9 responses to “Biblical Faith”

1. 

   Ryan Stohldrier

   December 21, 2025

   [Biblical faith, as presented in the New Testament, is primarily concerned with conviction in divine authority, rather than rational belief founded on evidence.]

   False dichotomy. Biblical faith, as presented in the New Testament, is primarily concerned with conviction in divine authority on the basis of rational belief founded on justification. You are confusing, I believe, justification with forensic evidence. Forensic inquiry presupposes skepticism, for one has to scrutinize everything and a conclusion must be formed only through careful analysis. However, we know that most of our beliefs are not obtained this way.

   Let’s suppose I have a daughter who has just died: she stopped breathing, her face and limbs turned pale, etc. Then someone shows up hours later, lifts her up by the hand, and she is eating and drinking and dancing around. There may be the questions that pop into my mind of Who (is this man), What (just happened), Where (did he come from), How (did he do it), and Why (would he do it); but chances are that while my curiosity would be there, my forensic inquiry would not be there. Let’s further suppose that this man claimed to be God. That claim matches my experience thus far, so my belief would be justified by evidence. This lines up with several of the Biblical narratives.

   Now, a third party comes along and says, “what proof have you that your daughter was actually dead? How do you know that this wasn’t just some magician? How do I know that this wasn’t some elaborate conspiracy? What proof have you?” I would simply reply: my daughter was dead and now she is alive, that man did it, that man claimed to be God – until I see evidence to the contrary, my belief is justified; but to an outsider, there would be no evidence except for the daughter being alive.

   That is the problem with your claim. You are looking at this as a third party saying there’s no evidence; but the people in Bible times had tons of evidence – mostly through stories. Did you count how many times it says that “word about Him spread all throughout the region”? You need to think more critically about this.

   [Verses such as John 20:29, where Jesus praises those who believe without seeing, underscore a theological point that belief in God or Christ is valuable precisely when it is held without the need for empirical proof.]

   Here again, you must apply your critical thinking: “without seeing” who/what? In John 20:29 there are a couple of ways this could be read based on the context: 1) blessed are those who have not seen [my risen body] and yet have believed, 2) blessed are those who have not seen [the works that I have done, but have read/heard about them] and yet have believed. I am sure there are plenty more ways that could be read based on the context, but you have not applied such hermeneutics and critical thinking, which has led you to erroneously believe that He is calling for blind faith.

   [This passage and others like it reject the notion of proportional belief, where evidence should correspond to conviction. Instead, faith is framed as a kind of moral or spiritual virtue, a test of loyalty and trust that goes beyond the need for verification.]

   Thomas walked with Jesus and saw Him feed 5,000 men (plus women and children) with loaves and fishes far too numerous, saw Him work all manner of miracles, and heard Him prophecy that He would raise from the dead after 3 days. That’s plenty of evidence to believe that He would do such a thing. What Jesus was asking for was a rational belief based on experience – again, not blind faith.

   [Romans 4:18 describes Abraham as having faith against hope, meaning that he believed God’s promise despite all the evidence to the contrary. This form of faith is explicitly anti-empirical, resting not on the fulfillment of promises already seen but on the hope that divine promises will eventually come to pass, irrespective of the present lack of evidence.]

   Let’s try a syllogism: [P1] If God created the world ex-nihilo, then God can create a baby from an aged body. [P2] If God is good, He keeps His promises. [P3] God created the world ex-nihilo and God is good. [P4] God promised me a child; [C] therefore, God will give me a child.

   While Moses did not record Abraham speaking a syllogism (which would have been evidence of a forgery, btw), the implied logic should be clear to a rational mind; therefore, Abraham was rational to believe God.

   [For instance, in John 6:30, Jesus’ audience asks him to perform more signs so that they can believe, yet this request for evidence is implicitly seen as a lack of genuine faith.]

   Again, I appeal to critical thinking. If I already prove to you proposition P, and then you ask me later on in a crowd to prove P, then it would be reasonable to believe that you have an ulterior motive, would it not? Furthermore, the demand to prove P after P has already been proven is itself an irrational request and should be dismissed. Furthermore, the demand to prove P after P has already been proven most likely points to manipulation. Yes, it is seen as a lack of genuine faith because it has to be proven over and over again, ad nauseum.

   [Belief in the resurrection, the central tenet of Christianity, is expected to be accepted on the basis of faith in testimony, even though it is an extraordinary claim that would normally require extraordinary evidence.]

   Again, I appeal to critical thinking. In Jewish custom and culture, the Law states (Deut. 19:15) “on the evidence of two or three witnesses a matter shall be confirmed.” By their evidentiary standards, the testimony of the witnesses (sent out in pairs or trios) was evidence. By western standards after the enlightenment, we would not accept this; however, for the culture in those days, that was accepted as sufficient evidence. On top of that, in Acts 17:11 we read “Now these were more noble-minded than those in Thessalonica, for they received the word with great eagerness, examining the Scriptures daily to see whether these things were so.” Here, this group of believers were lauded for their critical thinking and looking for evidence (so to speak). They were called more noble because they sought verification! Let this be a lesson to you: just because the text does not explicitly state that people looked for evidence doesn’t mean that they didn’t.

   [Verses like Hebrews 11:1 present faith as “confidence in what we hope for and assurance about what we do not see.” This is a direct rejection of the idea that belief must correspond to the degree of evidence.]

   This English translation, when taken in context with Hebrews 10:38-39, is a poor translation. A more accurate translation, based on the Greek and the context would be “Now [trust in God] is the [foundational support] for what we anticipate, the conviction of affairs we cannot see.” When taken in context, it is easy to see that this is not an exhaustive philosophical definition of faith, but a nuanced description of faith.

   [For instance, in John 2:23-24, many people believe in Jesus because of the signs he performed, but the passage goes on to say that Jesus did not fully trust them because “he knew what was in each person.” This implies a kind of inferiority of belief based on evidence, where those who only believe because of signs are viewed with skepticism.]

   This is a wildly irrational conclusion! First, skepticism implies a lack of certainty (one questions everything). If Jesus knew what was in each person, skepticism would not apply at all. Furthermore, the text does not say in what way He knew what was in each person. Your claim is just ridiculous – unless you want to show how a kind of inferiority of belief was implied. I see no implication whatsoever. I only see a non-sequitur.

   [Similarly, Luke 16:31 shows Jesus stating that even if someone were to rise from the dead, some people still would not believe, further illustrating the New Testament’s devaluing of evidence-based belief.]

   No, this only shows the truth that some people will refuse to believe things even when presented with evidence. We see this all the time. Psychological attachment to beliefs can very easily lead to irrationality in people who want to retain their beliefs. Your conclusion here is also a non-sequitur.

   Reply
   1. 

      Phil Stilwell

      December 21, 2025

      Ryan, your response attempts to bridge the gap between ancient text and modern rationality, but it relies on several logical maneuvers—specifically equivocation, anecdotal distraction, and a loosening of the definition of rational belief—that ultimately fail to reconcile the New Testament’s demand for binary “faith” with the requirements of a rigorous epistemic framework. Your words are in the quote boxes.

      ➘ [Biblical faith, as presented in the New Testament, is primarily concerned with conviction in divine authority, rather than rational belief founded on evidence.]

      False dichotomy. Biblical faith, as presented in the New Testament, is primarily concerned with conviction in divine authority on the basis of rational belief founded on justification. You are confusing, I believe, justification with forensic evidence. Forensic inquiry presupposes skepticism, for one has to scrutinize everything and a conclusion must be formed only through careful analysis. However, we know that most of our beliefs are not obtained this way.

