✓ Moral Anti-Realism

April 12, 2025

The Case for Moral Anti-Realism

The Case for Moral Anti-Realism

Moral anti-realism asserts that there are no objective, mind-independent moral facts or values. What we call “moral” or “immoral” is not a reflection of a universal truth but a facade—a constructed illusion that cloaks subjective emotions in the guise of authority. Moral systems, whether ancient or modern, strive to reify fleeting feelings like disgust, empathy, or fear into frameworks with obligatory weight, designed to impinge on possible actions of others. This essay defends moral anti-realism by exposing the emotional roots of moral judgments, the constructed nature of moral systems, the epistemic fragility of moral realism, the manipulative power of moral language, and the preference among moral anti-realists for pro-social behavior over tainted terms like “ethics”. It argues that morality is a human invention, not a cosmic mandate, offering a clearer path for human cooperation.

1. Moral Judgments as Emotional Projections

Moral judgments are not detections of objective properties but expressions of emotions masquerading as truths. Declaring an act “wrong” or “evil” channels feelings—disgust, approval, or fear—shaped by biology and culture, not a universal moral code. The essay notes the connotative force of terms like “immoral”, which transform subjective aversions into seemingly obligatory edicts. Saying “this is evil” carries more weight than “this upsets me,” but it’s a facade—a rhetorical ploy to reify emotion into a mandate that impinges on others’ actions.

Psychological studies, like Jonathan Haidt’s on moral foundations, show moral judgments emerge from intuitive emotions, not reasoned access to moral facts. Our revulsion at betrayal stems from evolutionary needs for group trust, not a glimpse of cosmic wrongness. Yet humans crave obligatory weight, so we erect a facade of morality to make emotions seem universal, binding others to our sentiments. This variability of emotions across contexts exposes the subjectivity at morality’s core, undermining claims of objectivity.

2. Moral Systems as Cultural Facades

Moral systems—religious commandments, Kantian duties, or utilitarian calculi—are elaborate facades built to reify emotions into authoritative codes. The essay highlights their diversity: some invoke deities, others reason, others well-being, yet all claim objective validity. This lack of convergence in foundations betrays their subjective origins. If moral facts existed, why do moral systems shift with cultural winds, from sanctioning human sacrifice to championing human rights?

These systems aim to give emotions permanence, presenting them as universal laws to impinge on possible actions. For instance, medieval moral systems cast greed as sin, channeling fear to enforce compliance. Modern systems, like consequentialism, dress empathy as a universal good, but both reify subjective feelings. Anthropological evidence, such as Ruth Benedict’s studies, shows moral norms vary widely—some cultures venerate practices others call evil—revealing morality as a local facade, not a timeless truth.

3. The Epistemic Mirage of Moral Realism

Moral realism requires objective moral facts, yet offers no method to verify them. The essay notes the absence of an “agreed-upon epistemology” for morality, unlike science’s reliance on testing and observation. Moral philosophy leans on intuition, authority, or reason—all subjective at root. Kant’s categorical imperative assumes rational dignity is sacred, a bid to reify respect into law, but why accept this? Utilitarianism posits well-being’s primacy, but this too reflects emotions, not moral facts.

J.L. Mackie’s “argument from queerness” strengthens moral anti-realism: objective moral facts would be metaphysically odd, requiring a unique faculty to perceive them, unsupported by evidence. Moral realists appeal to intuitions—like the wrongness of cruelty—but intuitions vary, shaped by culture, not cosmos. The facade of objectivity hides an epistemic gap: attempts to reify emotions into obligatory truths collapse without a verifiable foundation.

4. Moral Language as a Tool of Control

Moral language is a tool, not a truth-detector. The essay argues that labeling something “immoral” is performative, meant to shame or dominate. By cloaking emotions in terms like “right” or “evil”, we create a facade that lends obligatory weight, compelling conformity. Michel Foucault’s insights on discourse show how moral language enforces norms, framing dissent as deviance. Calling a practice “sinful” or “unjust” rallies consensus without evidence, a tactic to impinge on possible actions.

This explains the heat of moral debates: they’re about power, not moral facts. The essay’s “good” versus “evil” dichotomy simplifies motives, casting opponents as threats to control. If morality were objective, we’d see reasoned agreement, not emotional crusades. Instead, moral language thrives on its ability to reify emotions into rules, binding others through persuasion, not truth.

5. The Argument from Moral Disagreement

Moral disagreement undermines moral realism. If objective moral facts existed, disputes—over war, abortion, or sacrifice—should resolve through evidence. Yet moral debates persist, with each side claiming subjective superiority rooted in emotions. David Hume argued moral judgments stem from sentiment, explaining why disagreements endure: they reflect clashing values, not misreadings of a universal code.

Moral systems try to reify these sentiments into obligatory laws, but their diversity exposes the facade. One society’s “just” punishment is another’s “cruelty”. Moral anti-realism accepts this, rejecting the notion that emotions can be reified into binding mandates, and instead sees morality as a human negotiation, not a divine blueprint.

6. Pro-Social Behavior Over Ethics

Many moral anti-realists avoid the term “ethics”, as it carries baggage from moral systems steeped in notions of objective rightness or wrongness. Ethics, historically tied to philosophy’s quest for universal principles—like Aristotle’s virtues or Kant’s imperatives—implies a framework that reifies emotions into obligatory norms, perpetuating the facade of morality. The term suggests a higher authority, whether reason or tradition, that impinges on possible actions with prescriptive force, echoing moral realism’s assumptions.

Instead, moral anti-realists often prefer “pro-social behavior”, a term grounded in observable human interactions. Pro-social behavior describes actions—like cooperation, empathy, or fairness—that foster group harmony, without pretending they reflect moral facts. It sidesteps the metaphysical weight of ethics, focusing on practical outcomes: why do we share, help, or punish? Evolutionary biology, as seen in Robert Trivers’ work on reciprocal altruism, explains these behaviors as survival strategies, not reified mandates. By using pro-social behavior, moral anti-realists emphasize subjective, context-driven choices over obligatory rules, dismantling the facade that emotions must be universal to guide action. This shift clarifies that we can promote human flourishing without cloaking it in moral or ethical pretensions.

