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4 responses to “#31 ✓ Consider: Would an actual compassionate God deem sincere belief in another God worthy of eternal damnation?”

1. 

   Simon Williams

   November 4, 2025

   I think this paper does a good job tempering our human desire for others to have certainty regarding our preferred religious system as well as our unloving impulse to immediately and/or harshly correct or ostracize those wresting with doubts (Jude 1:22).

   It rightly shows why systems that condemn Mariam’s honest 45-45-10 stance are unwise. It should remind us: when we meet someone who feels like they are in a state of nonresistant unbelief, that we need to respond with love because only God knows their heart. We keep pointing to the cross of Christ, trusting its power, not the threat of hellfire.

   That being said, I’m not convinced the evidence is as ambiguous as Stilwell imagines and I don’t think that humans can know if there actually are people in a state of nonresistant unbelief. Even themselves. But that’s irrelevant because, as I said, God knows the heart. So even if the math holds (I don’t need to doubt Mariam’s honesty or call her irrational) I simply trust that God is just and keep pointing her to Jesus in a variety of different ways.

   There is, however, a dangerous aspect to this paper that needs to be addressed because I’m convinced that it is a slippery slope. It doesn’t just critique Hell as Eternal Conscious Torment (ECT) for Mariam, it attacks the doctrine itself. The problem is that ECT is no minor threat.

   Since Hell as ECT is literally the worst possible thing imaginable, in order for us to be prudentially warranted in acting as though it does not obtain, we’d need philosophical certainty that it’s false. Which I don’t think is possible in this instance and that’s the point. If we reject ECT and start teaching universalism or annihilationism, they will become justifications for pursuing distractions rather than reconciling with God through Christ. If those doctrines turn out to be false then those people who were convinced that they were safe to pursue distractions will suffer for all eternity. Whereas if we teach ECT and it turns out to be false then everyone escapes ECT anyway.

   The paper’s arguments against ECT fall far short of that level of certainty, of course. They assume our finite sense of justice trumps God’s if it turns out that God has ordained Hell as ECT. But if an omniscient, omnipotent, perfectly wise and perfectly good God has ordained ECT, logic demands our submission, not rejection. Since we are cognitively finite and morally imperfect, we must defer to God.

   My hope is that Hell is or will be empty. But I don’t think that we, Christians, should teach that hope as doctrine.

   So, while I think the paper gives us good reason to avoid religious systems that encourage people to condemn others who are struggling with doubts to eternal hellfire and it gives us reason to doubt that God would condemn Mariam-like agents to Hell as ECT, it doesn’t do enough to prove that Mariam-like agents actually obtain (mostly because Schellenberg himself failed to do this) and it doesn’t do enough to make us justified in behaving as though Hell is not ECT.

   Reply
   1. 

      Phil Stilwell

      November 4, 2025

      Thank you for your sincere and thoughtful comment. You clearly engaged with the paper in good faith, and that deserves respect. However, your reasoning contains several critical epistemic and logical missteps that undermine your conclusion. Below is a direct response highlighting those issues and clarifying why your argument collapses under closer logical and evidential scrutiny.

      1. You Rely on an Argument from Consequences

      You argue that since Hell as Eternal Conscious Torment (ECT) is the worst possible outcome, we should act as if it is true unless we have absolute certainty that it isn’t.
      That is the argument from consequences: assuming a claim’s truth or falsity based on how desirable or terrifying its implications are.
      Beliefs are justified by evidence, not fear. The possibility of catastrophic loss cannot convert a low-probability claim into a rational one. You could apply the same logic to any other theology promising eternal bliss or torment — Islam, Hinduism, or Zoroastrianism — and reach identical prudential conclusions. Once multiple “infinite threat” systems exist, your wager logic collapses into incoherence.

      A rational agent must proportion belief to the strength of evidence, not to the magnitude of possible outcomes. That is the very principle of Bayes-neutrality developed in the paper you were responding to.

      2. You Base Your Reasoning on a Flawed Pascalian Epistemology

      Your reasoning reduces to a variant of Pascal’s Wager:

      “If ECT might be true, prudence dictates belief, since disbelief risks infinite loss.”

      But Pascalian reasoning fails on multiple fronts:
      ✓ Belief isn’t a voluntary act of will; it tracks perceived evidence.
      ✓ If God values honesty, feigned belief based on risk calculation would itself be disqualifying.
      ✓ With rival eternal claims, expected utility nets to zero—each “bet” cancels the next.

