THEIST:
I would also observe that any so called Creator that does not present as a being beyond my understanding would rank pretty low on my truth claim scale. I’m not that smart, and if I could comprehend my Creator — that doesn’t seem like much of a Creator and perhaps more like a man made story.

Response

The claim above suggests that a deity who is comprehensible to an ordinary human being is likely a fabrication, whereas a truly divine being would be beyond human comprehension. However, from a probabilistic and logical standpoint, this position neglects an important asymmetry: it is intrinsically more probable that a being who fails to make itself comprehensible cannot do so, rather than that it arbitrarily chooses not to.

1. Comprehensibility as Evidence of Greater Power

To assert that comprehensibility diminishes divine plausibility is to overlook a deeper principle: the greater the power, the greater the capacity to communicate and condescend to lower minds. A being that can render itself comprehensible while maintaining ontological grandeur displays greater rather than lesser creative power.

Let:

• : “x is a God”
• : “x is comprehensible to humans”
• : “x has the power to make itself comprehensible”
• : “x reveals itself to humans”
• : “x is ultimately incomprehensible to humans”

Then we have:

Premise 1:
(If x is a God, then x has the power to make itself comprehensible.)

Premise 2:
(x is not comprehensible to humans.)

Premise 3:
(x has not revealed itself in an intelligible way.)

From these, a highly probable inference arises:

Conclusion: is more probable than

That is: it is more probable that x lacks the power to make itself comprehensible than that x possesses the power and yet chooses not to exercise it without clear reason.

This means that for any being , failure to communicate intelligibly is more plausibly explained by inability, not volitional transcendence.

2. Incomprehensibility Is Not a Virtue

The intuition that something “beyond our understanding” is more divine confuses epistemic opacity with ontological depth. Many false or incoherent ideas are also beyond understanding, but that doesn’t confer credibility. In fact, the complete inability of a being to reveal itself intelligibly to the minds it purportedly created undermines the claim that such a being is powerful or benevolent.

3. Man-Made Comprehensibility vs. Divine Comprehensibility

The argument assumes that anything comprehensible must be man-made. But this is a non-sequitur. Comprehensibility only indicates that a concept is accessible to human cognition, not that it was originated by human minds. If humans encounter something understandable, this could reflect either human invention or divine accommodation. What distinguishes the two is not whether the concept is comprehensible, but whether it is arbitrarily simplistic or evidentially robust.

A God who is completely incomprehensible is more likely non-existent or incapable than benevolently transcendent. The intrinsic probability structure favors this formulation: failure to reveal is best explained by absence or impotence, not by selective transcendence. Therefore, the view that a God must be unknowable in order to be real actually reduces, rather than increases, the plausibility of that God’s existence.

4. Complexity Comprehended: A Mark of Greater Divine Power

A further consideration rests on the relationship between divine complexity and human cognitive endowment. A God of immense complexity who nevertheless engineers minds capable of comprehending that complexity—to some nontrivial degree—is displaying not just metaphysical grandeur but epistemic generosity and sovereign intentionality. All things being equal, this kind of God is more powerful and more probable than a purported god who remains forever incomprehensible.

To clarify:

Let:

• : “x has the cognitive capacity to comprehend y”
• : A deity of maximal complexity
• : A human being
• : “x endowed y with the capacity to comprehend x”

Then:

Premise 1: is true if and only if is true
(i.e., human comprehension of divine complexity requires intentional divine design)

Premise 2: is a deity of maximal complexity who does not endow such capacities
Premise 3: is a deity of maximal complexity who does endow such capacities

Then, by inference:

Conclusion:
(Deity D” is more powerful than D’ because it bridges the gap between infinite complexity and finite cognition.)

Thus, in probabilistic terms, a God who creates finite minds and intentionally designs them to grasp divine truths—however partially—is epistemically superior to one whose nature forever escapes understanding.

Moreover, a being who refuses to enable comprehension, despite having the power to do so, is at best indifferent, and at worst malevolent or imaginary. But the more plausible explanation remains: the failure to provide cognitive access to divine truth indicates a lack of power, not a surplus of it.

In summary, a complex God who creates comprehending minds is more powerful than one who does not—and more likely to exist if we assume that such power entails communicability. The failure to produce comprehension is more plausibly traced to divine incapacity than to divine preference.

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