The following video features a commentary on a recent Jordan Peterson video in which he interacts with a room-full of atheists. Below that will be a treatment of the major arguments made in the commentary.

The following section contains a treatment of the major arguments in the commentary. An attempt is made to reflect likely responses from Christian apologists and to respond to those counterarguments.

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◉ Argument 1: The Bible’s Endorsement of Slavery Undermines Claims of Its Anti-Slavery Stance

A. Restatement of Alex’s Argument

Alex argues that Jordan Peterson’s claim that the Bible, particularly the Exodus narrative, teaches that slavery is wrong is a misreading of the text. He points out that while God liberates the Israelites from Egyptian slavery, this act is specific to God’s chosen people due to His covenant with Abraham, not a universal condemnation of slavery. The Hebrew Bible, including Leviticus 25 and Exodus 21, explicitly condones and regulates slavery, allowing Israelites to own non-Israelites as inheritable property for life and even permitting limited forms of Hebrew slavery (indentured servitude). Alex emphasizes that these passages provide detailed instructions on how to own slaves, contradicting Peterson’s assertion that the Bible inherently opposes slavery. He further notes that the Bible’s failure to explicitly denounce slavery, combined with its use to justify slavery historically, weakens any claim that it provided a clear foundation for abolitionism, which only gained traction thousands of years later during the Enlightenment.

B. Likely Counterargument from a Christian Apologist

An upper-tier Christian apologist, such as William Lane Craig or John Lennox, might argue that Alex’s critique takes the biblical texts out of their historical and cultural context. They could contend that the slavery described in the Hebrew Bible was not equivalent to modern chattel slavery but was a regulated system of servitude common in the ancient Near East, often involving debt repayment or war captives. Leviticus 25 and Exodus 21, they might say, impose restrictions to protect slaves, such as the release of Hebrew servants after six years and penalties for killing slaves, reflecting improvement over surrounding cultures. The apologist might further argue that the Exodus narrative establishes a theological trajectory toward human dignity, as God’s liberation of the Israelites implies a divine preference for freedom. Over time, this trajectory, rooted in the biblical concept of humans being made in God’s image (Genesis 1:26-27), inspired Christian abolitionists like William Wilberforce to oppose slavery, showing that the Bible’s moral framework ultimately led to its rejection.

C. Rigorous Counterargument to the Christian Apologist

The apologist’s appeal to historical context and a moral trajectory does not adequately address the Bible’s explicit endorsement of owning humans as property, which is considered by many indefensible regardless of cultural norms. Leviticus 25:44-46 permits lifelong slavery of non-Israelites, allowing them to be bequeathed as inheritable property, a practice indistinguishable from chattel slavery in its dehumanization. The regulations in Exodus 21, such as freeing Hebrew male slaves after six years, exclude women and children, who remain enslaved, and even allow permanent enslavement of men through coercive means (e.g., withholding family unless the slave agrees to lifelong servitude). These distinctions based on ethnicity and gender undermine claims of a universal moral improvement. If the Bible intended to establish a trajectory toward abolishing slavery, it could have explicitly condemned the practice, as it did with polytheism or idolatry, rather than providing instructions that enabled its perpetuation. The apologist’s reliance on later Christian abolitionism ignores that the Bible was equally used to justify slavery for centuries, as seen in the American South, and that abolitionist movements coincided with secular Enlightenment ideals of equality, not solely biblical principles. The concept of humans made in God’s image is too vague to serve as a clear anti-slavery mandate, especially when the text itself sanctions treating certain humans as property.

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◉ Argument 2: God’s Commands of Genocide Contradict Christian Ethics

A. Restatement of Alex’s Argument

Alex argues that the Bible’s depiction of God commanding genocide, such as in 1 Samuel 15:3 where God orders the slaughter of Amalekite men, women, children, infants, and animals, is incompatible with Christian ethics, which emphasize love and non-violence. He challenges Peterson’s suggestion that these commands must be contextualized within the broader biblical narrative, asking what context could justify such acts. Alex notes that the Amalekite genocide is framed as divine punishment for a battle 400 years prior, which does not justify targeting innocent infants. He contrasts God’s harsh treatment of the Canaanites with the guidance given to sinful Israelites, highlighting an apparent unfairness. Alex asserts that if Christian ethics are defined by the Bible, God’s commands of genocide create a contradiction, as they violate the behavioral standards Christians claim to uphold, making Peterson’s contextualization defense inadequate.

