➘ #14 Source Article

Symbolic Logic Formalization

Annotation: Hypothesis 1 states that a single, clarity-seeking divine revelation is truth-tracking and is responsible for the global pattern of religious conviction.

Annotation: Hypothesis 2 states that religious beliefs arise from ordinary cultural and psychological mechanisms rather than reliable revelation.

massive doctrinal incompatibilities, cultural clustering, synchrony effects, affective misattribution, thin predictive record
Annotation: The observed evidence consists of widespread disagreement across religions, strong dependence on cultural origin, group synchrony dynamics, misattribution of emotions, and the absence of successful risky predictions.

Annotation: There exist at least two propositions, each affirmed by more than a billion people, that contradict one another (e.g., Jesus crucified vs. Jesus not crucified). Therefore, at least one vast group is decisively wrong.

Annotation: Therefore, popularity across billions does not entail probability of truth for core religious claims.

Headcount increases truth-likelihood
Annotation: The Condorcet jury theorem shows that large numbers improve reliability only if individual judgments are slightly better than chance and largely independent.

Annotation: In religion, neither condition holds: judgments are unreliable (centuries of non-convergence) and highly correlated (cultural dependence). Thus, headcounts amplify error.

Annotation: The observed evidence is much less likely if divine revelation were truthfully informing billions than if sociocultural-psychological mechanisms are generating beliefs.

Annotation: The likelihood ratio strongly favors Hypothesis 2 over Hypothesis 1.

Annotation: Therefore, the total evidence decisively supports sociocultural-psychological generation over divine revelation. Popularity without predictive power is not evidence.

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Fitch-Style Deductive Chain

(1)
Annotation: Hypothesis specifies a truth-tracking, convergence-oriented disclosure to humanity.

(2)
Annotation: Hypothesis posits ordinary cultural transmission, synchrony, affect, and incentives as the main generators.

(3)
Annotation: Let abbreviate the total evidence: = durable doctrinal incompatibilities among large blocs; = tight cultural clustering; = ritual synchrony effects; = affective misattribution; = thin record on risk-bearing predictive tests.

(4)
Annotation: There are core propositions and each affirmed by billions that cannot both be true (e.g., crucifixion vs. non-crucifixion). This is the formal core of .

(5)
Annotation: Contradictory propositions cannot both be true; at least one massive bloc is wrong on a world-involving claim.

(6)
Annotation: From (4)–(5), at least one belief with billions of adherents is false; sheer popularity is not a safeguard of truth.

(7)
Annotation: Define the “headcount as evidence” thesis : popularity confers evidential support on .

(8)
Annotation: Bridge principle: if popularity is evidential in a truth-tracking domain, we should see either cross-tradition convergence on cores or reproducible risky predictive successes.

(9)
Annotation: The global record shows persistent, large-scale non-convergence on core claims despite exposure. This is and .

(10)
Annotation: Public, risk-bearing tests (e.g., prayer trials) fail to yield robust, reproducible positives; this is .

(11)
Annotation: From (9)–(10) by conjunction: neither convergence nor robust predictive success is observed at scale.

(12)
Annotation: From (8) and (11) by modus tollens: the headcount-as-evidence thesis fails. Popularity does not, by itself, raise credence.

(13)
Annotation: Condorcet-style necessity: for headcounts to improve accuracy, contributors must be at least modestly reliable and sufficiently independent.

(14)
Annotation: In religion, calibration is poor (centuries of non-convergence) and judgments are highly correlated (birthplace, language, authority), so at least one Condorcet condition fails. This is .

(15)
Annotation: From (13)–(14) with the contrapositive: aggregating religious headcounts does not preserve or increase truth-likelihood.

(16)
Annotation: The total evidence is antecedently unlikely on but expected on (heterogeneity, clustering, synchrony, affect, thin tests).

(17)
Annotation: Likelihood principle: if data are strictly more probable under one hypothesis, then those data favor that hypothesis.

