t fear God.”

Why it fails: Tone policing. Doesn’t respond to substance.

“You’re reading with a hardened heart.”

Why it fails: Psychological attack. Avoids the argument.

“God has revealed all we need.”

Why it fails: Assertion without justification. Ignores the critique’s examples.

“Truth isn’t determined by logic but by revelation.”

Why it fails: Rejects critical scrutiny in favor of dogma.

“God gave us brains, but not to question Him.”

Why it fails: Contradictory reasoning. Undermines human inquiry.

“You’re arrogant to think you could judge the Creator.”

Why it fails: Fallacy of hubris. Shifts focus from the argument to tone.

“Spiritual things are spiritually discerned.”

Why it fails: Exclusionary epistemology. Dismisses reasoned critique.

“Faith begins where reason ends.”

Why it fails: Abandons logic. Doesn’t respond to the argument.

“Many have come to Christ through that same Bible.”

Why it fails: Popularity fallacy. Doesn’t address content.

“Your questions are dangerous.”

Why it fails: Anti-intellectualism. Refuses engagement.

“Doubt is the devil whispering.”

Why it fails: Demonizes skepticism. Avoids rational debate.

“Only God knows what’s best.”

Why it fails: Appeal to authority without justification.

“His silence is part of the test.”

Why it fails: Theodicy by obfuscation. Doesn’t respond to the central concern.

Other Considerations:

12 responses to “#01 ✓ Consider: Do we dare assess the character and actions of a proposed God before accepting the existence of that God?”

Sushanth

February 1, 2025

existence ? So you don’t know god. If you know about god. You dont ask for existence or proof.

Reply
1. Phil Stilwell
  
  February 1, 2025
  
  Claiming someone does not know a particular God is to assume that particular God exists. That assumption needs substantiation. This entire site is an invitation for evidence. It is not, however, a place for empty assertions.
  
  Reply
2. Phil Stilwell
  
  February 3, 2025
  
  If I understand your argument correctly, you’re suggesting that knowledge of God makes questions about existence or proof unnecessary. However, let’s examine this claim logically.
  
  — P1: Knowledge of a being requires that the being exists.
  Explanation: For example, I know a person if that person exists in reality. If the person does not exist, any knowledge I claim to have is either mistaken or imaginary.
  — P2: To verify the existence of a being, especially one not directly observable, we typically rely on evidence.
  Explanation: We apply this principle universally to all claims—whether about scientific phenomena, historical events, or abstract concepts.
  — P3: Claims about God’s existence, like all existential claims, are subject to the same reasoning process.
  Explanation: Just as one would ask for proof of a distant star’s existence before accepting it, it’s reasonable to ask for proof of God’s existence if someone asserts it as a fact.
  — Conclusion: Asking for evidence or proof of God’s existence is not an indication of ignorance but rather a commitment to rational inquiry.
  Merely claiming to “know God” without evidence does not demonstrate God’s existence any more than someone claiming to know a mythical creature would demonstrate its reality. Belief without evidence may satisfy some on a personal level, but it fails the test of logical scrutiny.
  
  Would you agree that if evidence is crucial in other areas of knowledge, it should also apply to questions of God’s existence?
  
  Reply
Ryan Stohldrier

December 17, 2025
Prompt Under Discussion

Do we dare assess the character and actions of a proposed God before accepting the existence of that God?

What I Read (and Why)

I read the article, but I did not read the accompanying technical paper for two reasons:
1. The article itself contains more than enough material to engage in meaningful dialogue.
2. I agree with what I take to be your main point: people should not accept God on blind faith or dismiss difficult questions as “mysteries.”
Related note: the Greek term musterion does not denote an unobtainable truth; it points to a profound matter of inquiry that people should actually investigate. Point 1: Isaiah 55:8–9 and Authorial Intent

You referenced Isaiah 55:8–9, but I believe that misses the author’s intent.

God was not saying:
- humans cannot understand His ways, and
- humans therefore should not seek understanding.
Rather, the surrounding context suggests the opposite. Consider Isaiah 55:6–7:

“Seek the LORD while He may be found;
Call upon Him while He is near.
Let the wicked forsake his way
And the unrighteous man his thoughts;
And let him return to the LORD,
And He will have compassion on him,
And to our God,
For He will abundantly pardon.”

In this light, Isaiah 55:8–9 is not a call to abandon inquiry. It is more like an invitation to a higher and better road of inquiry—turning away from the worldly and profane gods of surrounding nations and seeking the God who offers “higher thoughts.”

To borrow the language you used: it’s closer to a “come up higher” moment than a “stop asking questions” moment.

So, I’m happy to discuss further, but I think the Isaiah reference was taken out of context (as many Christians do, unfortunately). Point 2: Suffering and the Claim of Benevolence

You then move into the Problem of Evil in a somewhat vague way, and I’m open to dialogue here.