B. Likely Counterargument from a Christian Apologist

A Christian apologist might respond, as William Lane Craig has, that God, as the author of life, has the moral authority to command the destruction of entire groups if it serves His divine purposes. They could argue that the Canaanite and Amalekite cultures were irredeemably corrupt, practicing idolatry and child sacrifice, posing a spiritual and moral threat to Israel’s covenant relationship with God. The command to destroy them, including children, ensured the purity of Israel’s worship and prevented future corruption, while also serving as divine judgment. The apologist might claim that the children’s deaths were merciful, granting them eternal life with God rather than a life in a depraved culture. They could further assert that the Bible’s broader narrative, culminating in Christ’s teachings of love and self-sacrifice, reframes these Old Testament events as part of a progressive revelation, where God’s ultimate moral character is revealed in the New Testament, aligning with Christian ethics.

C. Rigorous Counterargument to the Christian Apologist

The apologist’s defense fails to resolve the contradiction between God’s genocidal commands and Christian ethics, which prioritize love and the sanctity of life. The claim that God’s authority justifies killing innocent children assumes divine commands are inherently moral, but this renders morality arbitrary—if God can command genocide, any act could be deemed moral, undermining the concept of an objective moral standard Christians claim to uphold. The assertion that Amalekite children were better off dead ignores their inherent right to life and assumes an unverifiable afterlife outcome, which is unconvincing to those questioning the text’s ethics. The cultural corruption argument is also weak, as infants cannot be culpable for their society’s sins, and the Bible does not depict God offering them redemption, unlike the Israelites. The progressive revelation defense is problematic because it implies God’s earlier commands were morally deficient or misunderstood, raising questions about the reliability of scripture. If the New Testament’s ethics supersede these commands, why include them in the canon as divine instruction? The apologist’s position also sidesteps Alex’s point about fairness: the Israelites received prophets and laws for correction, while the Amalekites faced annihilation, suggesting a moral double standard incompatible with an all-loving God.

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◉ Argument 3: Peterson’s Definition of God as the Fundamental Value Leads to Philosophical Inconsistencies

A. Restatement of Alex’s Argument

Alex critiques Peterson’s definition of God as the foundational value in a hierarchy of preferences, arguing it leads to philosophical inconsistencies. Peterson claims that God is, by definition, the ultimate value guiding moral actions, but Alex highlights a problem raised by Zena: if different people have different foundational values, this implies multiple gods, contradicting Peterson’s apparent monotheism. When Peterson suggests some foundational values are valid (approximating God) and others invalid, he introduces criteria like iterability and breadth of application to judge them. Alex argues this creates a dilemma: either these criteria are more fundamental than the foundational value (undermining its status as God), or they themselves are God, but iterability and breadth of application are inadequate definitions of divinity. Alex concludes that Peterson’s definitional approach makes the claim that morality requires God trivially true but philosophically empty, as it fails to resolve how to evaluate competing fundamental values without introducing further values that challenge the definition.

B. Likely Counterargument from a Christian Apologist

A Christian apologist might defend Peterson’s approach by arguing that his definition of God as the foundational value aligns with classical theism, where God is the ultimate source of all value and meaning. They could assert that Peterson’s criteria of iterability and breadth of application reflect attributes of the true God, such as eternality and universality, which distinguish valid foundational values from invalid ones. The apologist might claim that human differences in foundational values result from imperfect perceptions of the one true God, not the existence of multiple gods. Drawing on Augustine or Aquinas, they could argue that all humans seek the ultimate good (God), but sin or ignorance leads some to misplace their ultimate value in lesser goods. The apologist might further contend that Peterson’s framework avoids the naturalistic fallacy by grounding morality in a transcendent source, unlike atheistic systems, and that the Bible provides the narrative context (e.g., Christ’s life) to identify the true foundational value.

C. Rigorous Counterargument to the Christian Apologist

The apologist’s defense does not resolve the logical inconsistencies in Peterson’s definition. If God is the foundational value, introducing criteria like iterability and breadth of application to judge its validity implies these criteria are more fundamental, contradicting the claim that God is the ultimate value. If, instead, these criteria are attributes of God, they must be part of the foundational value itself, but Peterson’s examples are too abstract and utilitarian to equate with the personal, transcendent God of classical theism. The apologist’s appeal to human misperception of the one true God assumes a singular divine reality, but Peterson’s framework allows for multiple foundational values, each potentially valid as a “god” for different individuals, leading to a form of polytheism or relativism incompatible with monotheism. The claim that the Bible clarifies the true foundational value is also problematic, as it reintroduces the issues of slavery and genocide, which conflict with the attributes (e.g., love, justice) the apologist ascribes to God. Furthermore, grounding morality in a transcendent source does not address Alex’s point that Peterson’s definition renders the God-morality link tautological, lacking substantive content. An atheistic system could equally posit a foundational value (e.g., human flourishing) without requiring a divine label, and Peterson’s failure to justify why his criteria are uniquely divine leaves the framework philosophically vulnerable.