      Your assertion introduces an immediate equivocation between “belief,” “faith,” and “conviction.” You attempt to pivot the conversation toward “justification” as if it is distinct from the degree of evidence. In a rational framework, justification is not a separate category from evidence; it is the product of evidence. To say a belief is “justified” is to say that the degree of credence one holds in a proposition maps accurately to the strength of the available data.

      Furthermore, you attempt to normalize lower epistemic standards by pointing out that “most of our beliefs are not obtained” via forensic inquiry. This is a common but fallacious appeal to common practice. While humans are frequently prone to cognitive biases and heuristic shortcuts in daily life, these lapses do not redefine the nature of rationality. Rationality requires that our credences move in the direction of the evidence. When the Bible demands a binary “yes/no” commitment (as seen in John 3:18) regardless of the specific weight of the data, it is promoting an epistemic vice, not a “pro-social” or “compassionate” intellectual humility.

      

      ➘ Let’s suppose I have a daughter who has just died… Then someone shows up hours later, lifts her up by the hand, and she is eating and drinking and dancing around… Let’s further suppose that this man claimed to be God. That claim matches my experience thus far, so my belief would be justified by evidence. This lines up with several of the Biblical narratives.

      Now, a third party comes along and says, “what proof have you that your daughter was actually dead? … I would simply reply: my daughter was dead and now she is alive… but to an outsider, there would be no evidence except for the daughter being alive.

      Your anecdote serves as a distraction from the comprehensive survey of the text. While a single dramatic event might provide high local evidence for the witness, the New Testament consists of over 500 references to pistis and pisteuō, the vast majority of which do not involve the observer personally witnessing a resurrection. You are prioritizing a hypothetical anecdote over a statistically significant data set that shows the biblical text routinely rewards belief that is untethered from evidence.

      Even in your example, the leap from “this man performed a miracle” to “this man is the Creator of the Universe” is a massive jump in credence that far outstrips the evidence of the singular miracle. A rational observer might assign a higher probability to “this man has unknown biological powers,” but assigning a probability of 1.0 (certainty) to “this man is God” based on one event is irrational. More evidence provides warrant for more belief; however, the Bible demands total “conviction” (a binary term) even when the evidence is second-hand or non-existent.

      

      ➘ [Verses such as John 20:29, where Jesus praises those who believe without seeing, underscore a theological point that belief in God or Christ is valuable precisely when it is held without the need for empirical proof.]

      Here again, you must apply your critical thinking: “without seeing” who/what? … you have not applied such hermeneutics and critical thinking, which has led you to erroneously believe that He is calling for blind faith.

      I do not make the accusation of “blind faith” in the colloquial sense, but of unsupported belief. The critique is focused on the degree of mapping. If your degree of belief does not map to the degree of the evidence, you are being irrational to that exact extent.

      In John 20:29, Jesus explicitly identifies a “blessing” (a positive value judgment) for those who believe without the very evidence Thomas requested. By praising the absence of evidence as a catalyst for belief, the text creates a hierarchy where evidence-free belief is more “virtuous” than evidence-based belief. You must substantiate why a “creator of rationality” would incentivize the loosening of epistemic standards. To call this “nuanced” is merely to use a descriptive term to mask an underlying logical incoherence.

      

      ➘ Thomas walked with Jesus and saw Him feed 5,000 men… That’s plenty of evidence to believe that He would do such a thing. What Jesus was asking for was a rational belief based on experience – again, not blind faith.

      You are cherry-picking the high-water marks of the narrative to ignore the broader pattern. Even if Thomas had seen previous miracles, the claim “I have risen from the dead” is a new proposition. In any other domain of life, “he did something amazing yesterday” is not sufficient evidence to accept “he defied entropy and decomposition today” without verification. The demand for more evidence is never irrational. It is the only mechanism by which we avoid being deceived. Rebuking Thomas for wanting to verify a specific, extraordinary claim is a direct rejection of the principle that belief should correspond to the degree of evidence.

      

      ➘ [Romans 4:18 describes Abraham as having faith against hope… This form of faith is explicitly anti-empirical…]

      Let’s try a syllogism: [P1] If God created the world ex-nihilo, then God can create a baby from an aged body. [P2] If God is good, He keeps His promises. [P3] God created the world ex-nihilo and God is good. [P4] God promised me a child; [C] therefore, God will give me a child.

      While Moses did not record Abraham speaking a syllogism… the implied logic should be clear to a rational mind; therefore, Abraham was rational to believe God.

      This syllogism is a textbook example of retroactive justification. You are assuming the truth of the premises (P1, P2, and P3) which are themselves the very propositions that require evidence. Abraham’s belief was “anti-empirical” because the observable data (biological infertility due to age) pointed toward a specific conclusion, yet he chose to hold a credence of 1.0 in the opposite conclusion based solely on a “promise.”

      A promise is not evidence of the thing promised; it is merely evidence that a claim was made. For Abraham to be rational, his belief in the outcome should have remained low until the outcome manifested. Elevating “hope” to the level of “assurance” (as in Hebrews 11:1) is an epistemic failure. You also use terms like “virtue” and “good” here; as a moral non-realist, I must point out that these are unsubstantiated claims. You have yet to substantiate a “moral” system that justifies why irrationality should be considered a “virtue.”

      

      ➘ [For instance, in John 6:30, Jesus’ audience asks him to perform more signs so that they can believe, yet this request for evidence is implicitly seen as a lack of genuine faith.]

      If I already prove to you proposition P, and then you ask me later on in a crowd to prove P, then it would be reasonable to believe that you have an ulterior motive… the demand to prove P after P has already been proven is itself an irrational request.

      This is logically flawed. The request for more evidence can never be irrational. In a Bayesian sense, every new piece of evidence (E) updates the probability of the hypothesis (H). Even if I have seen “Sign 1,” seeing “Sign 2” through “Sign 100” continues to increase the warrant for my belief.

      To condemn a request for more evidence as a “lack of faith” is to admit that the system cannot withstand continued scrutiny. If the goal is truly “pro-social” truth-seeking, more evidence should always be welcomed. The “ulterior motive” you suggest is a psychological projection intended to disparage the skeptic rather than address the epistemic validity of their request.

      

      ➘ On top of that, in Acts 17:11 we read “Now these were more noble-minded than those in Thessalonica, for they received the word with great eagerness, examining the Scriptures daily to see whether these things were so.” Here, this group of believers were lauded for their critical thinking and looking for evidence.

      The Bereans are frequently cherry-picked to suggest the Bible promotes critical inquiry, but their “test” was anything but rigorous. They were not performing scientific experiments or forensic analysis; they were simply checking if the new claims matched their existing Old Testament scriptures.

      This is a form of internal coherence testing within a closed system, not an external validation against reality. Finding a verse in the Old Testament that can be poetically reinterpreted to fit Jesus is not “critical thinking”—it is confirmation bias. There was no rigorous critical analysis or scientific control involved in the Berean “examination.”

      

      ➘ [Verses like Hebrews 11:1 present faith as “confidence in what we hope for and assurance about what we do not see.” This is a direct rejection of the idea that belief must correspond to the degree of evidence.]

      This English translation… is a poor translation… When taken in context, it is easy to see that this is not an exhaustive philosophical definition of faith, but a nuanced description of faith.

      You are attempting to retreat into “nuance” to avoid the sharp edges of the text’s irrationality. However, all “nuanced descriptions” of abstract concepts are, by definition, philosophical. You cannot escape the epistemic implications of the word “assurance” (hypostasis) or “conviction” (elenchos) by calling them “descriptions.”

      Whether you call it a definition or a description, the text is still defining the state of faith as one that possesses “assurance” about things “not seen.” If you have assurance without sight (evidence), you are, by definition, holding a credence that is disproportionate to your sensory or rational data.