You wrote:

“If a God claims to be loving yet permits suffering among those he professes to love, such behavior suggests a lack of coherence with the concept of a benevolent deity.”

Thought Experiment 1: Discipline and Love

Suppose a child steals something from a store. The parent makes the child return the item and accept whatever consequences the manager imposes.

Would we conclude that the parent does not love the child because the child experiences discomfort or shame? That seems presumptuous. My parents did something like that, and they loved me. Thought Experiment 2: Bullying and Development

Suppose a child is bullied at school.

A parent could storm in and physically punish the bullies. But a parent might instead teach the child strategies for handling conflict—diplomacy, resilience, situational awareness, confidence.

Which is more loving?
I would argue the latter: equipping the child to cope with difficulty. Scriptural Framing

This is consistent with passages like James 1:2–4:

“Consider it all joy, my brethren, when you encounter various trials, knowing that the testing of your faith produces endurance. And let endurance have its perfect result, so that you may be perfect and complete, lacking in nothing.”

(“Perfect and complete” here is pointing toward maturity.)

Likewise:
- Job 2:10 — “Shall we indeed accept good from God and not accept adversity?”
- 2 Corinthians 4:17 — “For momentary, light affliction is producing for us an eternal weight of glory far beyond all comparison.”
A lot of life comes down to perspective. “Woe is me” makes “count it all joy” sound absurd. But a gratitude-oriented frame can change how adversity is interpreted. Practical Analogy: Martial Arts Training

In martial arts training, my instructor had us condition our fists by punching progressively harder surfaces. That involves discomfort, but it prepares the body to endure difficulty and avoid greater harm later.

In other words: suffering can be instrumental and beneficial. Summary: My Two Main Points
1. God does not require blind faith or forbid inquiry.
  The Isaiah 55 context supports a “seek higher” interpretation rather than an anti-inquiry one.
2. Suffering does not necessarily imply a lack of love or benevolence.
  Suffering can function as discipline, development, conditioning, or maturation—so its existence alone does not justify the conclusion that God is non-benevolent or non-existent.
Reply
1. Phil Stilwell
  
  December 17, 2025
  
  Thanks for the substantive engagement, Ryan. Few others actually addressing the thesis.
  
  ✓ 1) On Isaiah 55:8–9 and “mystery”
  I agree with you on the narrow point: Isaiah 55:6–9 is not a blanket command to stop thinking. The passage contains an invitation to “seek,” and I’m not claiming the authorial intent is “don’t inquire.”
  
  But here’s the problem my post targets: how Isaiah 55:8–9 is functionally used in apologetics discourse. In the wild, it routinely functions as a conversation-stopper when a believer is cornered by incoherence: “God’s ways are higher,” therefore your critique is illegitimate. Even if that’s not Isaiah’s intent, it becomes the text’s practical role.
  
  And that practical role creates an epistemic dilemma:
  
  ✓ If “higher” means “beyond human grasp” in the very places where coherence is questioned, then the claim becomes immunized from evaluation.
  ✓ If “higher” simply means “better,” then it doesn’t rescue contradictions; it just asserts that God’s plan is superior while leaving the alleged incoherence untouched.
  
  So yes: Isaiah 55 can be read as a call to seek. But the apologetic deployment I’m criticizing is still real, and it still undercuts rational evaluation.
  
  On μυστήριον: I’m fine granting your semantic point. The issue isn’t lexicography. The issue is that “mystery” is used as a method to bypass scrutiny rather than an invitation to deeper inquiry.
  
  ✓ 2) On suffering, love, and the relevance gap
  You’re right that some suffering can coexist with love. Discipline, training, and resilience-building are real. Nothing in my post requires the absurd premise “any suffering disproves love.”
  
  But your analogies are doing far less work than you think, because they don’t scale to the world we’re actually in.
  
  Your cases involve:
  
  ✓ bounded suffering (temporary, limited)
  ✓ purpose-linked suffering (clearly connected to growth)
  ✓ a non-omnipotent parent (limited options, limited foresight)
  ✓ a parent not responsible for the whole system (they didn’t design disease, physics, predators, earthquakes)
  
  The theistic claim under discussion is not “a loving being sometimes allows discomfort.” It’s closer to: a maximally powerful, maximally informed, loving creator intentionally actualized a reality in which vast quantities of extreme suffering occur, much of it unrelated to growth, and much of it experienced by beings incapable of learning from it.
  
  That’s where the analogies break.
  
  Examples you didn’t address:
  
  ✓ infants dying painfully before any “maturity” is possible
  ✓ animal suffering across evolutionary history (predation, starvation, parasitism)
  ✓ natural disasters that crush indiscriminately
  ✓ prolonged torture/abuse where “character formation” is a grotesque fit
  ✓ diseases whose primary “lesson” is simply that biology is brutal
  
  And once you appeal to “eternal weight of glory,” you’re relying on the afterlife framework to justify the present. But that’s inside the system. For someone assessing the system, that move is: “This looks awful now, but trust me, it cashes out later.” That’s not evidence; that’s a promissory note.
  