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◉ Argument 4: Peterson’s Refusal to Engage with Hypotheticals Undermines Constructive Dialogue

A. Restatement of Alex’s Argument

Alex argues that Jordan Peterson’s refusal to engage with hypothetical scenarios, such as the classic thought experiment about lying to Nazis to protect Jews hiding in an attic, hinders meaningful philosophical discussion. Peterson dismisses the hypothetical as a “game” and insists he would avoid such a situation altogether, which Alex finds evasive. He contends that this avoidance prevents Peterson from clarifying his moral stance, particularly on whether lying could be justified to save lives, a question central to ethical debates. Alex notes that Peterson’s response—that being “steeped in sin” leads to such dilemmas—sidesteps the question and contradicts the Christian emphasis on redemption, which should allow for moral action even in compromised situations. This refusal, Alex suggests, reflects a broader issue with Peterson’s approach in the debate, where he avoids direct answers, leaving his beliefs unclear and frustrating interlocutors.

B. Likely Counterargument from a Christian Apologist

A Christian apologist might defend Peterson’s reluctance by arguing that hypothetical scenarios, like the Nazi example, oversimplify complex moral realities and can be manipulative, designed to trap the respondent into conceding a point. They could claim Peterson’s focus on avoiding such situations aligns with a Christian ethic of proactive moral living—emphasizing personal responsibility to prevent moral dilemmas through virtuous choices, as seen in biblical teachings like “flee from sin” (1 Corinthians 6:18). The apologist might argue that Peterson’s reference to being “steeped in sin” highlights how sinful choices compound to create moral quagmires, and his approach encourages individuals to align with God’s will early to avoid such conflicts. They could further assert that engaging with hypotheticals risks diluting the Christian call to transform one’s life holistically, rather than debating abstract scenarios detached from real-world context.

C. Rigorous Counterargument to the Christian Apologist

The apologist’s defense fails to justify Peterson’s outright dismissal of a standard philosophical tool. Hypotheticals like the Nazi scenario are not manipulative traps but rigorous tests of consistency, widely used in ethical philosophy to clarify principles. Peterson’s claim that he would avoid such situations is unrealistic, as historical realities like Nazi Germany show that even morally conscientious individuals can face unavoidable dilemmas. The apologist’s appeal to proactive virtue ignores that Christianity, through teachings like redemption and forgiveness (e.g., 1 John 1:9), explicitly addresses how to act in imperfect circumstances, yet Peterson avoids this application. His “steeped in sin” response implies a deterministic view that undermines free will and redemption, central Christian doctrines. By refusing to engage, Peterson not only stalls dialogue but also fails to demonstrate how his moral framework applies to real-world complexities, weakening his position as a public intellectual claiming to bridge faith and reason.

Why This Argument May Not Deserve Full Treatment

This argument, while significant, is less central than the three primary ones because it focuses on Peterson’s rhetorical style rather than substantive theological or ethical claims about the Bible or God. It overlaps with Alex’s broader critique of Peterson’s evasiveness, particularly in the third primary argument about his definitional approach to God, where lack of clarity is a recurring theme. The hypothetical scenario debate is also context-specific to the Jubilee format, making it less universally applicable than the slavery, genocide, or God-as-value arguments, which engage directly with biblical texts and philosophical principles. Alex spends less time developing this point compared to the others, treating it as an example of Peterson’s frustrating debate tactics rather than a standalone critique.

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◉ Argument 5: Peterson’s Definition of Belief as Action-Oriented Is Problematic

A. Restatement of Alex’s Argument

Alex critiques Peterson’s definition of belief as something you “stake your life on” and “live for and die for,” arguing it is overly dramatic and leads to confusion in the debate. He initially agrees with Peterson’s idea that true belief is reflected in actions, not just words, using the example of carrying an umbrella despite claiming it won’t rain. However, Alex challenges Peterson’s escalation to requiring willingness to die for a belief, as seen in the exchange about believing in a pen’s existence. Alex argues this standard is impractical—people can believe mundane things (e.g., a chair exists) without being willing to die for them, and lying to save one’s life doesn’t negate belief. He suggests Peterson’s definition muddies the discussion, as it shifts from clarifying belief in God to an extreme criterion that doesn’t align with everyday understanding, contributing to the debate’s lack of progress.