      

      ➘ [Similarly, Luke 16:31 shows Jesus stating that even if someone were to rise from the dead, some people still would not believe, further illustrating the New Testament’s devaluing of evidence-based belief.]

      No, this only shows the truth that some people will refuse to believe things even when presented with evidence. We see this all the time. Psychological attachment to beliefs can very easily lead to irrationality…

      I agree that psychological attachment leads to irrationality, but this must be symmetrical. You are only applying this critique in one direction: toward the person who refuses to believe despite evidence. You fail to acknowledge the equal and opposite irrationality: the person who believes despite a lack of evidence.

      The New Testament consistently encourages the latter while condemning the former. If “insufficient belief given the evidence” is irrational, then “excessive belief given the evidence” is equally irrational. The Bible’s “pistis” is a demand for the latter—a binary, total commitment that refuses to fluctuate with the actual strength of the available warrant.

      

      Biblical faith is irrational. ὁ πιστεύων εἰς αὐτὸν οὐ κρίνεται· ὁ δὲ μὴ πιστεύων ἤδη κέκριται ὅτι μὴ πεπίστευκεν εἰς τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ μονογενοῦς υἱοῦ τοῦ θεοῦ. It is binary. No author of rationality would promote a binary belief that does not rigorously map to the evidence. And, because more evidence justified greater belief, any God who desires belief would not condemn requests for more evidence.

      You’re desire to abandon the notion of rational belief is parallel to all other religions in their identical attempt to unmoor belief from evidence to allow for a sloppy, more emotional approach.

      

      Reply
2. 

   Ryan Stohldrier

   December 22, 2025

   Since your whole refutation hinges on a flawed Bayesian approach to epistemology, I will only address one part of your response that is effectively the lynchpin for the rest of your response.

   If I already prove to you proposition P, and then you ask me later on in a crowd to prove P, then it would be reasonable to believe that you have an ulterior motive… the demand to prove P after P has already been proven is itself an irrational request.

   You said: [This is logically flawed. The request for more evidence can never be irrational. In a Bayesian sense, every new piece of evidence (E) updates the probability of the hypothesis (H). Even if I have seen “Sign 1,” seeing “Sign 2” through “Sign 100” continues to increase the warrant for my belief.]

   On the contrary, once proposition P has been sufficiently established relative to context, repeated demands for its re-demonstration—especially in public or adversarial settings—are not epistemically neutral. They can be irrational, redundant, or evidence of bad faith. Allow me to explain.

   In Bayesian framework (which you seem to rely heavily upon):
   If P(H|E1) ≥ threshold for rational acceptance then seeking E2​ is optional, not obligatory.

   If the expected information gain of E2​ is negligible, demanding it can be irrational—especially if the demand itself introduces costs, delays, or bad-faith signaling.

   Bayesianism without stopping rules collapses into epistemic paralysis.

   For example, you go in to have surgery. According to your reasoning, the surgeon occupying the position of surgeon is not enough to perform surgery on you (after all, it may have been 20 years since he graduated medical school). He must demonstrate his skills to you again to prove that he still has the requisite skills to operate on you. But then, according to your statement, even after he demonstrates his skills to you, “the request for more evidence can never be irrational.” So, you are pleased with the surgeon’s demonstration of his skills, but you ask him to do it again, just to verify. Then once he has done it again, you ask him again… your request for the surgeon to repeatedly demonstrate his skills to you ad infinitum would be irrational. Answer this: how many times does the surgeon need to demonstrate his skills before your request becomes irrational? According to your epistemic principle, it never becomes irrational. It is always rational to request him to demonstrate his skills at least one more time… until you never get the required surgery.

   The apostles already saw Jesus raise Lazarus from the dead [E1] and raise the widow’s son from the dead [E2]. Clearly He had the requisite skills: the ability to defy death. How many more times must He prove He can defy death before the apostles are rationally justified to believe He can do it? According to your principle, ad infinitum.

   Further, let’s take the story in John 6. Jesus feeds the 5,000 with 5 loaves and 2 fishes. Later in the chapter, the people demand again that He demonstrate His abilities. According to you, doing the miracle once is not enough – He should have to do it again… and then again… and then again. At what point does Jesus become nothing more than a food distribution center? According to you, the 100th time He feeds them is still not sufficient, for they are always justified in asking Him to repeat it at least one more time. How is this rational?

   Your response ignores a key Bayesian factor: the likelihood of the interlocutor’s behavior.

   Suppose:

   • H: the proposition is true
   • M: the interlocutor is acting in good faith

   If someone repeatedly demands evidence for H after decisive confirmation, then: P(M∣repeated demand)↓

   That is, the behavior itself becomes evidence—specifically, evidence of:

   • motivated skepticism,
   • rhetorical posturing,
   • or refusal to accept rational closure.

   In Bayesian terms, behavior is evidence, and repeated demands lower the posterior probability that the demand is epistemically sincere (as in John 6).

   If the principle were true that:

   “The request for more evidence is never irrational,”

   then no belief could ever be rationally settled, including:

   • belief in induction,
   • belief in Bayesianism itself,
   • belief that more evidence is helpful.

   Why? Because each would require further confirmation ad infinitum.

   This violates:

   • epistemic closure,
   • practical rationality,
   • and the necessity of stopping conditions in belief formation.

   A principle that forbids rational belief termination is epistemically incoherent.

   Finally, it is true that, in principle, additional independent evidence can update a probability distribution. However, Bayes’ theorem is descriptive, not normative. It tells us how beliefs update if evidence is processed—not when it is rational to demand further evidence.

   Crucially, Bayesian rationality presupposes:

   • finite cognitive resources,
   • non-zero costs of evidence acquisition,
   • diminishing marginal returns on confirmation.

   Once the posterior probability of H is already sufficiently high relative to the practical or epistemic context, further evidence may be epistemically redundant.

   At that point, demanding more evidence is not Bayesian prudence—it is Bayesian inefficiency.

   In short, your principle that “it is never irrational to request more evidence” is itself irrational because it leads to an epistemic paralysis. Essentially, you are siding with David Hume in stating that there can never be sufficient epistemic justification for belief. Furthermore, your claim is self-refuting because that claim demands more evidence to prove that it is true, ad infinitum.

   I think you have demonstrated not that Biblical faith is irrational, but your approach to epistemology is irrational; and thus, your rejection of Biblical faith is irrational

   Reply
   1. 

      Phil Stilwell

      December 22, 2025

      Ryan, your latest response confirms my suspicion: you are confusing pragmatic utility (the necessity to act within a physical, high-stakes environment) with epistemic warrant (the degree to which a internal credence maps to external reality). By insisting on “rational closure,” you are essentially demanding that the mind cease its processing of data once the “affective” heart has reached a state of satisfaction. This is a fundamental misunderstanding of how a rigorous observer handles probability.

      “In Bayesian framework… If P(H|E1) >= threshold for rational acceptance then seeking E2 is optional, not obligatory. If the expected information gain of E2 is negligible, demanding it can be irrational… Bayesianism without stopping rules collapses into epistemic paralysis.”

      ◉ The Blunder of Conflating “Acceptance” with “Certainty”

      Your “threshold for rational acceptance” is a psychological construct of convenience, not a mathematical necessity of logic. In a rigorous Bayesian framework, the probability of a hypothesis—P(H)—is a continuous value existing on the open interval (0, 1). It never reaches 1.0 (Absolute Certainty) nor 0.0 (Absolute Impossibility), as those states would require infinite evidence and the total exclusion of all alternative explanations, including those currently unknown to us.