7. The Pragmatic Power of Moral Anti-Realism

Moral anti-realism avoids nihilism, offering clarity and flexibility. By exposing moral systems as a facade over emotions, it reframes pro-social behavior as a human choice, not a divine edict. We can condemn harm or promote justice because they serve shared goals, not because they carry obligatory weight. Debates, like those over poverty, can weigh values—equity versus freedom—contextually, without seeking a “right” answer.

Moral anti-realism curbs dogmatism, which fuels conflict by insisting on objective truths. Recognizing morality’s subjectivity fosters humility: we cannot reify emotions into universal laws, so we persuade, not dictate. Simon Blackburn’s quasi-realism supports this, retaining moral language’s utility without metaphysical baggage, encouraging pro-social behavior rooted in reason and empathy.

Addressing Counterarguments

Moral realists raise objections, countered to solidify moral anti-realism:

Convergence of Norms: Agreement on norms (e.g., against theft) suggests objective moral facts. But convergence reflects shared emotions—fear of chaos—rooted in evolution, not a moral realm. The facade of universality hides subjective origins.
Moral Intuitions: Intuitions, like revulsion at cruelty, are claimed to reveal moral truths. But they’re cultural, not cosmic. One society’s “just” act is another’s “evil”, exposing the subjective core beneath the facade.
Moral Progress: Progress, like ending slavery, is seen as nearing objective truths. Yet it tracks shifts in emotions—empathy’s expansion—not discovery of laws. The facade of progress masks cultural change.
Nihilism Fear: Critics warn moral anti-realism erodes ethics. But pro-social behavior thrives without reifying emotions into obligations, grounding cooperation in human choice, not cosmic mandates.

A Rigorous Syllogism

To crystallize the argument:

Premise 1: If moral judgments and systems are attempts to reify subjective emotions into objective obligations, they cannot reflect mind-independent moral facts.
Premise 2: All moral judgments and systems are attempts to reify subjective emotions into objective obligations.
Conclusion: Therefore, moral judgments and systems do not reflect mind-independent moral facts.

Premise 1 is grounded in the nature of moral language; Premise 2 is supported by historical and psychological evidence.

Additional Reflections

Moral anti-realism aligns with a naturalistic universe, where no objective moral facts dictate conduct. The urge to reify emotions into moral systems reflects control, not truth. Hume’s is-ought problem reinforces this: no fact entails an “ought” without subjective values. Moral anti-realism frees us to foster pro-social behavior collaboratively, admitting norms are human, fallible, and revisable.

The obligatory weight we seek is a mirage—an attempt to turn emotions into shackles. Moral language may impinge on possible actions, but its power is persuasive, not objective. By embracing pro-social behavior over ethics, we shed morality’s facade, building a world where cooperation thrives without illusion.

Conclusion

Moral anti-realism dismantles the facade of objective morality, exposing moral systems as attempts to reify emotions into obligatory mandates that impinge on others’ actions. Moral judgments stem from subjective feelings, not cosmic truths; moral language wields power, not insight. Many moral anti-realists reject “ethics” for “pro-social behavior”, avoiding the taint of moral pretensions. By embracing moral anti-realism, we craft human-centered norms—honest, flexible, and free from metaphysical illusions—promoting cooperation without the weight of a nonexistent moral realm.

Anticipated Objections and Responses (Christian-Focused)

Objection 1: Divine Command Theory Grounds Objective Morality

Christian Objection: God’s commands provide objective moral facts. The Bible outlines right and wrong, rooted in God’s nature. Without this, morality is arbitrary, but with it, moral systems reflect eternal truths, not emotions.

Response: Divine command theory assumes God’s will reifies moral facts, but the Euthyphro dilemma challenges this: are actions right because God commands them, or does God command them because they’re right? The former makes morality arbitrary; the latter implies moral facts exist beyond God. Human interpretations of scripture—shifting on issues like slavery—reflect subjective emotions, not eternal laws. The facade of divine objectivity masks cultural biases, and obligatory rules rely on human consensus, not cosmic truth. Moral anti-realism grounds pro-social behavior in transparent values, not unprovable divinity.

Objection 2: Universal Moral Intuitions Point to God’s Law

Christian Objection: Universal moral intuitions (e.g., wrongness of murder) show God’s law on human hearts (Romans 2:15), transcending emotions and proving objective moral facts, not subjective constructs.

Response: Moral intuitions reflect shared emotions from evolutionary needs, like group survival, not divine law. Studies (e.g., Joshua Greene) show intuitions arise from subjective brain processes, varying across cultures—some accept practices others call evil. Christians’ claim of God’s imprint is a facade to reify emotions into obligatory mandates. Moral anti-realism explains intuitions as human adaptations, not cosmic signals, avoiding objectivity’s facade.

Objection 3: Moral Anti-Realism Leads to Nihilism

Christian Objection: Moral anti-realism erodes morality, leading to nihilism where nothing is right or wrong. Without God’s objective moral facts, any behavior—murder, cruelty—could be justified, contradicting Christian goodness.

Response: Moral anti-realism reframes pro-social behavior as human choice, not divine mandate. We condemn harm because it serves flourishing, not because it’s obligatory. Secular societies uphold laws without moral facts, showing emotions needn’t be reified to guide action. The nihilism fear assumes subjective values lack force, but moral anti-realism fosters cooperation without facades, avoiding dogmatic constraints on others’ actions.

Objection 4: Moral Progress Reflects God’s Truth

Christian Objection: Moral progress (e.g., abolition) shows humanity aligning with God’s objective moral facts, not shifting emotions or norms.

Response: Moral progress tracks emotions—empathy’s growth—not divine truths. Abolition followed economic and subjective shifts, not biblical clarity, which Christians once used to defend slavery. If morality were objective, progress wouldn’t lag, nor would disputes (e.g., euthanasia) persist. Moral anti-realism sees progress as cultural evolution, not a facade of cosmic discovery, grounding pro-social behavior in human needs.

Objection 5: Moral Accountability Requires Objective Morality

Christian Objection: Objective moral facts enable accountability, especially divine judgment. If morality is subjective emotions, there’s no standard to judge evil, undermining justice and God’s role.