  So the core point remains:
  
  ✓ Suffering doesn’t logically contradict love in every conceivable case.
  ✓ But the pattern, scale, and distribution of suffering we actually observe makes a “maximally loving and maximally capable” creator less probable than alternatives (indifferent nature, non-personal causes, or a deity not matching the advertised traits).
  
  ✓ 3) The post’s thesis you didn’t really touch
  My post isn’t “God forbids inquiry.” It’s: it’s rationally required to evaluate a candidate God’s coherence and trustworthiness before pledging allegiance, especially when the stakes are high. And if a framework blocks that evaluation by insisting (explicitly or in practice) that scrutiny is arrogant or illegitimate, then that framework deserves suspicion.
  
  So I’ll accept your two “main points” with modifications:
  
  ✓ 1) Christianity may say inquiry is allowed — but in practice it often draws a bright red line precisely where coherence and trustworthiness are challenged, then waves “mystery” to protect the claim.
  ✓ 2) Suffering alone doesn’t disprove benevolence — but the actual empirical profile of suffering is exactly what forces the coherence and likelihood questions back onto the table.
  
  If you want to push this forward cleanly, provide a coherent answer to this:
  
  ✓ What observable difference should we expect between a world with an indwelling, transforming Holy Spirit and a world shaped by ordinary psychology, culture, and selection effects?
  If the difference is not specifiable in a way that could, in principle, be checked, then “seek and you’ll find” remains a devotional slogan, not an epistemic method.
  
  And, one last point that’s central to why I wrote the post in the first place.
  
  Too often, “God is beyond our understanding” is not used as a modest reminder of cognitive limits; it’s wielded as a rhetorical club to force the surrender of the very responsibility that rational agents have: to aggressively assess every proposed God-claim without exception.
  
  Here’s the problem in plain terms:
  
  ✓ The moment “beyond our understanding” is invoked to block scrutiny, it becomes a license for any claim to pass.
  ✓ If “love” can look like cruelty, and “justice” can look like injustice, and the explanation is always “higher ways,” then the words stop doing any real work.
  ✓ And once terms lose stable meaning, you’ve lost the ability to distinguish a benevolent deity from a malevolent deceiver, a demon, or a purely human projection.
  
  So when someone says, “You can’t judge God,” the correct reply is:
  
  We’re not “judging God” from a position of superiority. We’re doing the only thing honest seekers can do: evaluating a candidate description before we hand over our trust, allegiance, and life-or-death commitments. If you demand that I suspend that evaluation, you are not defending God—you are defending a protected bubble in which claims are exempt from the standards applied to every other high-stakes belief.
  
  And that’s the core epistemic point:
  
  ✓ No proposed God gets a pass.
  ✓ No claim gets immunity.
  ✓ No “mystery” gets to function as a veto on scrutiny.
  
  If a God is real and worthy of trust, open evaluation won’t threaten that God. It will confirm it. If a God-concept can survive only by forcing people to stop asking the sharp questions—especially the questions about coherence, reliability, and the real-world consequences of belief—then that concept has already indicted itself.
  
  Reply
  1. Ryan Stohldrier
    
    December 18, 2025
    
    1. Clarifying the Claim About Christianity and Inquiry
    
    [“Christianity may say inquiry is allowed — but in practice it often draws a bright red line precisely where coherence and trustworthiness are challenged, then waves ‘mystery’ to protect the claim.”]
    
    This objection cannot be applied wholesale to Christianity as such. Christianity is not a monolithic entity. I am a Christian, and I do not, in practice, do what you describe.
    
    Some ignorant or poorly informed Christians do rely on appeals to “mystery” to shield weak or underdeveloped claims, and that is indeed a problem. It is one I am regularly working to address by helping to educate others. As such, the epistemic dilemma you pose applies to uninformed sects or practitioners of Christianity—not to Christianity properly understood or responsibly practiced. 2. Steel-Manning the Problem of Suffering
    
    [“It’s closer to: a maximally powerful, maximally informed, loving creator intentionally actualized a reality in which vast quantities of extreme suffering occur, much of it unrelated to growth, and much of it experienced by beings incapable of learning from it.”]
    
    Allow me to offer a steel-man version of your claim:
    
    An all-powerful, all-loving, all-benevolent, all-knowing God intentionally actualized a reality in which vast quantities of extreme suffering occur—much of it unrelated to growth, and much of it experienced by beings incapable of learning from it.
    
    This formulation is more robust, and I will now attempt to address it directly. 3. Love, Free Will, and the Necessity of Suffering
    
    God, being maximally great, would necessarily create the best possible candidate for maximally exemplifying love. The critical question is:
    
    Which is more valuable for the purpose of love?
    
    A being pre-programmed to love and only to love, or
    
    A being with the genuine choice to love?
    