(18)
Annotation: From (16)–(17), the observed world favors over ; combined with (12) and (15), popularity without predictive power is not evidence.

◉ A plain English walkthrough of the symbolic logic above.

1) Hypothesis H₁: The first possibility is that Christian revelation is genuine, clarity-seeking, and reliably informs billions of people.

(2) Hypothesis H₂: The alternative is that religious convictions arise mainly from sociocultural and psychological mechanisms like tradition, ritual synchrony, emotional arousal, and group incentives.

(3) Evidence E: The relevant evidence consists of five parts—durable doctrinal incompatibilities between traditions (D), strong cultural clustering of belief (C), ritual synchrony effects (S), affective misattribution (A), and a thin record of risky predictive successes (T).

(4) Contradictory propositions: At least two core claims, each believed by billions, are directly contradictory (e.g., crucifixion vs. denial of crucifixion).

(5) Principle of contradiction: Contradictory propositions cannot both be true; therefore, at least one massive bloc must be wrong on a world-involving claim.

(6) Result: At least one belief held by billions is false, showing that popularity by itself cannot secure truth.

(7) Pop_Evid defined: The “headcount as evidence” thesis asserts that if a proposition is popular, its popularity confers evidential support.

(8) Bridge principle: If popularity were genuinely evidential, we would expect either convergence across traditions or repeated predictive successes on risky tests.

(9) No convergence: In reality, we do not see convergence; traditions remain persistently divided across centuries.

(10) No predictive success: We also do not see reliable predictive successes; for example, prayer trials fail under scientific scrutiny.

(11) Combined point: Since there is neither convergence nor predictive success, the necessary bridge for popularity-as-evidence is broken.

(12) Collapse of Pop_Evid: Therefore, the claim that popularity provides evidence fails. Popularity alone does not raise credence.

(13) Condorcet jury theorem: Numbers improve accuracy only if individuals are somewhat reliable and largely independent in their judgments.

(14) Failure of conditions: In religion, neither condition is satisfied—judgments are poorly calibrated (centuries of disagreement) and highly correlated (by culture, language, and upbringing).

(15) Result: Therefore, aggregating religious headcounts does not improve truth-likelihood; instead, it entrenches shared error.

(16) Likelihood comparison: The total evidence is very unlikely if H₁ were true but is exactly what we would expect if H₂ were true.

(17) Likelihood principle: When evidence is more probable under one hypothesis than another, it favors the better-supported hypothesis.

(18) Final conclusion: Therefore, the evidence strongly favors H₂ over H₁. Taken with the earlier points, this shows that popularity without predictive power is not evidence of truth.

◉ Flowing Narrative Summary

The argument begins by contrasting two hypotheses: H₁, that Christian revelation is genuine and reliably informs billions, and H₂, that religious convictions arise primarily from sociocultural and psychological mechanisms. The evidence we actually observe includes massive doctrinal incompatibilities among the largest religious populations, strong dependence on birthplace and culture, ritual synchrony that amplifies cohesion, emotional misattribution interpreted as divine presence, and a thin record of risk-bearing predictive successes. These facts are stark: major traditions affirm directly contradictory claims—for example, Christianity teaches that Jesus was crucified and resurrected, while Islam denies even the crucifixion. At least one vast population must therefore be wrong, demonstrating that popularity alone cannot secure truth. If sheer numbers were genuinely evidential, we would expect convergence across religions or the production of reliable predictive successes, but neither has occurred. The Condorcet jury theorem reinforces this point: headcounts increase reliability only if judgments are modestly reliable and largely independent. In religion, however, judgments are both poorly calibrated and strongly correlated by culture, which means aggregation entrenches error rather than cancels it. When framed in likelihood terms, the observed pattern—persistent disagreement, cultural clustering, reliance on synchrony and affect, and failure in predictive tests—is far more probable under H₂ than under H₁. Thus, the global evidence strongly favors sociocultural-psychological generation of belief over the hypothesis of reliable divine revelation. Popularity without predictive power, the argument concludes, does not constitute evidence.