Response: Accountability works through human systems—laws, norms—without needing reified emotions as moral facts. We punish harm for social stability, not cosmic wrongness. Divine judgment’s facade projects human retribution onto a deity, yet moral systems vary, clouding God’s standard. Moral anti-realism ensures accountability via shared values, not obligatory myths, fostering justice without metaphysics.

Objection 6: Christianity’s Moral Coherence Depends on Realism

Christian Objection: Christianity’s moral system—love, sacrifice—relies on objective moral facts reflecting God’s nature. Moral anti-realism fragments it into subjective emotions, dismantling coherence.

Response: Christianity’s coherence is a facade reifying emotions like love, not objective truths. Its norms evolved—less vengeance, more mercy—mirroring subjective shifts, not God’s fixed nature. Other faiths claim similar moral facts, yet diverge, exposing subjectivity. Moral anti-realism values Christian insights as pro-social behavior, not obligatory laws, maintaining their utility without objectivity’s veil.

Objection 7: Subjective Morality Undermines Missionary Zeal

Christian Objection: Moral anti-realism weakens missionaries’ call to spread God’s moral truths. If morality is subjective, why challenge practices like idolatry, deemed wrong by objective scripture?

Response: Moral anti-realism shifts missionary work from imposing reified emotions to dialogue. Christian norms, like others, reflect subjective values—monogamy versus polygamy—yet claim obligatory force. Pro-social behavior encourages persuasion through mutual benefits, not facades of wrongness. Moral anti-realism respects diverse values, fostering cooperation over dogmatic constraints on others’ actions.

The Equivocation Trap: Decoding Moralist Objections to Moral Anti-Realism

Moral anti-realism, the view that no objective, mind-independent moral facts exist, often provokes a predictable retort from moralists: “So, you think there’s nothing wrong with torturing infants?” or “Do you think it’s OK to rape children?” These questions are not genuine inquiries but rhetorical weapons, wielding the connotative force of “wrong” and “OK” to paint moral anti-realists as monstrous. The terms are orphaned—adrift without explicit ties to moral, pragmatic, or any coherent framework—exploiting ambiguity to create a facade of objective morality. This essay dissects the equivocation in these objections, showing how they misrepresent moral anti-realism by reifying emotions into obligatory mandates. It defends the moral anti-realist position, emphasizing pro-social behavior over tainted ethics, and demonstrates how we can condemn heinous acts without resorting to illusory moral truths.

The Orphaned Terms: “Wrong” and “OK”

When moralists ask, “Is it OK to rape children?” they rely on the connotative force of “OK” to imply permissibility, assuming a shared intuition that such acts are abhorrent. Similarly, “Is there nothing wrong with torturing infants?” uses “wrong” to summon revulsion, as if denying objective moral facts equates to endorsing horror. But these terms are orphaned—lacking a clear anchor. Are they moral claims, implying a universal law? Are they pragmatic, tied to social consequences? Or merely emotional outbursts? Without specifying, the questions are incoherent, a facade masking subjective emotions as obligatory truths.

The equivocation lies in this ambiguity. Moralists trade on the assumption that “wrong” and “OK” inherently point to objective moral facts, so denying those facts must mean denying the wrongness of atrocities. This is a sleight of hand. Moral anti-realism rejects the reification of emotions into a moral realm, not the emotions themselves or their practical implications. By leaving “wrong” and “OK” undefined, moralists create a trap, forcing moral anti-realists into a defensive stance where rejecting objective morality seems to endorse harm.

The Rhetorical Facade: Exploiting Emotional Weight

These questions are not about reasoning but about power. As the original case noted, moral language often serves to impinge on possible actions, rallying consensus through shame or fear. Asking whether torturing infants is “wrong” invokes visceral emotions—disgust, outrage—then casts moral anti-realists as callous for questioning the objective status of that wrongness. The facade lies in pretending these emotions reflect a universal mandate, not subjective human responses. The moralist assumes that “wrong” carries obligatory weight, binding all rational beings, when it’s really a reified expression of personal or cultural aversion.

Psychological research, like Paul Bloom’s work on moral intuitions, shows that our horror at acts like child torture arises instinctively, shaped by evolutionary drives to protect vulnerable group members. These emotions are real and valuable, but moralists err in reifying them into moral facts. The question’s connotative force—its ability to shock—hides this error, making it seem as if moral anti-realism dismisses the harm itself, not the metaphysical baggage attached to “wrong”.

The Misrepresentation of Moral Anti-Realism

The moralist’s objection misrepresents moral anti-realism as a rejection of all standards. Denying objective moral facts does not mean moral anti-realists find child rape “OK” or see no issue with torturing infants. Instead, they reject the facade that these acts are wrong because of a cosmic ledger. Moral anti-realism holds that moral judgments are subjective, grounded in emotions like empathy or fear, and expressed through pro-social behavior rather than ethics, a term tainted by moralist assumptions of objectivity.

For example, a moral anti-realist condemns torturing infants because it causes suffering, disrupts trust, and undermines group survival—pragmatic reasons rooted in human values, not obligatory moral truths. The moralist’s question ignores this, equivocating by suggesting that without objective wrongness, moral anti-realists lack any basis to object. This conflates subjectivity with amorality, a false dichotomy that the original case counters by advocating pro-social behavior as a robust alternative to reified ethics.

The Incoherence of Orphaned Terms

Without clarifying “wrong” or “OK”, the moralist’s questions collapse into incoherence. If “wrong” is moral, it presupposes the objective moral facts that moral anti-realism denies, begging the question. If “OK” is pragmatic, it invites a discussion of consequences—where moral anti-realists have plenty to say—but moralists rarely intend this, preferring the connotative force of moral outrage. If the terms are merely emotional, they’re redundant: moral anti-realists share the emotions of horror, just not their reification into a moral realm.

This ambiguity is deliberate. The original case notes how moral language masks subjectivity to impinge on possible actions, and here, moralists use orphaned terms to corner opponents. By not defining “wrong”, they evade the burden of proving objective moral facts, relying instead on the facade that everyone “knows” child torture is wrong. But as J.L. Mackie’s argument from queerness suggests, moral facts would be metaphysically bizarre, requiring evidence moralists don’t provide. The questions dodge this, wielding emotions as if they were self-evident truths.