    I would argue the latter. Genuine love requires free will. A being capable of freely choosing love must also be capable of choosing evil. When beings freely choose to do evil, suffering follows. Therefore, if God aims at the greatest possible exemplification of love, the possibility of suffering is unavoidable. 4. Why God Does Not Simply Prevent All Suffering
    
    One might respond: “But God could stop suffering from happening.”
    
    My reply is that if God were to prevent all suffering, human choices would no longer be genuinely free. The moral significance of free will would collapse if its consequences were continually overridden. 5. The Fall, Cosmic Corruption, and Natural Evil
    
    God created the best possible world: a world in which there was only one potentially bad choice—to be satisfied with God or to choose dissatisfaction with God.
    
    The choice of dissatisfaction unleashed corruption into the world. Humanity was meant to steward the kingdom of the world, but when mankind relinquished that kingdom to Satan (the serpent), disorder followed. This accounts for:
    
    Infant suffering and death
    
    Animal suffering
    
    Natural disasters
    
    Disease
    
    6. Divine Mercy and Human Participation in Restoration
    
    Despite this corruption, God, in His mercy, provided means of relief—namely, through the love and action of mankind. God desired that humanity follow in His footsteps and participate in remedying the broken world that mankind itself handed over to corruption. 7. Love’s Highest Expressions: Sacrifice and Forgiveness
    
    Two of the greatest exemplifications of love are:
    
    Self-sacrifice for others
    
    Forgiveness of others
    
    The misdeeds and failures of mankind made these highest forms of love possible in ways that would not otherwise exist. 8. Agreement on Rational Evaluation of God
    
    [“My post isn’t ‘God forbids inquiry.’ It’s: it’s rationally required to evaluate a candidate God’s coherence and trustworthiness before pledging allegiance, especially when the stakes are high.”]
    
    I did not directly address this earlier because I largely agree with it. I believe that fully rational answers can be given for virtually all alleged incoherences, and I look forward to attempting to demonstrate that claim.
    
    Reply
    1. Phil Stilwell
      
      December 18, 2025
      
      Ryan, you wrote a thoughtful, structured reply, but it still doesn’t meet the central burden of the article you’re responding to.
      
      The post is not mainly “some Christians misuse Isaiah” or “a theodicy exists.” The post is a method claim:
      
      ✓ Before you pledge allegiance to a candidate God (especially under high-stakes threats/promises), you must first evaluate that candidate’s coherence, trustworthiness, and evidential posture using standards that are not smuggled in from the very system under evaluation.
      
      Right now, your response repeatedly re-enters the system (Fall, Satan, “best possible world,” love requires libertarian freedom, etc.) without doing the prior work the article demands: why should any outsider treat those as anything more than internal storytelling?
      
      Here’s what you need to answer to actually address the post.
      
      ✓ 1) “Christianity isn’t monolithic” doesn’t touch the thesis
      Saying “I’m a Christian and I don’t do that” is autobiographical, not an answer.
      
      The question is:
      ✓ Does your version of Christianity allow independent evaluation all the way down—especially at the points where coherence and trustworthiness are challenged—without invoking ‘mystery’ as a veto or ‘God’s standards’ as the court of appeal?
      
      Also, “Christianity properly understood” risks becoming:
      ✓ a “No True Scotsman” shield (“the bad replies don’t count; only my sect counts”), which is exactly the kind of insulation-from-scrutiny the post is warning about.
      
      ✓ 2) Your “steel-man” is fine — but your reply immediately assumes what’s under evaluation
      You say you’ll address: an all-powerful, all-knowing, all-loving God actualizing a world with massive suffering.
      
      But then your defense relies on additional big premises that you didn’t justify from outside the system:
      
      ✓ “God must create the best possible world.”
      ✓ “Libertarian free will is required for genuine love.”
      ✓ “Preventing many harms would collapse freedom.”
      ✓ “The Fall unleashed cosmic corruption.”
      ✓ “Humans handed the world to Satan.”
      ✓ “This explains infant death, disease, disasters, and animal suffering.”
      
      Those aren’t explanations unless you can argue they’re more credible than rival explanations without citing the very book/tradition whose trustworthiness is in question.
      
      ✓ 3) Free will doesn’t do the heavy lifting you’re assigning it
      Even granting freedom, your claim “God can’t prevent suffering without undermining freedom” is far too strong.
      
      ✓ A world can preserve meaningful choice while still preventing many extreme harms (e.g., less disease, fewer natural catastrophes, less predation, less stochastic horror) without turning people into puppets.
      ✓ “Some consequences” isn’t the same as this magnitude and distribution of consequences.
      
      So the article’s pressure returns:
      ✓ Why this world, rather than one with far less involuntary suffering, if the creator is both able and committed to human flourishing?
      
      ✓ 4) “The Fall + Satan” is a promissory internal patch unless you answer the evidential questions
      You say the Fall explains infant suffering, animal suffering, disasters, disease.
      