      By using the term “acceptance,” you are smuggling a binary switch into a gradient system. You are suggesting that once a probability reaches an arbitrary point—say, 0.95 or 0.99—we are permitted to flip the switch to “TRUE” and effectively stop looking. This is not Bayesianism; it is Procrusteanism—cutting off the legs of the data to fit the narrow bed of your “conviction.” Seeking E2 (more evidence) is never “irrational” from a purely epistemic standpoint. While it may be “inefficient” for a biological organism with finite time, it is always a net gain for mapping accuracy. To claim that more data is “optional” is to admit that you value the psychological comfort of a “settled” mind more than the rigorous, ongoing labor of a “correct” one.

      

      “For example, you go in to have surgery. According to your reasoning, the surgeon occupying the position of surgeon is not enough to perform surgery on you… He must demonstrate his skills to you again… until you never get the required surgery.”

      ◉ The Category Error: Action vs. Credence

      This is your most significant blunder, Ryan. You are conflating Binary Action with Probabilistic Credence. This is a category error that ignores the “pro-social” necessity of functioning while remaining epistemically honest.

      • Binary Action: I must either undergo the surgery or refuse it. This is a 1 or 0 physical decision required by the constraints of time and biology.
      • Probabilistic Credence: My confidence in the surgeon’s ability may sit at 0.99 based on his credentials and past performance.

      A rational person acts on the 0.99 confidence because the “cost” of inaction (death) is significantly higher than the “cost” of the 0.01 risk of incompetence. However—and this is the critical distinction—the rational person never stops being a Bayesian. If, mid-consultation, the surgeon begins to slur his words or exhibits a tremor, the credence drops from 0.99 to 0.10 instantly.

      If I had “closed” the file and “accepted” his competence as a binary, unchangeable fact (as your “stopping rule” suggests), I would be walking into a death trap because I would be blinded to the new evidence. Your “stopping rule” is actually an epistemic safety hazard. We act on the best available probability, but we never “terminate” the belief-forming process. The fact that I am on the operating table does not mean I have “binary faith”; it means I have made a calculated bet based on a high-probability credence that remains open to immediate revision.

      

      “If someone repeatedly demands evidence for H after decisive confirmation, then… the behavior itself becomes evidence—specifically, evidence of: motivated skepticism, rhetorical posturing, or refusal to accept rational closure.”

      ◉ Pathologizing the Skeptic to Protect the Dogma

      By labeling the request for more evidence as “bad faith,” you are attempting to move the goalposts from the quality of the claim to the character of the observer. You are attempting to place a “moral” blame—a term you have yet to substantiate with anything resembling a logical framework—onto the skeptic rather than addressing the “unsubstantiated” nature of the central claim.

      There is no such thing as “decisive confirmation” for extraordinary claims such as “A human defied entropy and rose from the dead.” In a Bayesian sense, an extraordinary claim has a near-zero prior probability. To move that prior to even a moderate credence would require a mountain of direct, verifiable evidence that simply does not exist in the textual record. Calling the demand for more evidence “rhetorical posturing” is a defensive maneuver. It assumes that the “threshold” of evidence has already been met, but it fails to acknowledge that you are the one setting that threshold at a level that happens to perfectly accommodate your “biblical” narrative. That isn’t logic; it is a circular boundary drawn to protect a specific “affective” preference for a certain conclusion.

      

      “A principle that forbids rational belief termination is epistemically incoherent… you are siding with David Hume in stating that there can never be sufficient epistemic justification for belief.”

      ◉ The Beauty of Non-Closure

      I embrace the comparison to Hume with enthusiasm. Epistemic humility is the realization that our mental maps are not, and can never be, the territory itself. The refusal to “terminate” a belief is not “paralysis”; it is a form of intellectual honesty that acknowledges the fallibility of human perception.

      ➘ A “stopping condition” is a tool for survival, not a tool for truth. We stop looking for more evidence that the floor will hold our weight because we have the “pro-social” necessity of walking across the room to acquire food or shelter. But the moment the floorboards creak or the wood shows rot, a rational mind updates its credence.

      Your “Biblical Faith” (pistis) demands that we stop the update process even when the floor is screaming under the strain. It demands a “conviction” that is intentionally made immune to the next data point. That is the very definition of an epistemic vice. You call it “beauty” and “nuance,” but it is actually the “unsubstantiated” abandonment of the very “compassionate” rationality that allows us to distinguish between a legitimate surgeon and a dangerous charlatan.

      ◉ The Affective Veto: Why “Closure” is an Emotional Demand, Not a Logical One

      Ryan, your insistence on a “stopping rule” reveals that your primary concern is not the mathematical accuracy of your belief, but the emotional cost of maintaining a state of uncertainty. You characterize a lack of closure as “epistemic paralysis,” but this is a psychological diagnosis, not a logical refutation. It is an affective veto—a rejection of a stochastic, probabilistic reality because it feels “brute,” “hollow,” or “unsatisfying” to the human desire for a tidy narrative finish line.

      “Bayesianism without stopping rules collapses into epistemic paralysis… A principle that forbids rational belief termination is epistemically incoherent.”

      ◉ The False Threat of “Paralysis”

      Your “paralysis” argument is a classic straw man. Living with a fluctuating, high-fidelity credence does not prevent a person from making decisions; it simply prevents dogmatism.

      In a “pro-social” and “compassionate” framework, we acknowledge that we must act on incomplete information every day. We don’t need a “binary termination” of belief to walk across a bridge; we only need a high enough credence that the bridge will hold to justify the risk of the crossing. The “paralysis” you fear is actually the loss of the emotional high of certainty. By demanding “rational closure,” you are attempting to justify a “moral” virtue out of what is essentially a cognitive shortcut. You want to feel that your “faith” is a completed task—a badge of “fidelity”—rather than an ongoing, rigorous, and often exhausting commitment to evidence. To a rational observer, “belief termination” is not coherence; it is epistemic laziness rebranded as a virtue.

      “Once the posterior probability of H is already sufficiently high… further evidence may be epistemically redundant… demanding more evidence is not Bayesian prudence—it is Bayesian inefficiency.”

      ◉ The “Inefficiency” of Truth-Seeking

      Calling continued inquiry “inefficient” is a revealing and highly problematic choice of words. It implies that the “goal” of belief is to reach a terminal state—a psychological destination where you can finally stop the labor of thinking and “rest” in your conclusion. In your worldview, the “cost” of evidence acquisition is perceived as too high not because of a lack of time or resources, but because it fundamentally threatens the stability of your “conviction.” You treat belief as a resource to be managed for maximum emotional return, whereas a rigorous likelihoodist framework views belief as a relentless, never-ending pursuit of accuracy.

      In such a framework, there is no such thing as “redundant” evidence. Every new piece of data, no matter how minute, updates the distribution. Even if the shift in credence is from 0.999 to 0.9991, that shift represents a closer, more honest mapping to reality. Your “stopping rule” is not a tool for logic; it is a filter designed to block any incoming data that might move the needle back down. This is the definition of confirmation bias masquerading as “practical rationality.” You have essentially built an irrational “epistemic wall” to protect your “compassionate” desire for certainty from the inherently stochastic and unpredictable nature of the universe. By prioritizing “efficiency,” you are trading truth for a sense of psychological closure.

      

      ◉ The Unsubstantiated “Moral” Anchor

      Your response relies heavily on the unsubstantiated idea that there is a “correct” or “noble” way to hold a belief. You employ terms like “noble-minded,” “good faith,” and “bad faith” as tools of pathologization to categorize those who do or do not accept your arbitrary “stopping rules.” As a moral non-realist, I must point out that these are entirely unsubstantiated claims. You are using “moral” language to disparage the skeptic, yet you have not provided any substantiation for a “moral” system that makes “belief termination” a virtue.