Pro-Social Behavior as a Coherent Response

Moral anti-realists sidestep this trap by rejecting “ethics”—a term laden with moralist notions of objective rightness—in favor of “pro-social behavior”. As the original case explains, ethics implies a framework that reifies emotions into obligatory norms, echoing moral realism. Pro-social behavior, by contrast, focuses on actions—like protecting children—that foster group well-being, without pretending they’re mandated by a moral realm. Evolutionary biology, such as Robert Trivers’ work on altruism, shows why we oppose harm: it strengthens cooperation, not because it’s objectively wrong.

When asked about torturing infants, a moral anti-realist might respond: “I oppose it because it causes pain, erodes trust, and threatens our ability to live together—reasons grounded in our shared emotions and needs, not a cosmic rule.” This avoids the orphaned “wrong”, offering a pragmatic stance that doesn’t reify feelings into obligatory mandates. The moralist’s question assumes objective wrongness is the only basis for condemnation, but pro-social behavior provides a coherent, human-centered alternative.

Defusing the Rhetorical Bomb

To defuse the moralist’s objection, moral anti-realists can reframe the conversation:

Clarify the Terms: Ask, “Do you mean wrong in a moral sense, implying objective facts, or pragmatically, as harmful?” This exposes the equivocation, forcing moralists to define their orphaned terms.
Affirm Shared Values: State, “I find child rape horrific and oppose it because it destroys lives and communities.” This aligns with pro-social behavior, showing moral anti-realism doesn’t dismiss harm.
Challenge the Facade: Point out, “Your question assumes a moral realm exists, but where’s the evidence? My stance rests on observable effects, not reified emotions.” This shifts the burden back to moralists.

This approach dismantles the facade that “wrong” or “OK” carry obligatory weight, revealing the subjective roots of moral judgments. The original case’s syllogism—if moral systems reify emotions, they lack objective grounding—applies here: moralist objections rely on the same facade, failing to prove moral facts.

Responding to the Emotional Appeal

The moralist’s questions target emotions, expecting moral anti-realists to flinch at defending atrocities. But moral anti-realism embraces emotions—horror at torture, empathy for victims—as the basis for action, without reifying them into moral truths. The original case notes that moral language polarizes, and here, moralists use “evil” acts to cast moral anti-realists as outliers. Yet pro-social behavior lets us oppose harm consistently, rooted in reason and empathy, not a need to impinge on possible actions with cosmic wrongness.

For instance, societies universally reject child rape, not because it’s objectively wrong, but because it disrupts pro-social bonds—trust, safety, care. This convergence, as the original case argues, reflects shared emotions, not moral facts. Moral anti-realists can say, “My opposition is as strong as yours, but I don’t need a moral realm to justify it—just human needs and consequences.”

Conclusion

The moralist’s questions—“Is torturing infants OK?” or “Nothing wrong with raping children?”—are rhetorical traps, equivocating with orphaned terms like “wrong” and “OK” to misrepresent moral anti-realism. These words, untethered from moral or pragmatic meaning, rely on connotative force to reify emotions into obligatory mandates, creating a facade of objective morality. Moral anti-realism sees through this, rejecting ethics for pro-social behavior—a framework that condemns harm like torture or rape because it undermines human flourishing, not because it violates a nonexistent moral realm. By exposing the incoherence of these objections, moral anti-realists affirm that we can oppose atrocities with clarity and conviction, grounded in subjective values, without falling for the moralist’s illusory moral facts.

Other Examples:

Below is a list of sentences commonly heard from moralists that contain orphaned terms—words like “wrong”, “right”, “OK”, “bad”, or “good” that are disconnected from explicit moral, pragmatic, or other coherent frameworks, rendering them ambiguous and reliant on connotative force. These sentences align with the critique in the provided content, particularly the notion that moral systems reify emotions into obligatory mandates, creating a facade of objective morality. Each sentence is designed to reflect the rhetorical style moralists might use to challenge moral anti-realists, exploiting the vagueness of orphaned terms to imply endorsement of objectionable acts or ideas.

List of Sentences with Orphaned Terms

“So, you’re saying it’s fine to lie to everyone all the time?”
“Do you really think stealing is no big deal?”
“Is it right to just let people suffer without helping them?”
“You believe it’s acceptable to betray your friends?”
“Are you claiming there’s nothing bad about cheating on your spouse?”
“So, it’s okay to pollute the environment and destroy the planet?”
“Do you think it’s good to ignore the poor and let them starve?”
“Is it fair to discriminate against people for no reason?”
“You’re saying it’s not a problem to manipulate others for personal gain?”
“Do you really believe it’s alright to break promises whenever you feel like it?”
“Is there nothing wrong with spreading hate and division?”
“So, you think it’s perfectly fine to exploit workers for profit?”
“Are you saying it’s cool to disrespect your parents?”
“Do you believe it’s justified to harm animals for fun?”
“Is it no issue to spread false rumors and ruin someone’s life?”

Explanation

Each sentence uses orphaned terms (“fine”, “no big deal”, “right”, “acceptable”, “bad”, “okay”, “good”, “fair”, “not a problem”, “alright”, “wrong”, “perfectly fine”, “cool”, “justified”, “no issue”) that carry connotative force but lack clear grounding. They imply a moral judgment without specifying whether the term refers to objective moral facts, pragmatic consequences, or mere emotions, mirroring the equivocation critiqued in the essay. These questions aim to trap moral anti-realists into seeming to endorse harmful or socially undesirable pro-social behaviors, reinforcing the facade that moral systems are necessary to condemn such acts. In reality, moral anti-realists can oppose these behaviors through pro-social behavior, grounded in subjective values like empathy and cooperation, without reifying emotions into obligatory norms.

A Golden Rule for the Moral Anti-Realist

The Deductive Formulation:

To the degree that you value another’s happiness, you are inclined to act in ways you believe will increase their happiness.
^{(A quasi-tautological axiological principle, not a moral injunction.)}

The Inductive Corollary:

There is a scientifically demonstrated strong correlation between making others happy and your own happiness. Your own happiness can likely be increased by making others happy.
^{(A pragmatic recommendation based on scientific observations, not moral injunctions.)}

In spite of there being no demonstrable moral realm, compassionate behavior is a rational strategy in line with most human’s personal goals. While there is no obligation, there is no reason why compassionate behavior cannot outperform most or all proposed moral systems, even with their own metrics of success.