      But the post’s method demand is:
      ✓ What public, checkable reason is there to think “Fall/Satan/cosmic corruption” is more than a retrofitted narrative added to protect the claim?
      
      So, concretely, you need to answer things like:
      
      ✓ What independent evidence do we have that “Satan” is a real causal actor in geology, virology, and meteorology?
      ✓ What observable signature would distinguish “cosmic corruption” from indifferent natural processes?
      ✓ What would count as disconfirming evidence for the Fall/Satan hypothesis?
      
      If the answer is “nothing could disconfirm it,” then it’s not functioning as an explanation; it’s functioning as an immunizing clause.
      
      ✓ 5) You didn’t answer the post’s key discriminator question
      This is the question that decides whether your framework is epistemically serious or devotional:
      
      ✓ What observable difference should we expect between (A) a world with an indwelling, transforming Holy Spirit actively guiding humanity and (B) a world explained by ordinary psychology, culture, incentives, and selection effects?
      
      Not “people feel transformed.” Not “there are saints.” Those happen under every major religion and many nonreligious ideologies.
      
      I mean:
      ✓ What specific, non-handwavy, in-principle-checkable difference should show up?
      
      If you can’t specify that, then “seek and you’ll find” remains a slogan, not a method.
      
      ✓ 6) The article’s core dilemma still stands
      If your view allows “love” and “justice” to be redescribed so flexibly that any outcome can be labeled compatible with them, then:
      
      ✓ those terms stop doing real discriminating work, and
      ✓ you lose the ability to distinguish a worthy deity from a deceiver or a projection.
      
      So here’s the tight way forward.
      
      ✓ Answer these three items directly (no Bible verses as the foundation—those can come later):
      ✓ A) What are your independent criteria for concluding a candidate God is coherent and trustworthy before allegiance?
      ✓ B) What specific observations would you expect in our world if your God exists that would be unlikely on naturalistic alternatives?
      ✓ C) What would falsify (or at least seriously reduce your confidence in) the Fall/Satan/cosmic-corruption explanation?
      
      Until those are answered, your reply is largely a well-written internal theodicy—but the post is asking for an external evaluation standard before commitment.
      
      Reply
J

December 18, 2025

Claiming that the “epistemic dilemma you pose applies to uninformed sects or practitioners of Christianity—not to Christianity properly understood or responsibly practiced” and “God created the best possible world: a world in which there was only one potentially bad choice—to be satisfied with God or to choose dissatisfaction with God” seem to be examples of begging the question:

1.) What is Christianity “properly understood” or “responsibly practiced”? Isn’t this the equivalent of saying “my chosen form of Christianity is the correct one”? Do Christians really agree on what is essential doctrine or teaching, i.e. necessary to be consider saved? For example, can someone reject the Trinity and still be saved if they have some trust in Jesus as the agent of salvation? People claiming to be Christian or followers of Jesus have espoused Unitarianism, Arianism, Gnosticism, etc. throughout history. Protestants have often claimed Catholics are in danger of eternal damnation and vice versa.

2.) How can you verify that God “created the best possible world” without knowing or verifying all the possibilities? I can conceive of a world where we were created entirely as spiritual beings (angels) who could choose to join Satan in rejecting God or choose to remain loyal. This would allow for your free choice demand and remove many physical forms of suffering: Without physical bodies, we could suffer tissue damage or experience physical pain. Also, without the need to reproduce, there could be no hormones to cause the forms of sexual desire that are condemned as sinful in the Bible. The creation of spiritual beings who could reject God as the devil did are

When you beg the question, you are using a different form of the same fallacy behind appeals to mystery. Appeals to mystery are “just-so” explanations that must be accepted just like the two examples of appeals to assumed premises given above.

Also, in response to some of your later points, the decision of God to create animals and human beings who must pass through a childhood stage without sentience or the capacity for meaningful moral decision-making would either undermine his supposed goal of ensuring free-will or be tangential/unnecessary to his creation of spiritual beings who obviously had a choice if one of them willfully rebelled against his creator. To argue that infants had to be born who could be contaminated by the sins of two ancient predecessors is to beg the question yet again. Spiritual beings presumably don’t have familial relations or genealogical ancestry. There is also no reason God would have been prohibited from creating each person individually to allow each one to choose whether to obey him without the problem of inherited original sin. (The bizarre account of Genesis 6 with the half-human, half-spiritual hybrids seems to only create a theological mess and is probably derived from Mesopotamian mythology.)

Further, how many free agents need to come into existence to satisfy God’s wish for beings to freely choose him? If God/Jesus will return and ultimately end the propagation of the human species, isn’t any population number arbitrary?