      You would do well to explore the extensive literature on how epistemic normativity—the rules for how one ought to believe to reach truth—is entirely orthogonal to ethical normativity. Why is it “noble” to stop looking for evidence? Why is it “bad” to be a “motivated skeptic”? These are merely labels you apply to protect your own affective preferences. You find the “stochastic” nature of a Bayesian world—where nothing is ever 100% settled and every “pro-social” action is a bet on a probability—to be cold and “brute.” You prefer a world where the claim “God is good” is a binary, terminal fact. However, your preference for a “compassionate” narrative does not make the “stopping rule” a logical necessity; it makes it an emotional crutch designed to shield you from the intellectual demands of a reality that does not offer “moral” closure.Conclusion: The Desire for a “Finished” Map

      Ryan, you are fundamentally confusing a finished map with a reliable map. A reliable map is a dynamic tool; it is one that is constantly being erased, updated, and redrawn as new terrain is discovered and new data is processed. It requires a dispositional account of evidence-proportionate credence—a willingness to let the map change as the world changes.

      A “finished” map, by contrast, is a static artifact that is entirely unavailable to fallible human minds operating in a stochastic reality. By demanding “rational closure,” you are essentially asking for a map that no longer needs to be checked against the world. Such a map is not a guide to truth; it is a tomb for the mind. If you value a “pro-social” and “compassionate” honesty, you must accept that the labor of evidence-mapping is never finished. To terminate the process is to abandon rationality in favor of a comfortable, but ultimately unanchored, fiction.

      

      ◉ A salient example:

      

      Ryan, this infographic visually dismantles the core category error in your epistemology—the confusion between a binary action required by pragmatic necessity and a probabilistic credence required by epistemic honesty, framed in a high-stakes, cinematic environment.

      Look at the left panel (“Pre-Decision State: Epistemic Constellation”). The figure, trapped on a rain-soaked cliff with a massive grizzly bear approaching, is in an urgent, stochastic situation. He possesses zero certainty. Instead, a glowing blue constellation maps his non-binary credences based on the grim evidence: a 25% chance of fighting the bear, a 35% chance of diving into the river, and a 40% chance of crossing the tattered rope bridge. He knows none of these outcomes are guaranteed.

      Now look at the right panel (“Post-Decision State: Rational Binary Choice”). Because the threat is imminent, he must act. He cannot remain in a state of pure contemplation. The rational binary choice is to commit fully to the option with the highest probability of success—the bridge. He physically steps onto the planks, illuminated by the green path of action; this is a 1 or a 0 decision. He is crossing.

      Here is the crucial point you continue to miss:

      Notice the prominent red, locked icon in the top right: “Credence REMAINS 40%.”

      Even though he has fully committed physically to the high-speed action of crossing, his epistemic belief that he will succeed does not rationally increase. Stepping onto the bridge does not magically repair the fraying ropes or strengthen the rotting planks. The probability of success remains exactly what the evidence indicated before the choice: 40%.

      Your concept of “Biblical Faith” (pistis) demands that once the man steps onto the bridge, he must “close the file,” lock the probability at 100% (conviction), and ignore the reality of the danger simply because he made the commitment. That is not rationality; that is affective delusion.

      A rational person bets their life on the 40% bridge because it is the best available option, but they never stop knowing it is only a 40% chance. They remain epistemically open, alert to every snap of a fiber, ready to update their beliefs and actions instantly if new data arrives. Even if they successfully cross the bridge, they cannot retrospectively claim, “There was a 100% chance I would successfully cross.” Your “stopping rule” demands the man ignore the creaking ropes because he has already “accepted” the bridge. That is why your epistemology is a safety hazard.

      Reply
      1. 

         Phil Stilwell

         December 22, 2025

         ◉ The Infinite Gap: Where Biblical Salvation Breaks Epistemic Hygiene

         Ryan, let’s take that imagery of the cliff and the bridge—where a rational person takes a binary action based on a non-binary spread of probabilities—and apply it directly to the theological system you are defending. This is where the rubber meets the road, and honestly, this is where the biblical model breaks down epistemically.

         As we established with our John Wick analogy, a rational person facing imminent danger might commit fully to a 40% probability bridge because it’s their best option. But—and this is critical to their survival and epistemic integrity—they don’t lie to themselves that the bridge is safe just because they are walking on it. Their internal confidence remains matched to the evidence (40%). They stay alert because knowing the actual odds is necessary for survival.

         The problem with the system you are advocating, Ryan, is that the Bible—particularly regarding salvation—demands the precise opposite of this rational hygiene. It doesn’t present salvation as a prudent wager based on the best available data. It presents it as a stark, inescapable binary switch determined by the presence or absence of total conviction.

         Look closely at the unforgiving structure of John 3:18:

         ὁ πιστεύων εἰς αὐτὸν οὐ κρίνεται· ὁ δὲ μὴ πιστεύων ἤδη κέκριται, ὅτι μὴ πεπίστευκεν εἰς τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ μονογενοῦς υἱοῦ τοῦ θεοῦ.

         (“The one who believes in him is not judged; the one who does not believe has been judged already, because he has not believed in the name of the only begotten Son of God.”)

         There are only two categories of humans permitted here:

         1. ὁ πιστεύων (The believing one): Not judged.
         2. ὁ δὲ μὴ πιστεύων (The not-believing one): Already judged.

         Here is the critical flaw: The text has no category for the “rational assessor who accepts there is a ~30% chance Jesus is God, acts accordingly for ‘pro-social’ reasons, but remains intellectually open to the very real possibility that they are wrong.” According to John 3:18, that person falls into category #2. They are “already condemned” because they haven’t met the threshold of total pistis.

         If we treat the historical and textual evidence for Christian claims as that tattered rope bridge (let’s be generous and give it a 30% credence), the contrast is stark:

         • The Rational Response: “The evidence is weak (30%), but the stakes are high. I will step onto the bridge (pragmatic action), but I know the ropes might snap. My credence remains aligned with the evidence at 30%. I am actively looking for reasons I might be wrong.”
         • The Biblical Demand: “Your 30% credence is insufficient; you are already condemned. To be saved, you must not only step onto the bridge, you must also internally convince yourself that the bridge is 100% secure. You must turn probabilistic ‘hope’ into absolute ‘assurance’ (Hebrews 11:1). To doubt the bridge while standing on it is a lack of faith.”

         This is why biblical faith is fundamentally irreconcilable with demonstrably successful epistemic standards like those used in science or rigorous philosophy. Those systems require our confidence levels to track the evidence, rising and falling as new data comes in. They thrive on doubt because doubt is the mechanism that detects error.

         By threatening eternal condemnation for those who “do not believe,” the Bible is not encouraging a search for truth; it is enforcing an epistemic blockade. It demands that you sacrifice the very cognitive tools that allow you to navigate reality successfully. It asks you to replace a dynamic, corrective search for truth with a static, binary, and ultimately brittle “conviction.”

         Is it not absurd to think an alleged author of rationality would encourage and demand irrationality for his favor?

         

         This infographic above visually contrasts the two irreconcilable epistemic systems we have been discussing. On the left, “Successful Epistemic Hygiene” represents the rational, evidence-based approach. Here, John Wick stands on a modern, stable bridge, looking at a data tablet. His credence is at 30%, which aligns with the “Weak Evidence” he is reviewing. He is alert and engaged in a “Continuous Evidence Assessment,” acknowledging the “High Stakes” but refusing to fabricate certainty. His path leads to “Multiple Probabilistic Outcomes,” reflecting a world where truth is a dynamic, ongoing search, and doubt is a necessary tool for detecting error.