      Your position mistakes decision theory for epistemology. Pascal’s wager is a survival heuristic, not a path to truth. Believing something “just in case” may minimize imagined risk but maximizes epistemic dishonesty. Rational faith—if it is to mean anything coherent—must track evidence, not incentives.

      3. You Confuse “Trust” with “Evidence”

      You say we should “trust God’s justice,” even when we can’t see how doctrines like ECT are just. That’s an equivocation on ‘trust’:

      • When trust rests on a history of demonstrated reliability, it has epistemic grounding.
      • When trust replaces evidence, it becomes fideism—belief because belief itself is praised.

      That second usage is epistemically vacuous. It exempts belief from rational testing while pretending to uphold reason. The moment you call God “loving” and “just,” you are importing human semantic content into those terms. If you then redefine them to mean whatever God does—no matter how monstrous—you’ve stripped them of meaning. You can’t coherently claim God is “just” while denying that justice bears any resemblance to the human concept.

      4. You Implicitly Concede Nonresistant Unbelief

      You admit that people can experience genuine, non-culpable doubt: “only God knows their heart.”
      But if you grant that some doubters are honest, you’ve already affirmed the existence of nonresistant unbelief—the very premise of Schellenberg’s hiddenness argument.

      Once you allow that doubt can be sincere, it follows that some people would believe if the evidence were clearer. That makes their unbelief a predictable outcome of divine hiddenness, not rebellion. And if God punishes such unbelief eternally, you’ve described a system that punishes integrity. The only consistent way to avoid that conclusion is to claim that all doubters are secretly resisting—which contradicts your own statement.

      5. You Use “Mystery” as a Logic-Stopper

      You close by saying that if God ordained ECT, “logic demands our submission.” That is begging the question—assuming what you need to prove.
      You start with “God is perfectly just,” then reason that whatever God does (including ECT) must be just. That’s circular. If you apply the same rule to any claimed deity or scripture, no atrocity could ever be called unjust. The moment you surrender rational evaluation, “justice” becomes an empty word, and faith becomes indistinguishable from authoritarianism.

      6. Summary of Your Reasoning Errors

      • Epistemic Error – Argument from Consequences
        You treat the fear of eternal punishment as evidence that the doctrine must be true. The emotional weight of an outcome does not increase the probability of its truth.
      • Decision-Theoretic Error – Pascal’s Wager
        You substitute a strategy of risk avoidance for genuine truth-seeking. Instead of following evidence, you base belief on a cost–benefit calculation designed to minimize imagined loss.
      • Semantic Error – Equivocation on “Trust”
        You shift between two meanings of trust: rational confidence grounded in evidence and blind emotional faith that replaces reasoning. By doing so, you allow sentiment to override epistemic responsibility.
      • Logical Error – Begging the Question
        You assume that whatever God decrees is automatically just, and then conclude that eternal torment must therefore be just. This circular reasoning defines justice by divine decree rather than by coherent moral or rational standards.
      • Theological Error – Inconsistent Concession
        You acknowledge that some people doubt sincerely and without rebellion—thereby admitting nonresistant unbelief—but you then deny the theological implications of that admission. This contradiction undermines the very claim that eternal punishment is reserved only for the willfully defiant.

      7. The Rational Alternative

      If you genuinely wish to uphold a coherent theism, it must align belief with evidence and punishment with culpability. Rational humility—not credal bravado—is the mark of integrity. Once you recognize that sincere seekers like Mariam could exist, you must also recognize that any theology condemning them cannot, by its own predicates, be called loving or just.

      In short, your instincts toward compassion are right. The danger lies not in your empathy but in your epistemology. Fear may motivate obedience, but it can never justify belief.

      Once again, thanks for your sincere comment.

      Reply
      1. 

         Simon Williams

         November 4, 2025

         I’d like to make a couple of clarifications. But since I’m not here to chat with an LLM, this will likely be my last comment. Unless something interesting comes up, of course.

         First, acting as though something is true is not the same as believing that it is true. I’m not telling people they must believe Christianity is true because Hell is terrifying. When a rational person decides how to act, they weigh not only epistemic justification but also pragmatic ones when the situation calls for it. In cases where epistemic justifications are ambiguous, pragmatic reasoning must be included for rational behavior. Questions about what happens after death clearly fall into that category.

         You’re right that the deeper question is, “Which of the ECT-threatening worldviews is most likely to be true?” I didn’t bring up this argument in order to say that Christianity is to be preferred over Islam. I raised it to highlight what level of justification would be needed to rationally reject any worldview that includes ECT. Your paper does not meet that threshold.