Finally, will there be self-sacrifice or forgiveness of sins (we have committed?) in heaven? Can human infants engage in conscious self-sacrifice? If not, then it seems this isn’t a priority of God or something good for its own sake? In fact, you could argue that choosing to suffer in hell alongside or for someone you cared about for all eternity would be the highest possible form of self-sacrifice. A deity permanently renouncing their divinity would also count. (To illustrate, I believe in the universe fictional Legend of Zelda games, the princess Zelda is actually the reincarnation of a goddess who chose to “shed” her divinity in pity for the hero Link’s ancestor who gave himself up. It’s hard to argue that isn’t a high form of sacrifice.)

But’s that not what Jesus did or the type of love that Christians teach, is it?

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1. Ryan Stohldrier
  
  December 21, 2025
  What I was attempting to show was that much of what “Christianity” [a vague term] teaches lacks critical thinking in the realm of apologetics. What I mean by that is: many well-meaning people take large swaths of scripture and boil them down to inaccurate pithy sayings and base a theology off of that. Instead, what should be done is to develop a theology from the text itself. So, to be more direct “properly understood,” essential means “taken within context using critical thinking.” This doesn’t mean that two people won’t walk away with two different ideas about a scripture; however, it does lead to a more informed position as opposed to the cheap hermeneutics employed by many. “Responsibly practiced” refers to actually doing what the Bible says in light of what the Bible says. For example, Jesus taught that adultery was an acceptable reason for divorce (I say this tongue-in-cheek because there are nuances there); however, He also taught that we must forgive one another. So, one could divorce because of adultery; however, in light of the principle of forgiveness, forgiveness should be the primary principle in operation. That is just one of many examples that could be made. Your point #1 asks a lot of questions that, to answer fully, would comprise a full discipleship program. So, I will leave it at what I have already said.
  
  The world you described that you conceive is precisely what I am saying happened. Adam and Eve were created as spirit-beings clothed in flesh (which is why they did not consider themselves as naked). When they disobeyed God and transferred their rights over to Satan, the world was transformed, as were the man and his wife. All of what you describe can be traced back to this transformation that I referenced.
  
  Please clarify how I was begging the question. I think perhaps you think I was begging the question because of some ambiguity rather than actually begging the question.
  
  You are free to disagree with me on the idea that God created the greatest possible world. I will admit that perhaps there is a possible world beyond my cognition that could have been greater; however, I don’t think the point is altogether crucial to my case. But, regarding reproduction: would it not be greater for the perfect creation to be such that it reproduces, assuming a continual choice to obey God?
  
  The questions you ask are all good questions, but the answer to each one could easily comprise a full philosophical discussion of their own. I suggest narrowing down your scope to 1-2 questions at a time that can be substantively responded to. Furthermore, the answers to some of your questions can serve as a means to eliminate other questions you ask. So for that reason also, I suggest that you limit yourself to 1-2 questions at a time. For this purpose, you may want to open up a private dialogue with me (may be a better format than this). If so, let me know and I can give you my email address.
  Reply
  1. J
    
    December 22, 2025
    
    Thanks for the response. I apologize if my posts weren’t well-outlined or well-formatted: it would probably have been better to split off each set of the many questions on different topics into separate posts or to include an outline of some sort.
    
    Also, I appreciate what you are saying about “1-2 questions” at a time but have concerns about its being used as a tactic by apologists to diminish the weight of skeptical objections. My suspicion (after having seen this approach used on William Lane Craig’s Reasonable Faith site) is that it helps portray the rejection of Christianity as being based on a few objections rather than on a rigorous inquiry into Christian claims resulting in a larger list of questions that appear more formidable as a result. (Also, I generally prefer to include anticipatory questions for possible replies.)
    
       In regards to e-mail discussion, I’ll definitely consider it, but there would probably need to be agreement on certain points to ensure that something productive came out of any future discussion.
    
    In light of that, would you agree with the following “starting points”? (I respectfully ask because many Christians reject them. In parentheses are my reasons for appealing to them while trying to determine the possibility for future dialogue on these subjects.):
    
          1.) Evolution through natural selection (both Macro- and Micro) is confirmed by the body of current scientific evidence. (Important for questions regarding suffering and biblical interpretation.)
    
    2.) The formation of scripture (i.e. determination of books as canonical vs. non-canonical) was compiled through a gradual process involving some combination of communal use, citation by certain authorities, opinions issued at church councils, and (especially in the case of the New Testament) response to perceived “heresy.” (Important for questions involving appeals to the Bible.)
    
    3.) The works that were canonized as part of the Old and New Testaments were written in the same fallible manner as applies to any human creation. As a result, biblical passages can be erroneous or otherwise limited by the very human understanding of their respective authors. (Important for questions involving appeals to the Bible or evaluating Christian doctrine.)
    
    4.) Different biblical writers can present contradictory or mutually exclusive perspectives on topics such as suffering, the afterlife, the existence of other gods, proper ritual practice, or even celibacy. (That is to say, biblical texts are best thought of as an anthology of different authors.) (Important for philosophical questions or evaluating Christian doctrine.)
    