         On the right, “Biblical Faith Demand” shows the consequence of the John 3:18 binary. The same man is on a tattered, perilous rope bridge over a fiery chasm, but he is blindfolded and holding a cross. He is forced to pass under an archway demanding “Total Pistis: 100% Assurance.” This represents the “Epistemic Blockade” where doubt is forbidden, and the mind must be forced into a “Static, Fragile ‘Conviction’” regardless of the evidence. The locked stamp at the bottom reads “Already Condemned – Do Not Doubt,” illustrating the inescapable trap of a system that punishes the very rationality required to navigate reality successfully. The “Infinite Gap” in the center emphasizes that these two approaches are not just different; they are fundamentally broken from one another.

         This infographic may be more conceptually accurate and intuitive:

         

         Infographics that reflect Miriam’s honest epistemology:

         

         

         The left panel, titled “Divine Compassion,” illustrates a perspective where God understands the complexity of the human mind and the sincerity of an individual’s search for truth.

         • The Honest Seeker’s Mind: This is represented by a brain, cradled in a hand, showing a probabilistic breakdown of belief rather than a single certainty. In the example of Mariam, her mind holds a mix of “45% Christian Belief,” “45% Muslim Belief,” and “10% Agnostic/Uncertain”.
         • Context Matters: This complex state of belief is not due to “laziness nor malice” but is the result of an “honest search” influenced by diverse factors, such as having a Christian mother and a Muslim father.
         • Judgment Based on Sincerity: This framework suggests that a “just deity” would understand such “complexity of human upbringing, cultural conditioning, and ambiguous evidence”. It questions whether it is just to penalize someone for “sincere striving” and “intellectual integrity” when their evidence does not lead them to absolute certainty in a single faith.

         Dogmatic Judgment: The Procrustean Bed of Certainty

         The right panel, “Dogmatic Judgment,” depicts a framework that demands absolute certainty, likening it to a “Procrustean Bed” where conformity is forced.

         • Forced Conformity: The honest seeker, Mariam, is shown being forced into a rigid mold labeled “ACCEPTED (100% CERTAINTY)”.
         • Rejection of Nuance: In this process, essential parts of her intellectual journey—“Nuance,” “Complexity,” and “Uncertainty”—are violently broken off and discarded. This illustrates a tradition that often demands “absolute certainty” and draws a line at “accepting only one path—no exceptions for sincere, rational plurality”.
         • Condemnation of Uncertainty: A gavel stamps the seeker as “CONDEMNED.” This side argues that “sincere uncertainty is rejected” and “absolute conviction in one path is demanded under threat of eternal condemnation”. In this view, “evidence is secondary to the binary choice” of accepting a specific faith.

         The Central Question

         At the center of the infographic is “The Infinite Gap,” which poses the fundamental theological question: “Is God a loving parent understanding the journey, or a rigid rule-maker demanding binary conformity?”. This reflects the core issue of whether a God who values truth-seeking would punish an intellectually honest person for following evidence that leads to a probabilistic, rather than certain, conclusion. The Bible is very clear on what its God requires. Miriam’s honesty has no place in biblical epistemology.

         Reply
         1. 

            Phil Stilwell

            December 22, 2025

            This is a list of probing questions designed to clarify and scrutinize your epistemic position, particularly in light of the “Miriam scenario” and the concepts presented in the provided infographics. The goal is to understand how your framework handles uncertainty, evidence, and the demand for binary conviction.Probing Questions for Ryan

            1. Defining the “Stopping Rule”: Your position has been associated with a “stopping rule” that dictates when to cease gathering evidence and move to a fixed state of “acceptance”. Can you define the specific, non-arbitrary criteria that trigger this rule?
               • Importance: To understand your justification for shifting from a probabilistic stance to one of certainty.
            2. Handling Post-Commitment Evidence: Once the “file is closed” and a conviction of P=1.0 is reached, how does your epistemic framework account for new, contradictory evidence that may arise?
               • Importance: To determine if your position allows for belief revision in light of new data.
            3. The Fate of Nuance: Does your demand for a “forced binary ‘truth’” necessitate the discarding of data that introduces nuance and complexity into a worldview?
               • Importance: To examine if your position requires an oversimplification of reality.
            4. Comfort over Accuracy: Is the primary driver of your epistemology the desire for the psychological comfort of “affective closure” and a “finished map,” rather than the pursuit of epistemic accuracy in a changing world?
               • Importance: To question the fundamental motivation behind your epistemic choices.
            5. Judging Miriam’s Sincerity: Consider Miriam, who, after a sincere and honest search, holds a 45% credence in Christianity and 45% in Islam. Would your framework conclude that her search was somehow deficient or insincere?
               • Importance: To apply your abstract principles to a concrete case of honest uncertainty.
            6. Divine Justice and Uncertainty: Based on your position, would it be just for a deity to condemn Miriam for her remaining uncertainty, given her “intellectual integrity” and “sincere striving”?
               • Importance: To explore the theological implications of your epistemology regarding divine fairness.
            7. Action vs. Belief: Do you agree with the principle illustrated in the bridge analogy: that making a necessary binary decision to act does not rationally increase one’s underlying probabilistic belief in the action’s success?
               • Importance: To test your understanding of the crucial distinction between pragmatic action and epistemic credence.
            8. Demanding Artificial Certainty: Does your view require that a person, upon making a commitment, must artificially inflate their credence to 100% (“total assurance”) to align with their action?
               • Importance: To clarify if your position demands a disconnect between evidence and belief.
            9. The Epistemic Role of Doubt: In your framework, is doubt viewed as a valuable tool for error correction and navigating a changing reality, or is it seen as forbidden or a sign of instability?
               • Importance: To understand the value (or lack thereof) you place on skepticism and questioning.
            10. Faith as Static Conviction: Does your concept of faith necessitate a “static binary conviction” that renders further evidence irrelevant to one’s fixed path?
                • Importance: To probe the relationship between your definition of faith and the ongoing assessment of reality.
            11. Accounting for Background: How does your epistemology integrate the reality that “human upbringing” and “cultural conditioning” significantly influence belief, as seen in Miriam’s case?
                • Importance: To see if your position acknowledges the external, contingent factors that shape conviction.
            12. Proportional Belief: Do you reject the standard rational principle that “reason demands proportional belief,” where one’s confidence level should match the strength of the available evidence?
                • Importance: To directly confront your views with a fundamental tenet of rational thought.
            13. Finality of Knowledge: Your preference for a “finished map” suggests a belief in attainable, final knowledge. Does this mean you believe one can arrive at a point where no future information could possibly necessitate an update to their core beliefs?
                • Importance: To clarify the scope and perceived permanence of your knowledge claims.
            14. Ignoring Warning Signs: The bridge analogy implies a rational person remains alert to danger even after committing to cross. Does your “stopping rule” require one to ignore the “creaks” of contrary evidence once a commitment has been made?
                • Importance: To test the practical, real-world consequences of your epistemic stance.
            15. Character vs. Certainty: Would you argue that a person like Miriam, who lives a life of “love, kindness, and curiosity” but remains uncertain, is morally inferior to someone who adopts a rigid faith out of “cultural inheritance or emotional conformity”?
                • Importance: To explore the moral weight your system places on doctrinal certainty versus ethical behavior.
            16. Caution as Sin: If an individual explores alternatives and “pulls back to reflect” out of epistemic caution, would your framework categorize that action as “sin” or as “epistemic diligence”?
                • Importance: To see how your position judges cautious, evidence-based inquiry.
            17. Certainty from Fragmentary Data: Given that evidence for grand metaphysical claims is often described as “fragmentary,” how can you epistemically justify a demand for “total assurance”?
                • Importance: To challenge the realism and rationality of demanding absolute certainty from imperfect data.
            18. The Violence of Procrustean Beds: Do you recognize the potential epistemic violence in forcing complex, stochastic reality into a “rigid, rectangular mold” of binary truth, as depicted in the “Procrustean Bed” analogy?
                • Importance: To ask you to reflect on the distorting effects of forcing nuance into binary categories.
            19. Image of the Divine: Does your epistemic view align more closely with the image of God as a “loving parent understanding the journey” of a seeker like Miriam, or as a “rigid rule-maker demanding binary conformity”?
                • Importance: To frame your position within the theological contrast presented in the source material.
            20. Admitting Fallibility: Once you have reached your state of “conviction” (P=1.0) and “closed the file”, does your epistemology allow you to retain the capacity to admit that you might be wrong?
                • Importance: To test the fundamental humility and fallibilism of your stance.