B. Likely Counterargument from a Christian Apologist

A Christian apologist might support Peterson’s action-oriented definition of belief, arguing it aligns with biblical faith, which demands commitment beyond mere intellectual assent. They could cite James 2:17 (“faith without works is dead”) to assert that true belief manifests in actions, even to the point of sacrifice, as seen in martyrdom stories or Jesus’ call to “take up your cross” (Matthew 16:24). The apologist might argue that Peterson’s emphasis on staking one’s life reflects the radical commitment Christianity requires, distinguishing it from superficial belief. They could claim Alex’s counterexample (lying about a pen) trivializes the discussion, as Peterson’s focus is on ultimate beliefs like God, where willingness to sacrifice aligns with the biblical narrative of faithfulness under persecution.

C. Rigorous Counterargument to the Christian Apologist

The apologist’s defense overextends Peterson’s definition, which fails to account for the spectrum of beliefs people hold. While biblical faith may emphasize action, equating all belief to a willingness to die is philosophically untenable and misrepresents everyday epistemology. People hold many true beliefs (e.g., a chair’s existence) without requiring life-or-death commitment, and lying under duress, as in Alex’s example, doesn’t negate belief but reflects pragmatic choice. The apologist’s reliance on martyrdom ignores that even devout Christians may prioritize survival (e.g., Peter’s denial of Jesus in Matthew 26:69-75) without ceasing to believe. Peterson’s definition also creates a false dichotomy: either you’re willing to die for a belief, or it’s not a belief, which excludes nuanced cases and stalls discussion on God’s existence by shifting focus to an extreme criterion. This rigidity undermines Peterson’s ability to engage with atheists who define belief more conventionally as cognitive assent, making his approach less philosophically robust.

Why This Argument May Not Deserve Full Treatment

This argument is less deserving of full treatment because it is a subset of the broader issue of Peterson’s unclear definitions, already addressed in the third primary argument about God as the foundational value. The belief-as-action critique is specific to a single exchange and doesn’t engage directly with biblical or theological issues, unlike the slavery and genocide arguments. Alex spends limited time on this point, using it to illustrate Peterson’s debate style rather than as a core critique. Its overlap with the third argument’s focus on definitional confusion reduces its standalone significance.

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✓ Other Potential Arguments and Why They Deserve Less Attention

The transcript contains other points that could be construed as arguments, but they are either too minor, repetitive, or tangential to warrant full analysis:

1. Peterson’s Ambiguity About Being a Christian: Alex notes Peterson’s refusal to identify as a Christian despite participating in a debate framed as “one Christian vs. 25 atheists,” arguing it’s unfair to participants expecting a clear Christian perspective. This is a procedural critique of Peterson’s participation rather than a substantive philosophical or theological argument. It’s subsumed under the broader issue of Peterson’s evasiveness, addressed in the third primary argument and the hypothetical scenario critique above.
2. Atheists Accepting Christian Morality Without Foundational Stories: Alex briefly engages with Peterson’s claim that atheists accept Christian morality but reject its foundational stories. He doesn’t develop this extensively, and it’s overshadowed by the slavery and genocide arguments, which directly challenge the moral coherence of those foundational stories. This point lacks depth in the transcript to stand alone.
3. Peterson’s Emotional Reactions: Alex comments on Peterson’s apparent irritation or hostility in responses (e.g., calling a participant a “smartass”). This is a critique of demeanor rather than a substantive argument about theology or ethics, making it too minor for full treatment.
4. Cultural Evolution of Morality: Alex briefly disputes Peterson’s claim that Judeo-Christian morality drove the abolition of slavery, arguing it was more tied to Enlightenment-era cultural evolution. This is a secondary point within the slavery argument (first primary argument) and doesn’t require separate treatment, as it’s already addressed in the critique of the Bible’s anti-slavery stance.

These points are less central because they either lack the depth of Alex’s primary critiques, are context-specific to the debate’s dynamics, or are derivative of the main arguments about slavery, genocide, and Peterson’s definitional approach. The five primary arguments initially selected focus on the most substantive issues—biblical morality and Peterson’s philosophical framework—while the two additional arguments above, though noteworthy, are narrower in scope or redundant. Alex’s emphasis on slavery, genocide, and the value hierarchy aligns with his core aim to challenge Peterson’s theological and ethical claims, making these the most deserving of detailed analysis.

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