    5.) The use of the historical-critical method supplemented by other scholarly approaches is the best way to understand the “original intent” of a biblical passage. This approach entails that the passage might be mistaken, at odds with other biblical authors, or standing in contradiction to opinions widely held in the church today. (Important for questions involving appeals to the Bible.)
    
    If you disagree with one or more of these principles, then I would suggest that discussions proceed while adhering to either of the following methods:
    
             6a.) One or more Biblical passages or theological statements may be cited in discussion but are subject to being evaluated philosophically on the basis of prior understanding, observation, and/or logical consistency.
    
              6b.) Biblical passages or theological statements may be cited but are subject to evaluation in light of other passages or doctrines to determine consistency or identify problematic implications as a result of harmonization attempts. (For example, trying to fit Satan into the narratives of Genesis 1-3 might potentially lead to contradictions or problems when viewed in light of Christian doctrine.)
    
            (In the interest of keeping my posts better organized, I decided to offer some clarifications and/or responses to your points above in separate posts below.)
    
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J

December 22, 2025

In response to the specific points in your last post:

1.) Respectfully, what appeared to a form of “question-begging” was in your statement about the epistemic dilemma that Phil’s questions posed: it seemed to be equivalent to stating that your desired understanding of certain biblical passages was the “correct” one (and would withstand scrutiny) while implying that the interpretations of others could not be correct as a result. There was also the appeal to the hermeneutical method of “context using critical thinking.”

a.) Couldn’t objections like Phil’s be applicable to any form of Christianity regardless of how well it is taught or the “correct” understanding of doctrine?
b.) The appeal to “correct context” in biblical interpretation could be equivalent to stating that “The Bible will agree with the truth, so let’s find any understanding or passage in its pages to serve an interpretive guide that allows a problem to be explained away.”
c.) What if “proper” critical thinking actually undermines certain biblical truths or Christian teachings?
d.) What if “orthodox” Christian doctrine is not completely based on the Bible but relies on appeals to church authority or arose in reaction to external critiques?

2.) In regard to your mentions of Jesus’ teachings on divorce and forgiveness, I would offer that choosing one verse to serve as the context for or to “clarify” another verse is an interpretive method that has to be justified or acknowledged to be a choice out of several possible contexts. Someone might have a preferred understanding of a passage, but it doesn’t automatically mean that it is authoritative or correct. Also, the original author might not have intended a passage to be understood in accordance with our wishes. (Keep in mind that the gospels themselves do not have Jesus explicitly connecting forgiveness with his teachings on divorce.)

3.) (As an aside, I don’t believe that forgiveness is at odds with the need to make sure something doesn’t happen again or the power of expressing disapproval with someone’s actions. It is possible, for example, that a husband could choose to divorce a wife after repeated affairs to look for a more committed spouse and prompt her to examine her behavior. This doesn’t mean he has to hold on to anger or wish her ill for the rest of her life.)

4.) In regard to the discussion of the creation story and the best of possible worlds, I wanted to offer my brief understanding of what Christian teachings are missing from it according to biblical scholarship (which suggests that it might not have the doctrinal authority that the church wishes to it have) and clarify why the Christian interpretation of Genesis you give does not meet my understanding of a “best possible world.”

a.) The Genesis 1-3 passage features two separate creation accounts. According to the New Oxford Annotated Bible (Fifth Edition) (pg. 13), the first is given in Genesis 1-2:4 and the second is given in 2:4-3:24.

If you look at the two accounts, the following Christian doctrines are never explicitly mentioned or included in the text:

i.) Creation ex nihilo: It is generally accepted by scholars that the first passage is inspired by other creation-accounts in the Near-East like the Enuma Elish or Canaanite myth. There was a “watery void” or “chaos” that had to be formed or defeated for creation to begin. The NRSV translates Genesis 1:1a as “In the beginning, when God created the heavens and the earth”. Genesis 2:4 simply states that there was “a day” when the heavens and earth were created without specifying whether any sort of primordial matter was used or other divine beings (i.e. the divine council) existed. (In The Bible Says So, Dan McClellan argues that the concept of creation out of nothing developed long after the last book of the Hebrew Bible was composed.)

ii.) The Ensoulment/Dual Nature of Human Beings: According to traditional Hebrew thought, living beings including humans are “animated” by the “breath of life.” This breath leaves them when they die, resulting in the corpse being lifeless. The Christian idea of an immaterial soul/spirit in each human is commonly believed to have been influenced by non-Jewish cultures, possibly Greek philosophy. (The word usually translated as “soul” in English translations of the Old Testament actually is best understood as “thinking and feeling aspect” of a person.)