            We can also, if you’d like, discuss real beliefs you have about non-religious topics to explore whether your epistemology varies across domains.

            Reply
         2. 

            Ryan Stohldrier

            December 22, 2025

            I understand your analogy and analysis, but I think you are confusing something. As I read the scriptures, I do not see a requirement of 100% belief; rather, I see a requirement of 100% binary action based on some level of belief. Going back to your John Wick illustration, the decision to take the bridge was a 100% commitment to a 40% belief. He had a 40% belief that the bridge would sustain him; yet, due to “pro-social reasons,” he took the bridge anyway. The bridge represents a binary choice: either you take the bridge or you don’t. This is what I see scripture requiring. Allow me to illustrate this with the scripture you cited.

            John 3:18. Here’s how I read this: “The one who believes in him [belief > 0] is not judged; the one who does not believe [belief ≤ 0] has been judged already, because he has not believed in [rejected] the name of the only begotten Son of God.” Now, your knowledge of Greek is better than mine, so if the Greek makes my interpretation impossible, then please let me know (I am open to learn), but that is how I read it. My understand of God is that He takes whatever level of belief we may have (assuming we have some) and helps us to develop that belief into a full-blown faith. For those who have some degree of belief and are willing to act on it, there is praise. For those who refuse to act due to lack of belief, that is taken as an unwillingness to look for/receive evidence.

            [The Rational Response: “The evidence is weak (30%), but the stakes are high. I will step onto the bridge (pragmatic action), but I know the ropes might snap. My credence remains aligned with the evidence at 30%. I am actively looking for reasons I might be wrong.”]

            Based on my understanding of scripture, this is the kind of faith that is praised in scripture (faith the size of a mustard seed that grows into a full tree).

            I think you have a hidden implied premise that somehow “doubt” is the complete antithesis of belief. I would argue that doubt is merely a sign of an immature faith (a faith that needs to grow). Consider Mark 9:24, “Immediately the boy’s father cried out, ‘I do believe; help my unbelief!’” Jesus doesn’t condemn this poor father for his unbelief. He helps him by restoring his son. Jesus then rebukes his disciples for their lack of faith (in other words, their faith is not at the warranted maturity level – they had already seen more than enough miracles to warrant such a faith – plus, further hermeneutics reveals that part of their lack of faith was that they were only concerned about themselves, but perhaps that teaching is for another time).

            This is a great instance where your gradient of belief actually works with the Bible. You act on whatever level of belief that you have and then that belief grows proportional with the evidence. Many of the people who followed Jesus in crowds witnessed more than one miracle before becoming disciples. Consider Luke 7:22, “So He replied, ‘Go back and report to John what you have seen and heard: The blind receive sight, the lame walk, the lepers are cleansed, the deaf hear, the dead are raised, and the good news is preached to the poor.’” Those who were present at that time saw numerous miracles all in one sitting (more than enough evidence to provide a 40+ grade belief.

            [the fundamental theological question: “Is God a loving parent understanding the journey, or a rigid rule-maker demanding binary conformity?”]

            I would answer that, from what I have seen in scripture, the answer is: a loving parent understanding the journey. If you find scriptures that seem to contradict that hypothesis (H), I am more than happy to consider them and help you to see that the context makes room for H.

            Reply
            1. 

               Phil Stilwell

               December 22, 2025

               This response is a necessary reboot of your position, Ryan. You have effectively abandoned the “stopping rule” epistemology you previously defended and have retreated to a position indistinguishable from pragmatic agnosticism. While this is an epistemic improvement, your attempt to relabel this rational skepticism as “biblical faith” is profoundly sloppy.

               You are attempting to have your cake and eat it too: claiming the epistemic high ground of the rational wager while retaining the theological benefits of absolute conviction. You cannot have both.

               Here is a breakdown of the epistemic sleight of hand in your new argument:1. The Total Collapse of Your Previous Stance

               Up until this comment, your defense of faith relied on the necessity of a “stopping rule”—arbitrarily closing the file on evidence to achieve a state of “conviction (P=1.0)” for affective satisfaction. You defended a system that views the demand for absolute assurance as a virtue and doubt as a defect to be overcome.

               Now, you claim scripture only requires “a 100% binary action based on some level of belief,” even a very low one, just like John Wick.

               Do you realize what you have conceded?

               In the John Wick illustration, the entire point is that even after he takes the 100% binary action, his “Credence REMAINS 40%”. He does not “close the file.” He does not achieve “conviction (P=1.0).” He remains in a state of high stochastics, fully aware the bridge might snap.

               If this is your new definition of biblical faith, then “faith” is no longer “the assurance of things hoped for” (Hebrews 11:1). It is merely a pragmatic wager made under duress by someone who remains largely agnostic about the outcome. If that is your position, you are no longer defending the “Dogmatic Acceptance” depicted in the infographics; you are defending the “Rational Evidence-Based Navigation” side, which acknowledges evidence is fragmentary and certainty is impossible. You can’t claim the rational territory now after spending so much time defending the dogmatic one.2. The Exegetical Absurdity of “Belief > 0”

               Your reinterpretation of John 3:18 to make it fit this new pragmatic stance is epistemically unserious.

               You write: “The one who believes in him [belief > 0] is not judged; the one who does not believe [belief ≤ 0] has been judged already…”

               Ryan, almost everyone on earth has a “belief > 0” for almost anything. A staunch atheist might grant a 1% philosophical possibility that a god exists. Under your new definition, that atheist is a “believer” who is “not judged.”

               This interpretation neuters the text entirely. John 3:18 draws a stark, horrifying line between the saved and the “already condemned”. It is a binary switch, a Procrustean bed that demands conformity. To suggest this text is merely asking for a slightly-above-zero acknowledgment of possibility before taking a pragmatic step is to strip the scripture of its own demands for radical, life-altering pistis (trust/reliance).

               You are trying to redefine “belief” downward to a level so low that it requires no epistemic sacrifice, just to avoid the uncomfortable reality that the Bible demands a certainty the evidence cannot provide.3. The “Growth” Fallacy

               You argue that faith starts small (like the bridge wager) and grows proportional to new evidence (like seeing miracles), citing Mark 9:24 and Luke 7:22.

               If Christian epistemology actually worked like this—where belief scaled perfectly with verifiable evidence and never exceeded it—we wouldn’t be having this conversation. That would just be rational Bayesian updating.

               The problem is the theological requirement for where that growth must end.

               In rational thought, if the evidence gets you to 60%, your belief stops at 60%. In Christian dogma, regardless of where the evidence stops, the believer is eventually required to bridge the remaining gap with “faith” to reach 100% assurance. The “mustard seed” isn’t just allowed to grow into a bush proportional to the evidence; it is commanded to become an immovable oak of “conviction (P=1.0),” artificially closing the file on doubt.