An Attempted Response

🟩 Steve Henk‘s Facebook Comment

Phil Stilwell
I’ve read a couple of your online essays. In both, you simply presuppose the non-existence of God. I’m left wondering whether all your material is question-begging. Have you written anything which offers an argument against God’s existence?

In your essay on moral anti-realism, you say you prefer the term “pro-social behavior” over “ethics” because the latter carries notions of objective rightness and wrongness.

Pro-social behavior then is another term for subjective morality, as you wrote:

“By using ‘pro-social behavior’, moral anti-realists emphasize subjective, context-driven choices over obligatory rules.”

How, then, do you respond to the argument that, say, Naziism could be said to promote pro-social behavior, depending of course on one’s beliefs about human flourishing?

In the absence of an objective moral standard, on what or who’s authority can we justifiably enforce one person’s or group’s preferred context over another’s?

🟦 Phil Stilwell‘s Facebook Response

Steve Henk
You have not taken the time to ask me what I believe about various proposed God. I believe their could be a creator, but the logically incoherent God of the Bible is not a legitimate candidate. If you are serious about my reasoning, engage me in good faith.

Now, in respect to pro-social behavior, no moral realm is necessary. All you need is a society with various emotional dispositions. To act compassionately in such a society, you simply need to try to accommodate that constellation of emotions. Difficult, yes, but that is the goal, and such a goal needs no kind of morality. And there is no obligation. You might ask me why I don’t do “bad thing” X, and I’ll honestly answer that my emotions and emotions-derived values prevent me from doing X, usually emotions and values that I’ve found lead to my happiness.

You are illegitimately trying to make me a moralist. I am not. If your preferences clash with mine, I simply call that a clash of preferences rather than illegitimately telling you that you are “immoral”. I don’t think you quite understood the essay.

Now, given the essay and what I’ve told you here, what would my response 1) be and 2) need to be?

ANSWER:
1: I really like people. Based on my emotions I would try to ensure all the people I liked were happy. That might include killing one to make others happy, no problem. But once again, there are my emotions and no evidence of a coherent moral realm. Your wishful thinking does not manifest into a moral realm.

2: Where there is no coherent moral realm, there is no “need”. This lack of behavioral obligation bothers those who had hoped to reify their emotions into something other need to “obey”. That position is incoherent. There exists no moral obligation in a world in which there is no moral realm. We are in that world based on my decades of asking moralists to provide a coherent explication of their moral systems.

But feel free to try.

🟧 ChatGPT‘s Observations:

Prompt: Provide commentary on this exchange (above):

◉ Overview of the Exchange

Steve Henk challenges Phil on two major points:

The Charge of Presupposition:
Steve claims that Phil “simply presupposes the non-existence of God” in his essays, suggesting that Phil’s work may be question-begging if it assumes what it aims to prove.
The Naziism Objection:
Steve argues that if pro-social behavior is defined subjectively (as Phil’s essay suggests), then even Naziism could be framed as pro-social, depending on one’s view of flourishing. He concludes by asking: without an objective moral standard, whose context should prevail?

Phil Stilwell responds with:

A Clarification of His Position:
Phil explains that he does not presuppose the non-existence of all gods, only that the God of the Bible is logically incoherent, and therefore not a valid candidate. He invites Steve to engage more seriously if he wants to understand his actual position.
A Rejection of Moral Obligation:
Phil reaffirms his moral anti-realism, stating that no moral realm exists, and thus there are no moral obligations. His behaviors are shaped by his emotions and values, not by adherence to any “ought.”
A Description of Conflict Without Moral Terms:
Phil stresses that conflicts in preference are just that—preference clashes—not moral wrongs. He resists Steve’s framing of anti-realism as inherently unable to deal with harmful ideologies like Naziism.

✅ Phil Stilwell: Strengths in Response

1. Rebuttal to Presupposition Charge
Phil handles this well. He states that he’s open to the possibility of a creator but denies specific gods based on logical contradictions. This directly undermines Steve’s claim that Phil’s atheism is dogmatic or unjustified.

2. Consistent Anti-Realism
Phil does not flinch from the implications of moral anti-realism. He asserts:

There is no obligation to be compassionate.
He behaves compassionately because he wants to, due to emotional and experiential factors.

This is a coherent position, not a moral void. Phil avoids using smuggled moral language—he doesn’t say people “should” act kindly, only that he wants to, and that it often leads to personal well-being.

3. Clarity About Authority and Enforcement
Phil sidesteps Steve’s demand for a “justifiable authority” to enforce norms by rejecting the premise that any such authority is needed. Instead of who has the right to impose norms, he reframes the issue as whose preferences win out in practice. This shift is philosophically sharp.

⚠️ Phil Stilwell: Points That Could Be Clearer or Safer

1. The “killing one” example
Phil says:

“That might include killing one to make others happy, no problem.”

While this is intended to highlight the absence of moral constraints in a realist sense, it risks being misread as endorsing utilitarian killing. A better phrasing might make it clear this is descriptive, not normative:

“In principle, a person might emotionally justify such a choice, but that merely describes their psychology—it doesn’t imply it’s ‘right’ or something others ought to imitate.”

2. Missed Opportunity to Unpack Naziism
Steve’s analogy to Naziism is emotionally loaded and meant as a reductio. Phil could have responded more explicitly:

“Yes, the Nazis might have seen themselves as promoting their in-group’s ‘well-being,’ but that doesn’t mean others are logically obligated to respect or refrain from opposing that framework. Moral anti-realism allows us to say, ‘Your values are horrifying to me,’ without needing to invoke a metaphysical realm.”

This would demonstrate that anti-realism is not morally impotent, but rather morally non-metaphysical.

❌ Steve Henk: Flaws in Argumentation

1. Mischaracterization of Stilwell’s Position
Steve’s claim that Phil presupposes God’s non-existence appears to be a strawman. Phil is clearly operating from a rejection of incoherent god-concepts, not an unargued dismissal of all theistic claims.