iii.) Satan: The serpent was apparently intended to be a clever antagonist in the story and in ancient folklore snakes were regarded as potential tricksters. The punishment given in Genesis 3:14-15 makes sense as an etiological explanation for the discrepancy in locomotion between legged reptiles and slithering snakes. Because Christians (or post-exilic Jews) could not have accepted God’s role in creating an “evil” tempting creature, the idea that a fallen angel rebelled and led the first humans astray as “the serpent” arose later.

iv.) Sin: The word translated as “sin” does not appear in the Book of Genesis until 4:7. From what I’ve read, the first mention of something along the lines of “Eve’s giving into temptation was a great catastrophe for humankind” might be the apocryphal Sirach 25:24.” For what it’s worth, the following notes by David M. Carr are found in the New Oxford Annotated Bible:

“Though this story is often taken by Christians as an account of ‘original sin,’ the word ‘sin’ never occurs in it. Instead, it is a sophisticated narrative describing how God’s acts and their aftermath lead to the formation of fully adult, mortal humans to the till the Earth outside the garden (2:5), separated from animals by both bodily shame (requiring clothing) and an awareness of good and evil otherwise possessed only by God.” (pg. 15)

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J

December 22, 2025

(Continued from Above):

4b.) The following elements in your understanding of the creation/common Christian interpretations (and correct me if I’ve misunderstood your stance) conflict with my understanding of either a perfect world or the best possible world with free agents:

i.) In order to tempt Adam and Eve, Satan had to have been created and fallen before the Garden of Eden part of Genesis. This entails that spiritual beings (i.e. angels) were created before humans. I was arguing that since angels must have possessed free-will in order to rebel against God, the idea of creating “fleshy” beings such as humans is redundant if purely spiritual beings such as angels already satisfied that need for freely-chosen obedience.

ii.) Even if humans were originally spiritual beings “clothed” in bodies, their physical nature subjected them to forms of suffering that a spiritual being would otherwise not have to deal with. As a result of having organic tissue and being subjected to physical forces, humans can suffer from injury, sensations of physical pain, aging, biological disease, cognitive decline, etc. Satan and the fallen angels freely rebelled and presumably never dealt with these additional forms of suffering.

iii.) This world involves the suffering of beings who lack meaningful agency, particularly animals and young children. That animals cannot “sin” according to Christian teaching is affirmed by that they are not mentioned as being “guilty” in any Bible passage or as needing to repent to accept the salvific work of Jesus. Yet they have pain receptors and are subject to violence, disease, and death. (The fall of Adam and Eve could not have been the cause of animal suffering or mortality as the fossil record indicates this was a fact of their existence long before any person walked the earth.)

iv.) Young children are made to suffer as the result of original sin or “inherited” guilt (according to mainstream Christianity). None of them chose to be born or have a “sinful” nature transmitted through a long line of descent. Yet fair judgement of a being requires that they have a meaningful capacity to choose the right course of action in the face of temptation or the possibility for wrong-doing. Infants and toddlers lack these. God could have created a sentient race with the capacity for moral choice without requiring their members to mature from infancy.

v.) That human reproduction (according to the Bible and later Christian teaching) is not simply a result of the fall is entailed not only by the creation of a human couple (presumably with functioning genitalia) but also by the fact that before the fall God commands them to “be fruitful and multiply” (Gen. 1:28) while this process is apparently affirmed to be “very good” according to Gen. 1:31.

4c.) The following implications and problems also seem to be result from the above or in conjunction with other considerations:

i.) What would have prevented God from separately creating intelligent beings on other planets or unrelated to the original “fallen” species if he needed more creatures to freely choose obedience? They would not have to deal with sinful natures (and suffering from birth) as the result of guilt transmitted of their ancestors. The notion of God “ceasing from his work” is not entailed by the simple need to create beings with the capacity for free choice and God has no problem miraculously intervening in the world in the Bible after the Genesis story.

ii.) To my mind, referring to the fall as humanity and creation being “made subject to the devil” or “transferring” their rights over to him does not resolve the problems above. Animals and human infants did not willingly choose to be subject to the power of Satan or suffer as a result. The question of human redundancy in the face of spiritual beings already being endowed with free-will still remains.

iii.) This isn’t even to mention that using the process of evolution to bring about the creation process can be argued to needlessly increase suffering: billions of organisms suffered and were subject to death just so the first species capable of free-will (homo sapiens) could emerge.

5.) I find it hard to reconcile the notion that “the best possible world entails the reproduction of a prefect creation” with the Christian teaching that apparently no one will reproduce in heaven, a place supposedly characterized by perfection and restoration of fellowship with God. If something either will not exist in heaven or isn’t necessary for the existence of free beings who could choose to serve God, it has no reason to exist in the “best of all possible worlds” if it would increase evils (such as needless suffering). Since free beings can exist without needing to reproduce and the process of human reproduction results in an increase of suffering hell-bound beings according to Christian theology, this would entail that the creation of humanity presented above is not in keeping with the best possible world. (Only if animals and children were somehow “shielded” from suffering would the process of reproduction be justified.)

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