         Second, I’m not defining “loving” and “just” as “whatever God does.” I believe God is loving and just because of the life, death, resurrection, and ascension of Jesus Christ. I also believe we have sufficient epistemic justification to affirm that the God worshipped by Jesus is omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly good, and perfectly wise. That combination logically entails that finite beings like us ought to trust His actions and obey His commands. That reasoning is not circular, it follows from warranted theistic premises.

         Third, when I encounter people who believe they are in a state of nonresistant unbelief, I treat them as though they are in that state, even though I do not believe such a state actually obtains. The fact that I recognize that I could be wrong about that is irrelevant because my action is the same. I preach the gospel, explain why I think Christianity is to be preferred over all other worldviews, and trust God with the results.

         Now, there is WAY more that could be said about a lot of points made in your comment and what I’ve said here, but I’m not convinced that it deserves that much time. Have a nice day.

         Reply
         1. 

            Phil Stilwell

            November 4, 2025

            Thank you, Simon — and I still appreciate both your tone and the seriousness with which you’ve engaged. You’ve clarified some distinctions that deserve credit, but they remain bound to the same epistemic error: privileging pragmatic caution over evidential proportion. Let’s examine that — and briefly address your aside about “chatting with an LLM.”

            Truth does not care about its vessel. Whether an insight originates from a human or an LLM, from a prophet or a parrot, its validity is grounded only in evidence and logic. If a proposition tracks reality, its source is irrelevant; if it doesn’t, no credential rescues it. A mind sincerely committed to truth welcomes correction from any quarter. The method, not the messenger, is what separates reason from rhetoric.

            1. Acting “As If” When Evidence Is Ambiguous

            You correctly distinguish between believing and acting as though something is true. But pragmatic reasoning only supplements epistemic justification when both (a) probabilities can be meaningfully estimated, and (b) the action does not corrupt rational calibration.
            Your use of infinite disutility (ECT) invalidates both. The moment an outcome carries infinite penalty, all competing doctrines that threaten infinite loss—Christian, Muslim, Hindu, or otherwise—demand identical deference. That symmetry collapses the wager into incoherence. Pragmatic caution under infinity produces epistemic paralysis, not rational action.

            To act as if one infinite-penalty claim deserves special weight, you must smuggle in prior credence—precisely what the wager logic tries to bypass.

            2. Trusting God’s Nature Without Circularity

            You claim your reasoning isn’t circular because it rests on historical evidence for Christ. Yet the structure still loops:

            P1: The Christian narrative depicts Jesus as embodying divine justice.P2: Therefore God is just.P3: Therefore, whatever God decrees (even ECT) is just.

            Unless you verify the truth of that narrative independently of its theological claims, you are defining justice by the text that asserts it. That’s still self-referential. A Muslim can run the same loop with the Qur’an; a Hindu, with the Vedas. The epistemic problem is not which circle you draw, but that you’re inside one.

            3. Trust as Rational Deference

            You say finite beings ought to trust an omniscient and perfectly good deity. Yet this collapses unless “good” retains stable semantics.
            If “goodness” can coherently include eternal torment for finite error, the predicate has been emptied of meaning. It becomes a label without content — “good” simply means “whatever God does.” Once that happens, the concept of goodness ceases to guide trust; it merely rubber-stamps authority.

            4. Nonresistant Unbelief and Behavioral Paradox

            You deny that nonresistant unbelief exists but behave as if it might. That dissonance reveals your intuitions outpacing your theology. You treat sincere doubters kindly because your moral intuition (in the pragmatic, non-transcendent sense) recognizes sincerity. That’s precisely the concession Schellenberg’s argument needs: if honest doubt is possible, divine hiddenness entails culpability gaps. You live as though those gaps exist — and that praxis tacitly refutes your dogma.

            5. Where the Real Dispute Lies

            Our disagreement isn’t pastoral but epistemic.
            You privilege fear of being wrong over desire to be right. You justify deference to an unverified claim because the consequences of disbelief might be infinite. But epistemic virtue is not loss aversion. The truth’s worth is intrinsic, not conditional on imagined penalties. A reasoning agent committed to accuracy must weight beliefs by evidence strength, not by the emotional magnitude of possible outcomes.

            6. Closing Reflection

            You’re right that there’s more that could be said, but here’s the crux:
            If reality is governed by a loving intelligence, it would not punish proportionate doubt. If it is not, then fear-based belief is wasted effort. In both cases, honesty before evidence is the higher act of trust.

            And if that truth happens to reach you through an LLM rather than a pulpit, remember: the medium is irrelevant. Rational minds recognize that truth is indifferent to the species—or the silicon—that speaks it.

            Reply