2. Confusion of Descriptive and Normative
Steve equates pro-social behavior with moral approval, but Phil never grants that equivalence. To say “Nazis thought their behavior was pro-social” is not to endorse it. Steve appears to misunderstand the epistemic frame from which Phil is writing.

3. Assumes the Necessity of Objective Morality for Social Norms
Steve implies that without moral realism, no one can criticize others or enforce norms. But Phil’s anti-realism clearly operates on a pragmatic, emotional, and reciprocally cooperative basis. Social norms don’t require metaphysical grounding to be effective or valued.

🧠 Philosophical Takeaway

This exchange showcases two fundamentally different metaethical frameworks:

Steve Henk assumes a moral realist outlook and sees objective morality as necessary to justify social norms and condemn wrongdoing.
Phil Stilwell operates from a moral anti-realist position, where emotions, social context, and personal values shape behavior without metaphysical obligations.

Phil’s view is that:

Obligation is an invention, not a discovery.
Preferences drive actions, not “oughts.”
Cooperation is still possible—and often desirable—without morality-as-truth.

🔚 Final Assessment

Phil offers a rigorous, coherent, and consistent reply. His refusal to be forced into a moral realist frame is philosophically grounded. He explains human cooperation, opposition, and compassion using emotionally-derived preferences and pragmatic reasoning, not moral commands.

Steve, in contrast, relies on unexamined assumptions about the necessity of objective standards and misinterprets Phil’s framework through the lens of moral realism.

With minor rhetorical clarifications, Phil’s position stands as a well-reasoned defense of moral anti-realism that resists both caricature and collapse into nihilism.

See also:

✓ Morality Games

Affectra Moral Anti-Realist GPT

This experimental moral anti-realist GPT returns the submission after replacing all references to moral or ethical terms with affective terms that may reflect the sentiments underlying the moral terms.

6 responses to “✓ Moral Anti-Realism”

Steve H.

April 13, 2025

My initial question was an honest one, and one from an admittedly limited assessment of your writing. In retrospect, I would accept that it was perhaps clumsily worded. I briefly tried doing a search on your website for something about God’s existence, but didn’t see any hits that looked obviously related. I may well have missed some that were.

Pro-Social Behavior:

You said, “Now, in respect to pro-social behavior, no moral realm is necessary. All you need is a society with various emotional dispositions. To act compassionately in such a society, you simply need to try to accommodate that constellation of emotions. Difficult, yes, but that is the goal, and such a goal needs no kind of morality. And there is no obligation.”

It’s interesting here that, right off the bat, you quite naturally suggest the need for compassion toward and accommodation of others. You say “that is the goal, and such a goal needs no kind of morality.” But isn’t such a goal a kind of morality? Indeed, why do we even find ourselves thinking there should be some goal here at all? A goal implies intentionality. On your view, why isn’t it sufficient that we simply experience an emotion apart from any obligatory intention to act on it?

You say, “there is no obligation.” But that conflicts with ChatGPT’s observation:

“While [the statement, “That might include killing one to make others happy, no problem.”] is intended to highlight the absence of moral constraints in a realist sense, it risks being misread as endorsing utilitarian killing. A better phrasing might make it clear this is descriptive, not normative.”

Thus, ChatGPT implies there is indeed an obligation to be recognized, namely, literally killing one person to make others happy is immoral. Note, any moral obligation proposed by artificial intelligence cannot be based on an emotional disposition.

Moreover, your Answer #1 could well have been said by a guard at Auschwitz:

“I really like people. Based on my emotions I would try to ensure all the people I liked were happy. That might include killing one to make others happy, no problem. But once again, there are my emotions and no evidence of a coherent moral realm.”

Given that context, according to ChatGPT such a view is immoral.

If there is no obligation, then it would follow that there is no right to impose a norm. Thus, you should agree that efforts to oppose and squelch Nazi objectives were wholly unjustified.

ChatGPT observes: “Phil sidesteps Steve’s demand for a “justifiable authority” to enforce norms by rejecting the premise that any such authority is needed. Instead of who has the right to impose norms, he reframes the issue as whose preferences win out in practice. This shift is philosophically sharp.”

Should we really believe it is philosophically sharp to reframe the issue as whose preferences win out in practice? The questionable end result here is that the view “might makes right” then becomes the norm, whether actively pursued or passively accepted.

You claim I am “illegitimately trying to make [you] a moralist.” I would say your own comments are self-refuting and expose the fact that you are indeed, and inescapably, a moralist.

As for ChatGPT’s observations, I would suggest that while AI tools might be able to observe and report on interactions between humans, such observations will always be artificially generated and should not be thought of as an objective third party.

Cheers.

Reply
1. Phil Stilwell
  
  April 13, 2025
  Steve, let me attempt to represent your position as fairly and charitably as possible before I respond:
  
  You are engaging critically with my position as a moral anti-realist, particularly my claim that no moral realm exists and that notions like obligation are illusory. You see this as problematic, and your concerns appear to revolve around five interwoven points:
  
  Normativity in Disguise:
  You observe that, although I deny the existence of obligation, I still speak of goals, such as the accommodation of emotional constellations in a given society. To you, such language smuggles in normative content. A goal implies intentional direction—a “should”—which, even if derived from emotion, resembles moral prescription. You’re asking whether my disavowal of obligation is coherent in light of my expressed intentions to act compassionately or prosocially. In short, you’re questioning whether my framework covertly reintroduces a kind of morality under another name.
  
  Descriptive Statements with Prescriptive Force:
  You point to statements I’ve made—such as one involving the hypothetical willingness to kill one person to make others happy—as examples of where the lack of obligation could lead to morally troubling conclusions. Even if I meant these hypotheticals descriptively, you argue they carry a prescriptive danger. You also note that ChatGPT, in interpreting my words, seemed to register a tension between my anti-realist stance and the reader’s likely normative reaction. This, you suggest, implies that even an AI system detects implicit obligations in such scenarios—obligations that I claim do not exist.
  
  The Shift from Justification to Power:
  You take issue with what you see as my reframing of ethical authority—not in terms of justification, but in terms of outcome. Rather than asking who has the right to impose norms, I’ve allegedly reframed the issue as whose preferences win out in practice. You interpret this as a form of “might makes right,” whether actively pursued or passively accepted. This, you argue, is not just philosophically ungrounded but socially dangerous, as it reduces ethical discourse to a contest of influence rather than a search for legitimate justification.
  
