➘ #31 Source Article

◉ A plain English walkthrough of the Master Proof above.

Step 1–6: Bayesian Setup

We start by noting that the live options are Christianity, Islam, or neither. Mariam assigns nearly equal prior weight to the first two and a smaller probability to neither. When we calculate the posterior odds using Bayes’ theorem, we see that ambiguous evidence—things both religions can interpret similarly—does not break the tie. Also, because many testimonies are correlated socially, the effective number of independent pieces of evidence is smaller than it looks. Together, this leaves Mariam in a state of epistemic ambiguity: her evidence doesn’t clearly favor Christianity over Islam.

Step 7–9: Ambiguity and God’s Love

We introduce a principle (P1): if God is truly loving, then a nonresistant seeker—someone sincerely trying—would not be left in paralyzing ambiguity. But in Mariam’s case (P2), she is both nonresistant and caught in ambiguity. That gives us the first conclusion (C1): either God is not loving in the traditional sense, or punishing Mariam cannot be justified.

Step 10–12: Proportionality of Punishment

We add another principle (P3): any just punishment must be proportional to the offense. Eternal punishment (P4), however, is radically disproportionate when the “error” is simply failing to pick the right religion under symmetric evidence. From these, we derive a second conclusion (C2): Mariam’s eternal punishment would be unjustified.

Step 13–15: Social Determinants of Belief

We further note (P5) that people’s religious commitments are strongly shaped by uncontrollable factors—where they’re born, their family, their culture. And (P6) when outcomes are shaped by uncontrollable factors, a person’s blame is limited. Thus, (C3) punishing Mariam eternally would again be unjustified.

Step 12–19: The Reductio Subproof

Here we explicitly model the contradiction.

• Assume for the sake of argument that God is both loving (LG) and just (J).
• Then assume Mariam is eternally punished (EP).
• From this, it follows she is punished, and by justice her punishment should be proportional.
• But eternal punishment is by definition not proportional for finite epistemic mistakes.
• We’ve reached a contradiction: Mariam’s punishment is both proportional and not proportional.
• Therefore, our assumption that she is eternally punished must be false.
• This yields the conclusion: if God is loving and just, Mariam cannot be eternally punished.

Step 23: Generalization

Finally, we generalize. Mariam’s case is not unique. For any nonresistant agent (NR) who finds themselves in ambiguity (Amb), eternal punishment (EP) would clash with the very idea of a loving and just God. So the final conclusion states:

If God is both loving and just, then no nonresistant person caught in ambiguity will face eternal punishment.

This proof shows that eternal punishment for people like Mariam is incoherent under the claim of a loving and just deity. The contradiction isn’t in Mariam’s reasoning—it’s in the theological model that tries to pair God’s love and justice with eternal punishment under ambiguity.

◉ Narrative Summary

The structure of the argument begins with Mariam’s epistemic situation. The religious landscape she faces is not one where one tradition clearly dominates the evidence. Christianity and Islam each present overlapping claims, testimonies, and interpretive frameworks. The prior plausibility she assigns to both is nearly equal, and when the available evidence is carefully examined through Bayesian reasoning, no decisive advantage emerges. Much of the testimony that might seem powerful is correlated socially, reducing its weight once we correct for dependence. What remains is a state of symmetry: the evidence does not push strongly in favor of either Christianity or Islam. Mariam, therefore, stands in genuine epistemic ambiguity, despite her sincere and nonresistant effort to proportion belief to the strength of the evidence.

The question that follows is whether a loving God could permit this state to exist. If God is truly loving, then those who seek in good faith should not be left without a clear path. Yet Mariam’s situation shows the contrary: she is earnest, nonresistant, and still caught in ambiguity. This forces a dilemma. Either God is not loving in the sense traditionally claimed, or punishing Mariam for her failure to resolve the ambiguity would be unjustified.

A second line of reasoning concerns the proportionality of punishment. Any just system of sanctions requires that punishments be proportionate to the offense. Eternal punishment, however, is radically disproportionate if the error at stake is nothing more than failing to identify the correct religion when the evidence is nearly balanced. Mariam’s epistemic error, if it is an error at all, is finite, constrained by the limits of her circumstances. To attach infinite consequence to such a finite misstep is to violate the most basic principle of proportional justice. From this it follows that eternal punishment, in her case, cannot be justified.

A third consideration arises from the role of social determinants in belief formation. People do not choose the cultural contexts into which they are born, nor the families, traditions, and networks that shape their horizons. Belief, especially in religious matters, is profoundly conditioned by these uncontrollable variables. When outcomes are heavily shaped by such factors, responsibility is correspondingly limited. Mariam’s beliefs are not the product of defiance or resistance but of the circumstances that defined the scope of her inquiry. Punishment for what is largely out of her control cannot be reconciled with the concept of justice.

These strands converge in a reductio structure. Suppose, for the sake of argument, that God is both loving and just, and that Mariam is nonetheless eternally punished. Eternal punishment entails that Mariam is indeed punished, and if justice is in place, that punishment must be proportional. But eternal punishment, by its very nature, is not proportional when applied to finite epistemic mistakes. We arrive at a contradiction: Mariam’s punishment would have to be both proportional and not proportional. The contradiction dissolves only if we reject the assumption that she is eternally punished. Therefore, under the assumption of a loving and just God, Mariam cannot be eternally punished.

The conclusion extends beyond Mariam herself. Her case is representative of countless others who, through no fault of their own, find themselves caught in religious ambiguity. If God is both loving and just, then no nonresistant seeker in such a position could be consigned to eternal punishment. The framework of love and justice is fundamentally at odds with the idea of infinite sanction applied to those whose only failing was the unavoidable uncertainty of their evidence.