               By pretending this artificial inflation doesn’t exist, you are ignoring the very “stopping rule” you previously defended.Conclusion

               Your new position is that biblical faith is simply taking a pragmatic risk based on weak evidence while remaining epistemically uncertain. If that’s true, then the “procrustean bed” of dogmatic certainty is wrong, and the open-minded, probabilistic seeker is right.

               You have redefined faith so drastically to save it from rational scrutiny that you have defined it right out of orthodox existence. You are now arguing for rational agnosticism dressed up in biblical language. I have little interest to continue dialoguing given the epistemological and scriptural slop you’re posting.

               The concepts are not difficult. But neither are they unavoidable. You can’t contort your way past them. Biblical belief is logically incoherent and not something a God of rationality and honest belief would promote.

               

               Reply
               1. 

                  Phil Stilwell

                  December 22, 2025

                  In a personal chat about the scenario in which a young girl with a Muslim father and a Christian mother, holding a 45% degree of certainty in the truth of Christianity and Islam, and a 10% degree of certainty that neither was correct, Ryan responded:

                  “I don’t believe in the reality of such a scenario.“

                  That was when I acknowledged the dialogue had nowhere constructive to go.

                  

                  

                  ✶ ChatGPT’s Debriefing: How Ryan was able to avoid hard epistemic commitments

                  ✓ Definition drift (“evidence,” “justification,” “faith,” “belief”)
                  Ryan repeatedly re-labeled the target. Early on he says you’re confusing justification with forensic evidence, as if “justification” is some separate category that can float free of evidential weight. That lets him sound evidence-friendly while never cashing out what justifies what, and to what degree.

                  ✓ Anecdotal substitution for the actual evidential base
                  The “my daughter was dead, now alive” story is a classic move: replace your broad, textual-pattern critique with a single high-impact scenario where belief looks obviously warranted. It shifts the debate from what the NT generally demands to what an eyewitness might rationally do in one extreme case.

                  ✓ Scope shifting: epistemic warrant → pragmatic action
                  When cornered on proportional belief, he pivots to “we can’t do forensic inquiry for most beliefs” and later doubles down with “stopping rules,” “costs,” and “practical rationality.” Those are real considerations for action, but he uses them to soften demands for warrant—and to immunize “faith” from scrutiny.

                  ✓ Hermeneutic escape hatches (“could be read as…”)
                  On John 20:29 and Hebrews 11:1 he doesn’t defend a specific reading; he multiplies possible readings and then faults you for not exploring them. That’s a convenient way to avoid committing to the plain sense and avoid staking out a falsifiable alternative.

                  ✓ Threshold smuggling (“acceptance” as a binary switch)
                  His Bayes talk introduced an implicit rule: once P(H|E) crosses some threshold, further requests for evidence become suspect/irrational. But he never pins down the threshold, and he never shows that the NT’s “believe” maps to that threshold rather than something much more totalizing.

                  ✓ Psychologizing the skeptic (“bad faith,” “ulterior motive,” “motivated skepticism”)
                  He tries to turn requests for more evidence into evidence of bad character or bad intent. That moves the argument off the claim and onto the interlocutor’s alleged psychology—useful rhetorically, evasive epistemically.

                  ✓ Cultural relativism as a warrant multiplier
                  He appeals to Deut 19:15 and ancient testimony norms (“two or three witnesses was evidence then”). Even if true descriptively, it doesn’t show the claim is well-supported; it just argues people felt entitled to closure under local norms.

                  ✓ Retreat-and-reframe when pressured (“belief > 0” / “100% action, not 100% belief”)
                  This is the biggest dodge. After defending “stopping rules,” he reboots into: scripture requires only some belief and a binary action. That avoids your “binary credence” critique by redefining “belief” downward to near-zero—without admitting the earlier stance is abandoned. Where you gave him openings (so you can seal them next time)

                  ✓ The absolute “request for more evidence can never be irrational”
                  That sentence handed him a clean reductio (surgeon loop / infinite regress). You meant something like “more independent evidence always has epistemic value,” but he answered the stronger claim you actually wrote.

                  ✓ You let “Bayesianism: descriptive vs normative” become the battlefield
                  He used “Bayes is descriptive, not normative” as a get-out-of-jail card. The debate then risks turning into meta-epistemology instead of (a) what the NT demands, and (b) whether the available evidence rationally supports that demand.

                  ✓ Some motive-claims (“affective veto”) gave him an off-ramp
                  Even if you’re right about the psychology, it invites him to play therapist and deny motives. You’ll do better treating his moves as structural evasions rather than emotional needs. Cut him off at the pass next time: a tight “commitment gate” protocol

                  Post (or paste) this at the start of your next exchange and refuse to proceed until he answers each item in one line.

                  ✓ Gate 1: Operational definitions
                  “By faith/belief in this discussion, do you mean:
                  A) a credence level (0–1),
                  B) a loyalty/action posture,
                  C) both (specify how they connect)?”

                  ✓ Gate 2: Thresholds (no more hand-waving)
                  “If John 3:18 is ‘belief > 0,’ give a number: what minimum credence counts as ‘believes’—0.01? 0.2? 0.6? 0.9?”

                  ✓ Gate 3: Update policy (what would change your mind?)
                  “Name 3 specific kinds of evidence that would lower your credence that Christianity is true (not just ‘I’d consider it’).”

                  ✓ Gate 4: Symmetry test (apply your rule outside Christianity)
                  “Would your same ‘stopping rule’ justify Muslim conviction on Islamic testimony? If not, state the principled difference without special pleading.”

                  ✓ Gate 5: Textual claim must be pinned to a concrete reading
                  “Pick one reading of John 20:29 / Hebrews 11:1 and defend it. No ‘could be read as…’ lists. One reading, with reasons.”

                  If he won’t answer: you say, once, “No commitments, no debate. You’re keeping your position unfalsifiable.” The best “prebuttals” to Ryan’s favorite evasions

                  ✓ On stopping rules:
                  Use this phrasing instead of absolutes:
                  “Stopping rules govern action, not truth-status. I can rationally stop searching because of costs, while still refusing to inflate credence to certainty.”

                  ✓ On ‘repeated demands are irrational’:
                  Force the real question:
                  “Show me that the earlier evidence was (1) independent, (2) reliably transmitted, and (3) uniquely favors your hypothesis over live alternatives. Otherwise ‘repeat it’ isn’t the issue—quality and independence are.”

                  ✓ On ‘bad faith’ accusations:
                  Don’t defend your motives; demand his standard:
                  “What observable criterion distinguishes ‘legitimate request for evidence’ from ‘bad faith’—and would you apply it to someone doubting Islam/Hinduism too?”

                  ✓ On ‘ancient standards of testimony’:
                  One line kills it:
                  “Descriptive acceptance norms don’t convert weak evidence into strong evidence. They only tell us what people were willing to accept.”

                  ✓ On ‘belief > 0’ in John 3:18:
                  Spring the immediate consequence:
                  “If 1% credence counts, then most atheists qualify. If you don’t accept that, you’re admitting a higher threshold—so state it.” A compact reply template you can reuse

                  ✓ “Before we continue: lock in (1) what ‘belief/faith’ is, (2) the minimum credence you think counts as ‘believes’ in John 3:18, and (3) what would lower your confidence. If you won’t commit to those, you’re not doing epistemology—you’re protecting a conclusion.”

                  If you want, paste Ryan’s exact next comment when it arrives, and I’ll mark (a) which dodge it is, and (b) the shortest possible “cutoff” response that forces a commitment.

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