  Unavoidable Moral Commitments:
  You contend that my position may be self-refuting. Even though I claim to reject moral realism, you believe that my language and behavior suggest I am operating with moral assumptions nonetheless. Terms like “compassion,” “accommodation,” and “pro-social behavior” suggest evaluative preferences that resemble moral commitments. You argue that it’s nearly impossible to speak about interpersonal goals, social harmony, or objectionable actions without making some form of normative claim. Thus, I may be, in practice, a moralist—whether or not I accept that label.
  
  Distrust of AI as Arbiter:
  Lastly, you raise a concern about relying on ChatGPT’s interpretations. You suggest that AI, as a non-human entity, may offer observations about human discourse but does so without grounding in reasoned value or moral reasoning. Therefore, it should not be treated as an objective third party capable of rendering judgments on the presence or absence of obligation.
  
  Before I reply substantively to your concerns:
  
  Would you say the summary above captures your argument accurately?
  Have I represented your key points fairly, or is there anything I’ve misunderstood or mischaracterized?
  
  Once you confirm, I’ll be happy to offer a detailed response.
  Reply
Steve H.

April 13, 2025

Yes, Phil. I’d agree that correctly represents what I said. Thanks.

Reply
1. Phil Stilwell
  
  April 14, 2025
  
  Good. I’ll now offer a set of direct, point-by-point counterarguments to your concerns. I appreciate the clarity and earnestness of your response, Steve.
  
  1. On Whether Goals Imply Morality
  
  You’re right to observe that I articulate goals—such as the accommodation of others’ emotions—and you ask whether this sneaks in morality. However, a goal does not require obligation. I may pursue the goal of making others comfortable because I’m emotionally inclined to do so, not because I believe I must in some objective or prescriptive sense.
  
  A goal merely reflects preference under limited information and incentives, not an endorsement of a normative “ought.” For example, preferring quiet over noise doesn’t entail a moral imperative for silence. Similarly, my interest in compassion is descriptive of my disposition, not a universal prescription. It is a prediction of behavior, not a judgment about its cosmic rightness. What I value does not impinge on your behavior in any way. But a general sensitivity towards the values of others is demonstrably a happier way to live than ignoring the emotionally-derived values of others.
  
  2. On Descriptive Language and “Dangerous” Hypotheticals
  
  The comment regarding “killing one to make others happy” was plainly a descriptive hypothetical to illustrate that, under moral anti-realism, decisions are made based on emotional calculus rather than appeals to asserted objective moral truths. This does not imply endorsement, any more than describing the psychology of a murderer implies approval of murder.
  
  The emotional recoil people feel when hearing such hypotheticals is evidence of evolved psychological mechanisms—not of ontologically real moral laws. That ChatGPT or any agent detects “immorality” in such statements reflects the pattern recognition of emotional aversion, not the detection of obligation. Even if it feels wrong, the feeling itself is what is being explained—not validated as a moral law. While I see much evidence for emotions and emotions-derived values, I have never encountered an internally coherent moral system.
  
  3. On “Might Makes Right” and the Nature of Norm Imposition
  
  You suggest that my reframing collapses into “might makes right.” I understand the concern. However, the point I made is not that domination is justified—it is that domination is what happens, and pretending that there’s a metaphysical referee who can resolve the legitimacy of one preference over another is an illusion. The language of “rights” and “oughts” gives a veneer of legitimacy to what, in practice, is simply competing desires with differential leverage. Coherent societies are realized when common emotionally-derived values of individuals result in laws and behavioral standards that are accepted by the majority. This consensus might be called “might“, but such might remains detached from actual obligation.
  
  Importantly, describing norm dynamics this way does not entail approval of the outcome. It means we must work within the emotional and social terrain we inhabit, persuading others through empathy, reason, or solidarity—not by appealing to invisible absolutes.
  
  4. On the Alleged Self-Refutation of Anti-Realism
  
  You claim that because I use terms like “compassion” or “accommodation,” I must be presupposing moral realism. Nope. These terms, in my usage, are emotionally descriptive and behaviorally predictive, not morally prescriptive.
  
  To say “I prefer kindness” is not to say “You ought to be kind.” It’s to say “Here’s how I’m likely to act, based on the social-emotional makeup of the community I value.” There is no contradiction here. The language of kindness or cooperation only becomes “moral” if you import moral realism into the semantics of these terms.
  
  If you take “compassion is good” as a descriptive shorthand for “compassion tends to foster emotional flourishing,” then the appearance of moral implications disappears. There is no moral obligation, only pragmatic advantage to acting compassionately.
  
  5. On AI as a Commentary Tool
  
  Your skepticism about AI is well-taken, and I would never appeal to ChatGPT as an arbiter of philosophical truth. In fact, I’ve found that a fun and intellectually healthy exercise is debating AIs on various positions. However, its interpolations of moral content reflect only the conventions found in its training data. In other words, you and I should treat AIs as we would any other fallible interlocutor. However, paying attention to the track record of successes among AIs will inform the degree of confidence we place in their future outputs.
  
  The sentence you quote from ChatGPT—“a better phrasing might make it clear this is descriptive, not normative”—was a linguistic suggestion, not a moral correction. The AI was attempting to help clarify intent, not to adjudicate rightness.
  
  Final Thoughts
  
  At the heart of your concerns appears to be a noble desire to resist the flattening of human value into mere contest, and I share that emotional aversion. But anti-realism does not entail apathy. It simply refuses to dress emotional imperatives in the costume of objectivity. I can fiercely oppose cruelty, work to shape social behavior, and support compassionate policies—all without invoking an imagined realm of moral facts.
  
  If that makes me, in your eyes, a “practical moralist,” I would only insist we understand that as shorthand for “emotionally motivated agent,” not someone who believes in a metaphysical realm of moral truths. I hold that nearly all references to moral facts or dispositions reduce to emotions, once scrutinized. Either that or the blind obedience reflected in those who would not hesitate to hack infants into pieces if asked by a perceived deity. This article is relevant: https://freeoffaith.com/morality/
  
  Let me know which points, if any, you feel I have misunderstood or inadequately addressed. I’m happy to continue refining the conversation.
  
  Reply
Steve H.

April 15, 2025

The appreciation is mutual, Phil. You are clearly a deep thinker (and prolific writer!). I’m glad to have had this opportunity to delve into the weeds on a topic about which we are both passionate. Thank you.

While reading your comments, I can’t help but think of these two quotes:

“Any argument for moral skepticism is going to be based upon premises which are less obvious than the reality of moral values and duties themselves, and therefore it can never be rational to accept moral skepticism.” ~ Atheist philosopher, Louise Antony

“Objective moral imperatives can only be issued by a competent moral authority.” ~ Christian apologist, philosopher, and theologian, William Lane Craig

I think both those statements are true.

It seems to me your arguments demand a level of mental gymnastics beyond what is obvious, unjustifiably reducing morality to a matter of mere preferences. That’s not how I experience morality, and I doubt anyone else does. The moral experience goes deeper than the realm of emotion. If it all boils down to shared emotions, then justice becomes an illusion – yet another emotion.

And, some things are just wrong, and always have been, regardless of context. Plain and simple.

I’ll bow out here. Thanks again for a very thought-provoking discussion. I wish you well!

Reply
1. Phil Stilwell
  
  April 15, 2025
  I’ll leave you with one final thought—a direct response to Louise Antony’s quote, followed by an analogy that I hope captures the essence of our disagreement.
  
  You quoted Louise Antony:
  
  “Any argument for moral skepticism is going to be based upon premises which are less obvious than the reality of moral values and duties themselves, and therefore it can never be rational to accept moral skepticism.”
  
  This is a striking claim—but I think it mistakes emotional salience for epistemic clarity.
  
  Yes, the feeling of moral wrongness—say, when we see cruelty or betrayal—is deeply vivid. But so is the feeling that time flows uniformly, or that the sun revolves around the Earth, or that consciousness is indivisible. Emotional experiences create powerful cognitive intuitions—but history shows us that these intuitions often fail us.
  
  Antony’s assertion rests on the idea that the felt certainty of morality should override any skeptical argument. But we would not—and should not—apply this principle elsewhere. If we did, we’d never have made progress in physics, psychology, or neuroscience. Our ancestors felt that the mind must be immaterial, that diseases came from sin, and that slavery was divinely ordered. Should we have deferred to their intuitions because they were more “obvious” than any skeptical premises?
  
  In fact, the history of human thought is largely the story of overcoming the obvious.
  
  Here’s the analogy:
  
  Imagine living in 14th-century Europe. A child falls gravely ill. The entire village is certain: this is the work of a witch. The child had been healthy, and now suddenly is not. That emotional shock demands an explanation. The theory of witchcraft grounded in a fictional domain of magic isn’t merely believed—it feels true. It accounts for suffering, identifies a villain, and unites the community in righteous opposition.
  
  To suggest otherwise—to say that no magical realm exists, that there’s no spell, that illness has a natural cause—isn’t just seen as wrong, but as dangerous, unfeeling, and naive. The emotional force of the belief is its justification. Witchcraft explains evil. It makes suffering feel less arbitrary.
  
  But we now know better: the witch was never there. The suffering was real, but the cause dependent on a domain of magic was not.
  
  Likewise, I submit that morality—objective morality—is our era’s “witchcraft.” The experience of injustice feels real, so we posit a metaphysical realm of morality to house that feeling. The emotional force of our indignation leads us to mistake projection for perception.
  
  It’s easy to forget that our moral intuitions are deeply shaped by evolution, culture, and psychology. What seems timeless (“slavery is evil”) was once widely accepted. What now feels obvious (“equality is good”) was once condemned. Our moral reactions are real—but their supposed referents in an external realm are not.
  
  We no longer need witches and a fictional domain of magic to account for illness. And we no longer need a fictional domain of morality to account for compassion, cooperation, or outrage. These are human emotions—powerful, predictive, and deeply meaningful—but they do not imply a hidden domain of moral facts.
  
  If you ever want to interrogate my moral anti-realist position more deeply, a useful approach would be to test whether I remain consistent across emotionally charged or ethically complex situations. Rather than debating the abstract metaphysics of morality, you could simply ask me how I would respond, think, or frame specific cases without invoking any objective moral realm.
  
  Here are some illustrative scenarios you could introduce to see whether I am fully committed to moral anti-realism:
  Scenarios for Testing Moral Anti-Realism
  
  The Child Torture Thought Experiment
  “Would you say that torturing a child for fun is morally wrong? Or just something you emotionally oppose?”
  
  The Compassionate Nazi Guard
  “If a Nazi guard genuinely believed he was promoting the well-being of society, is he ‘wrong’ in any non-emotional sense?”
  
  The Isolated Island Culture
  “Suppose an isolated culture practices ritual violence that outsiders find horrific. Do you believe they are wrong in any way, or merely different?”
  
  The AI Dictator
  “Imagine an AI seizes global power but guarantees peace and happiness by eliminating dissenters. How would you evaluate this outcome without appealing to objective moral rules?”
  
  The Plea from a Murderer
  “If a murderer says, ‘My emotions led me to do it, and I don’t accept any moral realm that says I’m wrong,’ is there anything left to say besides ‘I abhor what you did’?”
  
  Your Own Child’s Harm
  “If someone gravely harms a loved one, would your condemnation be based on emotional rage alone, or would you say they deserved punishment in a non-emotional, realist sense?”
  
  Universal Agreement
  “If 100% of humanity agreed that a certain action is evil, would you say that action becomes morally wrong, or still just widely opposed emotionally?”
  
  Historical Regression
  “If humanity suddenly began to justify slavery again, would you then argue that slavery has become immoral? Or would you continue to argue against it purely from emotional revulsion?”
  
  Each of these cases invites tension between emotional instinct and ontological restraint. If I respond consistently without appealing to any transcendent or obligation-laden realm, that’s evidence I take moral anti-realism seriously—not just as a theory, but as a lens through which I evaluate all such cases.
  
  And I would hope that the consistency in my responses allow you to perceive the fact that morality is an invented domain emergent of raw emotions.
  
  Thanks again, Steve. I truly appreciate the intellectual exchange.
  Reply